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Voorwoord
Ergens in mijn derde jaar aan de universiteit, tijdens een vak over economisch beleid,
vroeg Prof. Swank, of Otto zoals ik hem nu ken, me of ik wel eens nagedacht had over het
halen van een Ph.D. Als ik mijn bachelor thesis goed deed, dan was er waarschijnlijk wel
een promotie plek op de ESE te vinden. Mijn doctoraal is nu 5 jaar in de maak, blijkbaar
deed ik het goed.
Zoals elk traject op de universiteit wordt de doctoraal studie afgesloten met een
geschrift, een dissertatie. Kijkend naar de 4 hoofdstukken die de mijne vormen, kan
ik enige gemengde gevoelens niet ontkennen. Een van de belangrijkste redenen om een
Ph.D. te doen was het excuus dat het me gaf om op de Uni te blijven en mijn tijd aan
de Erasmus zit er nu op. Hoewel ik weer een volgende universiteit gevonden heb, voelt
na 9 jaar in Rotterdam de Erasmus als de´ Uni. Ook voelen deze 4 hoofdstukken als een
incompleet verhaal. Het omvat ’maar’ 3 van de projecten waar ik aangewerkt heb, geen
aanbestedingen, geen rechten, geen risico in toernooien, of iets van de andere projecten
die ik (nog) niet af heb kunnen maken. Bovenal is er een hoeveelheid trots. Dit boekje
bevat vier artikelen waar ik mijn naam onder, of zoals gebruikelijk in Academia, boven
durf te zetten. Alle vier kunnen ze een bijdrage leveren aan de literatuur en ik hoop dat
ze hun plek snel vinden.
Hoewel dit mijn boekje is, heb ik de artikelen niet alleen geschreven. Ik had het geluk
dat ik aan de Erasmus veel mensen heb kunnen vinden om mee samen te werken. Niet
alleen zijn mijn papers daar beter van geworden, ik had het ook nooit volgehouden als ik
5 jaar lang in mijn uppie op een kantoor had gezeten. Voor hun inzet in het onderzoek en
voor de mogelijkheid om zo nu en dan binnen te vallen ben ik Floris, Bauke, Bert, Rene
en Philip Hans veel dank verschuldigd.
Als het op binnen vallen aankomt heb je aan Floris sowieso een goede. In de afgelopen
jaren zijn we zo vaak bij elkaar het kantoor ingestormd, dat onze kantoorgenoten zich
meer dan eens afgevraagd hebben of we niet beter een plek bij konden zetten. Floris is
degene die me ge¨ıntroduceerd heeft in de wereld van Mirrleesiaanse belasting modellen
en hun eigenaardigheden. Deze eigenaardigheden hebben we onderzocht en dit leverde
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de twee hoofdstukken op die ons beider Job-market paper zouden worden. Na deze twee
papers weet ik een ding zeker, als er een probleem is in deze literatuur dat ik niet samen
met Floris kan oplossen, dan is het een probleem dat ik niet kan oplossen (al zou het me
niet verbazen als het hem later als nog lukt). Dit is een samenwerking waarvan ik hoop
dat we hem nog lang doorzetten, ook al zullen we het nu over een paar grenzen heen
moeten doen.
Bauke was behalve mijn coauteur ook mijn begeleider. Sinds mijn master scriptie is
hij bezig geweest me bij te sturen. Dit deed hij niet door elke week te kijken of ik wel
genoeg geschreven had, maar door er te zijn als ik om hulp vroeg. Aangezien ik eigenwijs
genoeg ben om dat niet al te vaak te doen, moest hij zo nu en dan vragen waar ik mee
bezig was om zeker te maken dat het mijn dissertatie was en niet iets anders. Deze
losse begeleidingsstijl is waarschijnlijk niet voor iedereen geschikt, maar ik zou het niet
anders willen. Ik heb van weinig dingen meer geleerd dan van mijn pogingen om mijn
verschillende onderzoeken aan de gang te krijgen. Bauke gaf me de mogelijkheid mijn eigen
weg te vinden en daarvoor ben ik hem zeer dankbaar. Op de ESE en bij het Tinbergen
instituut ben ik veel mensen tegengekomen die er voor gezorgd hebben dat onderzoek doen
geen eenzame aangelegenheid was. De vakken bij Tinbergen werden een stuk prettiger
doordat ik ze samen kon doen met Rogier, Sven en Oke. Mijn kantoorgenoten Nick en
Jugo en de laatste vier jaar Wim en Saskia zorgden er voor dat er altijd leven was in
het kantoor. Op de gang, in seminars en als ik een probleem wilde bespreken, kon ik
altijd rekenen op de input van Barbara, Otto, Bauke, Suzanne, Dana, Josse, Vladimir,
Otto, Max, Robert, Aart, Benoit, Jurjen, Bas, Olivier, Rey, Kyle, Zara, Heiner en de vele
andere collega’s die het H-gebouw zo’n prettige werkplek maken. Ik ga jullie missen.
Probably the most intense part of my Ph.D. training were the four months I spent at
UC Berkeley at the invitation of Shachar Kariv. For me this was the first real experience
at a university other than the Erasmus, and an amazing experience it was. The campus
life in the US is a bit more impressive than around these parts, more seminars, more
renowned speakers, more international visitors, and an incredible martial arts program
made it a time to remember. I’ve learned a lot from the professors and students in
Berkeley alike, and most of all from John Morgan. He gave me quite the wake-up call
about the academic job market, discussed my research with me, and wrote me a reference
letter for the job market at the end of it all. Although he would have doubtlessly bested
me, I am sorry we never got to play that game of golf.
Een bijzondere groep bij Algemene Economie en Tinbergen vind ik de (adminis-
tratieve) staf. Zoals zoveel academici ben ik organisatorisch een beetje rommelig. Gelukkig
kon ik als ik een deadline had, een computer probleem had, iets raars had met een ex-
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perimenteel lab, of gewoon hulp nodig had, altijd op de staf rekenen. Ik ging langs de
betreffende personen en dan werd er een oplossing gezocht. Na enige aanvaringen met
andere, duidelijk minder hulpvaardige, administraties ben ik heel blij met de hulp die ik
van jullie gehad heb. Marrianne, Milky, Thea, Jany, Ankimon, Arianne, Judith, Carine,
Ine, Caroline, Christina , Sytske, Jan, Urne, Gino en de vele anderen, zonder jullie hulp
over de jaren heen had ik het waarschijnlijk een stuk zwaarder gehad en ik had in ieder
geval ergens vertraging opgelopen, dank voor alles.
Op het persoonlijke vlak zijn het ook een paar interessante jaren geweest. Zonder de
steun van mijn ouders, Alex en Joke, mijn zus, Linda, en mijn vriendin, Jacq, had ik
de eindstreep nooit gehaald. Ondanks dat jullie niet altijd volgden waar ik inhoudelijk
mee bezig was, waren jullie bereid om mijn monologen aan te horen en waar mogelijk
te helpen. Misschien nog wel belangrijker, jullie waren er altijd om me met beide benen
op de grond te houden, zodat ik niet verdwaalde in een wereld van multi-dimensionale
tweede orde afgeleiden. Halverwege de rit kwam er een extra zorg bij. Na de opkomst van
diabetes had ik wel wat tijd nodig te herstellen. Het was erg prettig om te merken dat ik
op de mensen om heen kan rekenen. Mijn vrienden van de scouting, RSG, Lambiekske,
de SV en mijn collega’s (de lijst is iet wat lang om ze een voor een te noemen) hielpen
me de draad weer op te pakken. In het bijzonder heb ik veel gehad aan Evey en Foeke
die me lieten zien dat er goed mee te leven valt en Frank die me mee nam naar Huk-tti.
Op de vloer van Huk-tti, onder Sa Bum Rob Salm en tussen mijn medeleerlingen heb ik
een stuk vertrouwen in mezelf terug gevonden. Kwan Jang Nim, Sa Bum nim, Ko dan Ja
nim, You Dan Ja nim en You Kup Ja nim, Kamsa hamnida!
For the last step towards becoming a doctor, Bauke and I found Arno Riedl, Bas
Jacobs, Jan Potters, Nicola Pavoni, Otto Swank and Victor Maas willing to serve as the
defense committee. Their initial remarks have already improved the essays in this dis-
sertation and their questions at my defense will doubtlessly induce more changes. Thank
you, o highly learned opponents.
Op de job market had ik niet alleen John Morgan’s referentie brief, ook Otto Swank,
Bauke Visser en Bas Jacobs waren bereid om hun vertrouwen in mij op papier te zetten.
Met deze referenties (en de papers met Floris) op zak ben ik naar de job market gegaan.
Ik heb een plek gevonden als Post-doc in Mannheim, een van de beste universiteiten in
Europa en bovenal een plek waar ik de komende jaren verder kan leren, want hoewel ik
mezelf hopelijk snel doctor mag noemen, verwacht ik voorlopig nog niet uitgeleerd te zijn.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
During my time as a Ph.D. student I got interested in phenomena that are most easily
characterized as ’gaming’ behavior. As a society we have developed extensive systems of
rules and institutions to achieve desirable outcomes. These institutions take care of every
aspect of our lives, from the interest we get on the bank, to the distribution of crime
and punishment and the regulation of radio frequencies for the use of tv, radio and cell-
communications. The presence of rules allows us to verify, ex post, whether the correct
procedure was followed, and thus ensure that (governmental) power is not abused. They
create a system in society that can be used to hold people responsible for their behavior
and thus form an essential part of an ordered society.
All these rules and procedures, however, have a flipside; they limit the decision maker’s
flexibility to respond to individual circumstances and thus make his responses exploitable.
By creating predictability in actions, they open up the system to gaming by informed
agents. Because of the sheer size of institutions (like governments and regulated mar-
kets) in most western societies and the importance of institutions in regulating our lives,
gaming can take many forms. In this dissertation, for instance, I look at the possibility
of misreporting in the tax-system as well as spurious investment to distort the quality of
important information. However, similar stories could be made if one looks at the bribery
scandals that plague the FIFA in the current world-cup (not to mention the 2022 one
in Quatar), to lobbying of special interests, to the presence of clearly distorted bids in
procurement procedures. In all cases some party with an interest and private informa-
tion exploits vulnerabilities of the decision making process by strategically presenting (or
hiding) information, or outright buying influence.
For gaming to exist there has to be a clearly defined, regulated decision process. The
process has to be predictable, preferably institutionally fixed, like procedures regulated
by law. This will mean that a researcher interested in gaming, will often encounter the
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law. For someone like me, with a background in both Economics and in Law, the concept
of gaming is particularly interesting; it allows me to combine my background knowledge
from both fields. Gaming is not a topic on its own, instead it is a problem that can
occur in many different settings. This dissertation therefore does not present the reader
with a clear singular topic, instead this booklet contains 4 papers that focus on aspects
related to gaming in one way or another. The first and second chapter are about the
game, they study particular game forms and why these forms are (not) susceptible to
gaming. The third and fourth chapter deal with the players, they study empirically how
people respond to certain stimuli to see whether or not the assumptions we make about
individual behavior are true, or at least close enough to reality to lend our predictions
the necessary credence.
The first two papers focus on the tax-system. Most people will realize that tax avoid-
ance or tax evasion can be constructed as examples of gaming. There is one problem
with this realization however: it ignores the goal of the tax authority. In a situation with
a government that cares for his constituents chapter 2 shows that the constituents, you
and me, should not have a reason to duck our responsibility and game the system. If the
allocation, the distribution of burdens and benefits, is meant to maximize some concave
sum of individual utility, i.e. make us all better off on average, then we all have good
reason to cooperate. In effect it shows that for gaming to be a problem two conditions
have to be met, the individuals have to disagree sufficiently with the one designing the
allocation and they have to have a sufficiently rich set of actions. In short, only if individ-
uals have both reason and opportunity to deviate from the planner’s plan, will gaming be
a problem. Since in most models studied in the literature individuals have neither reason
nor opportunity to deviate, the results show that most solutions found in the literature
are implementable through our tax-system. Because gaming is not a problem in these
models, the optimal distribution can be implemented through a tax-system that does not
use prohibitions or rule-based restrictions, a set of appropriate prices is all that is required
of the planner.
Chapter 3 completes the picture that the previous chapter started. It deals with a
planner that does not want to create incentives for individuals to game the system, but
whose environment is rich enough for individuals to have the opportunity to game his
system. The individuals can differ in many aspects and make many different choices and
the planner wants to steer them towards an allocation that maximizes total welfare. The
differences between people, however, imply that they will not all want to make the same
choices. It is exactly this difference between the choices of different individuals that allows
the designer to identify different individuals and thus assign them different combinations of
3goods and bads. In effect, we show that the entire problem can be seen as an informational
problem. No matter in how many aspects individuals differ and how many choices they
make, as long as the planner wants to design an allocation that identifies individuals’
preferences, the allocation will be shaped by the same forces. These driving forces can
be conveniently summarized by a multiplication of three factors, known as A, B and C.
On such allocations the planner balances the value of information (A) and redistribution
(B) gained by marginally distorting a particular choice, with the efficiency cost of this
distortion (C). The recovery of this formula allows us to produce generalizations of the
famous elasticity approach of Diamond and Saez, a generalization of the Atkinson-Stiglitz
theorem and the no-distortion at the top result, while we provide a partial bridge between
the complex New Dynamic Public Finance and the much studied classical Mirrlees model.
Chapter 4 focuses on some of the most important decision makers in our economic
system, the corporate executives. Especially since the financial crisis of 2008 many discus-
sions in the press and in politics have focused on their role and tasks. A lot of attention
has been given to their salaries, most notably to the bonuses they receive and whether
or not the use of such large bonuses was warranted by their added value. The discussion
also got attention in academia, but here it became a bit single sided in nature. The sci-
entific nature of the discussion sets methodological constraints that limit the discussion.
Due to the difficulties of showing their added value scientifically and the difficulties of
bringing together and properly questioning the executives, they have hardly been part
of the academic discussion. Chapter 4 reports on the results of a survey under Dutch
executives. It combines some of the methodology of experimental economics and survey
research through an internet based dynamic web-page. The web-page remembers the an-
swers given by individual respondents, which allows the researchers to alter the subsequent
questions dynamically, and thus use every bit of information available about the respon-
dents to tailor the questions to the respondent. Our survey first asks about the job of the
individual respondents and then uses the responses given to approach the respondents in
their professional role. Combined with exogenous variation in the questioned asked, this
allows us to show the effects of professional roles on individual decision making, while
diminishing the usual confounding factors of endogeneity and observational biases. The
results of the survey show that, against our own and our respondents’ expectation, in the
boardroom it is the CFO that is most willing to take risk, followed by the CEO and (at
quite some distance) the Non-Executive or supervisory Directors.
The last chapter deals with a direct test of theory. The theory predicts that experts,
informed agents that are hired because they are believed to be capable, will try to manage
their reputation. The public wants to hire the best expert since those have the informa-
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tion needed to make the best decision. This implies being perceived capable means an
expert gets more jobs in the future and thus is a direct career concern. To manage their
reputation these experts need to know what the public expects a capable expert to do.
Since the public can use many signals about an expert’s ability, e.g. prior decisions, public
statements, or the opinion of other experts, this is not a trivial problem. At the other
side of the problem we have the public, faced with the task of finding the most capable
expert they have to weigh in all the evidence, and figure out what signals to trust and
which to ignore. Nash equilibrium requires that while expert tries to make the public
believe he is able, the public tries to undo the manipulation of its believes by accounting
for the manipulation when weighing the evidence. Since there are so many signals to
choose from, this gives both sides a complex task, and it is far from obvious that they the
experts will succeed in using the signals that are valued by the public, while it is equally
uncertain whether the public will understand what signals to use. In our experiment we
allow for a relatively rich information structure, we give half of our subjects the role of
experts that produce signals about their ability, while we ask the other half to judge the
experts. The theoretical predictions clearly indicate what signals should contain informa-
tion about ability, and thus should be used by the public and which should be ignored. In
our experiments the signals that should contain information according to theory clearly
contain more information than the signals that should not. The public responds by plac-
ing more value on the informative signals than on the other signals. Although both sides
clearly deviate from equilibrium predictions, the theory is accurate enough to help us
identify situations in which career concerns can be costly, without having to know what
the correct decision is, that is without access to the information only the experts have.
Chapter 2
When a Price is Enough:
Implementation in Optimal
Tax-Design1
2.1 Introduction
Governments in modern welfare states have developed elaborate systems of taxes, benefits,
and subsidies (further: tax system). These tax systems are designed to raise revenue
for the provision of public goods, to redistribute resources from the fortunate to the
less fortunate, to insure constituents against adverse outcomes when insurance markets
fail, and to correct for externalities. Tax systems combine non-linear tax rates on labor
income, capital income and commodities, with non-linear subsidies on healthcare, housing,
education and other observable choices of the constituents.
The formal study of optimal non-linear tax systems was pioneered by Mirrlees (1971,
1976). In his model agents are heterogeneous in their earnings ability. They make several
observable choices, such as labor income, portfolio and savings choices, and consumption
levels of various goods. The social planner wants to redistribute from agents with high
to agents with low earnings ability. However, earnings ability is private information, and
1This chapter is based on Renes and Zoutman (2014b). We would like to thank Felix Bierbrauer,
Eva Gavrilova, Aart Gerritsen, Yasushi Iwamoto, Bas Jacobs, Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann,
John Morgan, Dominik Sachs, Dirk Schindler, Dana Sisak, Bauke Visser, Casper de Vries and Hendrik
Vrijburg for useful suggestions and comments on an earlier version of this paper. Furthermore, this paper
benefited from comments and suggestions made by participants at the 2011 Nake Conference, Utrecht,
the 2013 CESifo Area Conference on Public Economics, Munich, the 69th IIPF Conference, Taormina; ;
and seminar participants at the Erasmus School of Economics, the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology, the Norwegian School of Economics, the University of Konstanz and the Centre for European
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hence, the first-best allocation is not attainable. Instead, the main problem in optimal
taxation is to find a tax system that implements the social planner’s second-best allocation
in a market-based economy.
The technique, pioneered by Mirrlees, to identify the optimal tax system is to split the
problem into two subproblems. The first subproblem is to characterize the best attainable
outcome given the informational restrictions, the second-best allocation, through a direct
mechanism. The second subproblem is to identify a tax system under which the second-
best allocation is a market equilibrium, and hence, a tax system that implements the
second-best allocation in a market-based economy.
There is an extensive literature that studies the first subproblem and describes the
properties of the second-best allocation. In addition, Mirrlees (1976) proposes to solve
the second subproblem of designing the optimal tax system by equating the marginal tax
rates to the optimal wedge between the marginal rates of substitution and transformation
(further: equating marginal tax rates to wedges). In his model agents differ only in their
earnings ability, such that equating marginal tax rates to wedges yields a separable tax
system in which the marginal tax rate on each good only depends on the consumption
of that particular good. The Mirrleesian tax system has become the canonical solution
in, and has subsequently been applied throughout, the literature on optimal non-linear
taxation (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976, Diamond, 1998, Saez, 2001, Bovenberg and
Jacobs, 2005, and Chone´ and Laroque, 2010).
By equating the marginal tax rate to the wedge, the Mirrleesian tax system solves the
first-order conditions for implementation. However, to the best of our knowledge, general
conditions under which this tax system satisfies the second-order conditions for market
implementation have never been derived. To understand this issue in more detail note
that a tax system can only implement the second-best allocation in the market if no agent
can increase his utility by deviating from the bundle that would have been assigned to him
in the direct mechanism. However, agents typically have more choices available to them
in a market economy than they have in a direct mechanism. In the direct mechanism of
Mirrlees (1976, sect. 3), for example, agents can choose which earnings ability they report
to the planner. Based on this reported ability the planner assigns each agent a bundle
of choice variables, such as labor effort, consumption levels and savings. On the market
the agent can make each of these choices separately, only constrained by his budget. The
combination of these choices allows agents to create bundles that are not available to them
in the direct mechanism. Hence, even if an allocation is incentive compatible in the direct
mechanism and the tax system satisfies first-order implementability conditions, it does not
follow that the tax system implements the allocation in a market economy. The bundles
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that are not part of the second-best allocation are known in the literature as ”joint” or
”double” deviations (see e.g. Kocherlakota, 2005). The potential for these joint deviations
implies that second-order implementability constraints on the market are generally more
stringent than the incentive-compatibility constraints in the direct mechanism.
This issue has not gone entirely unnoticed. Specifically, the principle of taxation de-
rived by Hammond (1979) proves that for any incentive-compatible allocation there exists
at least one tax system that satisfies first- and second-order implementability constraints.2
This tax system stops agents from creating joint deviations in the market by simply pro-
hibiting such deviations. The incentives created by this tax system are mathematically
equivalent to the incentives in a direct mechanism. Hence, incentive compatibility in the
direct mechanism implies implementability through this tax system.
Hammond’s result is of importance to the study of optimal tax systems because it
shows that there always exists at least one tax system that can implement the second-
best allocation in the market. However, restricting the choices of economic agents to the
choices available to them in a direct mechanism effectively removes the benefits of free
choice and limited administrative costs associated with a market mechanism. Therefore,
this tax system has limited appeal to policy makers in market economies.3 Moreover,
the principle of taxation does not tell us whether less restrictive tax systems, like the
Mirrleesian tax system, can implement the second-best allocation.
In addition, in recent literature several papers have focused on identifying the second-
best allocation when agents differ in multiple dimensions (see e.g. Cremer et al. (2001),
Saez (2002a), Kleven et al. (2009), Chone´ and Laroque (2010), Renes and Zoutman
(2014a), Rothschild and Scheuer (2014) and Jacquet and Lehmann (2014)). However,
to our knowledge the second subproblem of designing the optimal non-linear tax system
in these models has not yet been addressed.
In this paper we address this gap in our understanding of tax design. We derive con-
ditions under which the Mirrleesian tax system, and indeed any tax system that satisfies
first-order implementability conditions, successfully implements the second-best alloca-
tion in the market. These results hold independent of the dimension of heterogeneity. In
models of optimal taxation where these conditions apply the optimal tax system follows
directly from the optimal wedges in the second-best allocation. If the planner adjusts
2A similar result has been derived in Maskin (1999) for any countable number of agents.
3The name ’principle of taxation’ stems from later applications of Hammond’s result to taxation by
e.g. Rochet (1985), Guesnerie (1995) and Bierbrauer (2009). However, the principle can also apply
to the multi-product monopolist pricing problem and auction design (see e.g. Armstrong, 1996). In
such a setting the application leads to perfectly realistic implementations, since the monopolist and the
auctioneer can choose what (not) to produce/sell and how to bundle their goods.
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relative prices in the market by equating taxes to wedges, this suffices and the planner
does not need to restrict the choice space of agents in the market.
The analytic starting point of this paper is a set of agents that differ in multiple
continuously distributed characteristics, such as earnings ability and tastes. The agents
make multiple choices pertaining, for instance, consumption levels of several goods and
income from labor and capital. Preferences are described by a completely general utility
function. The economy is guided by a planner who wants to implement a second-best
allocation of which we know three things: i.) it satisfies the economy’s resource constraint,
ii.) it is incentive compatible in a direct mechanism, iii.) it maximizes a general welfare
function under the constraints given by the other two conditions. It is well-known in
the literature that the derivation of the second-best allocation under multi-dimensional
heterogeneity of agents is technically very complex. In the companion paper, Renes and
Zoutman (2014a), we take up this issue and set the first steps towards fully characterizing
the second-best allocation with multi-dimensional heterogeneity of agents. In this paper,
however, we take the second-best allocation as given, and use the common elements of such
allocations to study sufficient conditions for the implementation of second-best allocations
in a market economy.
We first show the relevance of this analysis trough a simple, but instructive example.
The example shows that, even when agents only differ in a uni-dimensional characteristic,
the canonical Mirrleesian tax system may fail to implement the second best. In our
example at least one agent prefers a bundle available to him in the market over the bundle
assigned to him in the direct mechanism. The planner can only implement its second best
by restricting these joint deviations or taxing them at prohibitive rates. Neither the
restrictions nor the prohibitive tax rates can be derived from the second-best allocation.
Hence, in this particular example designing the optimal tax system is significantly more
complex than deriving the second-best allocation.
We proceed by deriving a lemma which describes general conditions under which a
tax system implements the desired allocation using standard micro-economic theory. The
first-order implementation constraints require that marginal tax rates are equal to optimal
wedges. The second-order implementation constraints require that indifference curves are
more convex than budget constraints in all linear combinations of the decision variables.
Economists can use these implementability constraints to verify whether a proposed tax
system implements the desired allocation. That is, after solving the maximization problem
of the planner and formulating the entire tax system, it can be verified whether the tax
system satisfies these constraints for the proposed allocation. Unfortunately, most optimal
allocations in the literature do not have a closed-form solution. Therefore, verification
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of implementation can only be performed in the special cases that have been simulated.
This verification is useful (and necessary) in such simulations, but it does not provide
insights in the general properties of optimal tax systems.
Therefore, our main contribution lies in identifying two classes of optimal tax problems
in which a tax system can always implement the allocation, provided that tax rates are
equated to wedges. In the identified classes joint deviations are never optimal, and hence,
the second-order implementation constraints are automatically satisfied. This implies
there is no need to impose restrictions, or levy prohibitive tax rates, on the choice space
available to agents in the market, and that implementation does not have to be verified
ex post.
The first class of models satisfies the following conditions: i.) the allocation is feasible,
incentive compatible and on the Pareto frontier, ii.) there are no externalities iii.) tax
rates are equated to wedges, and iv.) the resulting tax system does not have an internal
maximum. For this class of problems we show that in any allocation that allows profitable
joint deviations, at least one joint deviation exists which increases the utility of the agent
and weakly increases tax revenue. Such a deviation entails a Pareto improvement over
the original allocation. Hence, the initial allocation could not have been on the Pareto
frontier. For optimal taxation, the most important implication of this first class of models
is that the second-best allocation of a welfarist planner can always be implemented by
equating taxes to wedges, since the second best of a welfarist planner always resides on
the Pareto frontier.
A simple corollary to this proposition shows that the Mirrleesian tax system can
implement the second-best allocation under uni-dimensional heterogeneity of agents. It
follows that a separable tax system can implement the second best in models with uni-
dimensional heterogeneity provided the four conditions outlined above are satisfied.
Intuitively, if the planner is welfarist the preferences of the planner and the agents are
aligned. The objective function of the planner is, ceteris paribus, increasing in the utility of
the agent. Hence, budget-neutral joint deviations that increase the agents’ utility cannot
exist in a market mechanism. It is this property of alignment between the objective of
the planner and the agents that allows the planner to implement its second best through
a relatively simple tax system.
If the tax function has an internal maximum on the allocation, the proposition fails to
apply. Intuitively, from such a maximum a deviation that weakly increases tax revenue
does not necessarily exist. However, most tax systems that result from equating taxes to
wedges are either monotonic or convex in all choice variables and, as such, they usually
do not exhibit internal maxima.
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More importantly, the proposition fails for non-welfarist planners or in the presence
of externalities. The second-best allocation of a non-welfarist planner is not necessarily
on the Pareto frontier (see Kaplow and Shavell, 2001). Similarly, in the case of external-
ities, even if both the utility of the agent and tax revenue weakly increase, this does not
necessarily imply a Pareto improvement, since other agents might be adversely affected
through the externality.
The second class of problems where a tax system that equates taxes to wedges can al-
ways implement the second-best allocation, is when the second-best allocation is surjective
onto the choice space. Intuitively, when each bundle that exists in the market is assigned
to at least one type in the direct mechanism, the agents’ problem on the market is iden-
tical to the agents’ problem in the direct mechanism. Therefore, incentive-compatibility
and implementability constraints coincide. Since we assumed the original allocation was
incentive compatible, it must also be implementable in the market. The prime example
of this class of models is the Mirrlees (1971) model where agents only differ in earnings
ability and their only choice variables are consumption and labor income.
Our main results hold independently of the number of choice variables, and indepen-
dently of the number of characteristics in which agents differ. As such, our results have
strong implications for the extensively studied models of optimal tax design with uni-
dimensional heterogeneity, as well as for the technically more complex study of optimal
taxation under multi-dimensional heterogeneity. Moreover, preferences do not have to
satisfy a Spence-Mirrlees or single-crossing condition, since our results remain valid even
if there is bunching, such that at least two types receive the same bundle, in the optimal
allocation.
The conditions we derive are sufficient conditions, not necessary conditions. There are
cases outside of these two classes for which a mechanism that equates taxes to wedges
(without additional restrictions) suffices to implement the second-best allocation. Imple-
mentation cannot be guaranteed ex ante through our propositions in that case. The two
identified classes, however, are of enormous importance since they encompass virtually
all non-stochastic models based on Mirrlees (1971, 1976) and the generalization of these
models in Renes and Zoutman (2014a) and as a result validate almost all tax systems
proposed in the literature.4
This paper primarily provides a guide to the relatively understudied second step of
optimal tax design. More generally, our results show an imperfect link between direct and
indirect mechanisms. A central planner that perfectly observes choices and can price/tax
4A notable exception is Jacobs and De Mooij (2011) which extends the Mirrlees model with external-
ities.
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them non-linearly, might still want to rely on quotas or legal prohibitions to reach the
second-best allocation. This provides some intuition for the existence of (possibly op-
timal) complexities in the tax systems in modern welfare states. To prevent abuse of
social insurance schemes, a central planner may have to restrict the choices of (potential)
beneficiaries, and force them to study, apply for jobs, or enroll in debt counseling for
instance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 contains an example that shows the potential
problems in implementation. Section 5 derives our main results and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
A large and growing literature has been devoted to deriving second-best allocations under
multi-dimensional heterogeneity. Early examples of multi-dimensional screening problems
include Mirrlees (1976), Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chone´ (1998) and Armstrong and
Rochet (1999), and recently there have been several applications in the optimal taxation
problem, including Cremer et al. (2001), Saez (2002a), Kleven et al. (2009), Chone´ and
Laroque (2010), Renes and Zoutman (2014a), Rothschild and Scheuer (2014) and Jacquet
and Lehmann (2014). The tax systems that implement the second-best allocation in the
market are usually left implicit. This paper complements this literature by guiding the
design of a tax system that implements the second-best allocations in the market.
In recent literature it has become popular to derive the optimal tax system using a
perturbation method (see e.g. Roberts, 2000, Saez, 2001 and Jacquet et al., 2013). With
the perturbation method one can directly derive the optimal tax system in the market
without resorting to the direct mechanism. However, the perturbation method is mainly
applied as a heuristic tool, to find first- but not second-order optimality conditions. More-
over, the perturbation method does not formally show that the derived tax system also
achieves the second-best allocation. Hence, in practice, articles that use the perturbation
method usually supplement their analysis with a formal proof applying the direct mech-
anism. Therefore, the insights derived in this paper apply equally to articles that use the
perturbation method to identify the optimal tax system.
Stiglitz (1987b) studies implementation in a setting with discrete types. His analysis
shows that a discrete distribution of characteristics adds another layer of complexity,
since the optimal wedge is determined for each type in the economy, but not for the
‘holes’ between the types. The insights derived in this paper do not apply directly to the
case with discrete types, and we leave this issue for future research.
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Our paper also relates to the more general problem of implementation theory, which
identifies economic mechanisms that can implement the planner’s optimal allocation (see
e.g. Hurwicz, 1960, Vickrey, 1961, Hurwicz, 1973, Dasgupta et al., 1979, Myerson, 1979
and Maskin, 1999). In many applications it has been shown that the planner should
apply restrictions to the choice space of the agents. In particular, in optimal taxation
Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) and Hammond (1979) shows that quantity restrictions on
some goods can be welfare improving in the general case, even if the planner sets its linear,
respectively, non-linear tax rates optimally. Adams and Yellen (1976) and Armstrong
(1996) show that the multi-product monopolist should optimally bundle its products in
order to maximize its profits, effectively restricting the combinations of goods available to
customers. A similar result has been found in the literature on multi-product auctions,
where the auctioneer should optimally bundle its products in order to maximize auction
revenue (see e.g. Palfrey, 1983, Chakraborty, 1999, Armstrong, 2000, and Jehiel et al.,
2007). Moreover, it has been shown that if several goods are procured or auctioned in a
single contract, but the planner is uncertain about the exact quantities required at the
time of the procedure, the principal should optimally restrict the range of possible bids.
This prevents agents from using skewed bids, bids where the price is too high for one
good, and too low for another (see e.g. Athey and Levin, 2001, Ewerhart and Fieseler,
2003, and Renes, 2011). We add to the implementation theory literature by deriving
two special cases where the planner can implement its optimum in a market mechanism
without imposing any restrictions on the choice space of the agents, provided the planner
has access to non-linear taxation/pricing. In particular, we show that when preferences of
the planner and the agents are sufficiently aligned, the planner does not need to restrict
the choice set of the agents. Hence, the optimal restrictions in the applications above may
stem from a misalignment of preferences between the planner and the agents.
The New Dynamic Public Finance has generalized the Mirrlees model to a setting
where earnings ability follows a stochastic dynamic process.5 Kocherlakota (2005) shows
that in this setting equating the tax rate to the optimal wedge generally does not im-
plement the second-best allocation, and hence, the planner should restrict the choice set
of the agents. Albanesi and Sleet (2006) show that even in the simplest setting, where
earnings ability follows an iid process, the planner can implement the optimal allocation
only if it supplements income taxes by borrowing constraints. We provide an intuition for
this result. As Kocherlakota (2010) a.o. argues, in dynamic stochastic models of taxation,
savings by an agent in period t create an “externality” on the labor supply decision of
future incarnations of this agent through the wealth effect. Our first proposition does not
5See Golosov et al. (2007) and Kocherlakota (2010) for an overview of the literature.
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apply when there are externalities, and hence, the planner may need to restrict the sav-
ings decisions of agents in order to implement its second-best allocation. Intuitively, the
externality causes a misalignment between the preferences of the agents and the planner,
and hence, restrictions are required.
2.3 The Model
In this section we lay down the formal structure of our model. First, we define the
preferences of the agents in the economy. Second, we define the general properties of a
second-best allocation. Third, we define the agents’ maximization problem on the market.
Finally, we discuss the two methods of implementation that are most commonly applied
in the literature: the principle of taxation due to Hammond (1979) and the Mirrleesian
tax system due to Mirrlees (1976).6
2.3.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by a unit mass of agents characterized by a twice-differentiable
utility function:
u (x,y,n) , (2.1)
where x ∈ X ⊆ Rk is a vector of choice variables, y ∈ Y ⊆ R is an untaxed numeraire
choice variable, and n ∈ N ⊆ Rp is the type of an individual. Variables in x can include
e.g. effective labor supply, consumption of (different) commodities, or savings. Choice
variables x and y are observable at the individual level and the social planner can tax all
choices in x non-linearly, but cannot tax y.7 Throughout the paper we will sometimes
refer to the choice variables in {x, y} as goods, even though they can be both inputs and
outputs to the production process.
We assume that the untaxed good y is a normal good such that uy > 0, uyy ≤ 0 for
all values of {x, y,n}. Note that the choice of the numeraire variable has no effect on the
optimal allocation, since a tax on y can always be replicated by a uniform tax on all goods
6The model description below closely follows that of the companion paper Renes and Zoutman (2014a).
7To be able to apply non-linear taxes the planner has to observe each choice variable at the individual
level. Hammond (1987) and Guesnerie (1995) show that if anonymous transactions in a good are possible,
the planner can only tax that good at a linear rate. Mirrlees (1976, sect. 5), Christiansen (1984), and
Boadway and Jacobs (forthcoming) extend the non-linear tax framework to allow for goods that can
be traded anonymously, and as such should be taxed linearly. Although, the main intuition of our
approach remains valid in this setting, formally extending our model to allow for goods that can be
traded anonymously is beyond the scope of this paper.
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in x. Therefore, the assumption that y is a normal good is equivalent to the assumption
that among all the choice variables available to the agents, there is at least one normal
good.
The assumption that y is a normal good directly implies that the utility function is non-
satiated everywhere. In addition, it eases interpretation of the results in the remainder of
the paper. Since y will act as a numeraire, whether a good is taxed or subsidized can be
evaluated by direct comparison y. Moreover, marginal preferences for all goods are neatly
summarized by the vector of marginal rates of substitution with respect to the numeraire
good:
s (x,y,n) ≡ −ux (x,y,n)
uy (x,y,n)
.
Here element si is the negative of the marginal rate of substitution for choice variable
xi with respect to the numeraire y. Therefore, si represents the marginal utility loss of
receiving an extra unit of xi, expressed in units of the numeraire variable y. In case of
the choice of labor supply, for example, the marginal utility of providing an extra unit of
labor is usually assumed negative, it then follows that si will be positive in our notation.
Each element in the type vector n is referred to as a characteristic. Characteristics may
include variables such as ability and health status as well as taste parameters. We assume
n follows a multi-dimensional differentiable cumulative distribution function F (n), with
F : N→ [0, 1] and a probability density function f (n). Both are defined over the closure
of the convex type space N.
The type is private information to each individual and unobservable to the planner.
Note that we do not restrict ourselves to static models. Different choices can occur in
different periods. However, we do assume that both the type and the mechanism used by
the planner are revealed to the individuals before their first choice.
Our utility function allows a very general description of preferences. Note, for example,
that the conventional utility representation (e.g. Mirrlees, 1971, Saez, 2001) u˜ (y,l), where
l is labor supply and y is income, is a special case of our utility representation.8 In addition,
we do not require the utility function to be (weakly) separable in any of the goods or
characteristics as is usually assumed in the literature. Therefore, agents’ preferences for a
good may depend on all characteristics of the agent, as well as other consumption choices.
Moreover, the utility function does not need to satisfy a single-crossing condition, since
our analysis remains valid even if in the optimal allocation types are bunched. Finally, we
8To see this, assume that gross income x1 = n1l where n1 is earnings ability. It can readily be seen
that this utility function can be rewritten into our form: u˜ (y,l) = u˜
(
y, x1n1
)
= u (x1, y, n1).
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do not assume any relationship between the number of characteristics p and the number
of goods k other than k, p ≥ 1.
2.3.2 Incentive Compatibility and Feasibility
The problem of optimal non-linear taxation is to find a tax system that implements the
second-best allocation of a social planner in a market economy. Following the methodology
of Mirrlees (1971, 1976), this requires us to solve two subproblems. The first subproblem
is to find the second-best allocation using a direct mechanism. The second subproblem is
to find the optimal tax system that implements the second-best allocation in the market.
This paper focuses on the second problem, but before we can find the optimal tax system,
we first need to outline the properties of a second-best allocation.
A second-best allocation that has been derived through a direct mechanism must
satisfy the following three criteria: i.) the allocation is resource feasible, ii.) the allocation
is incentive compatible, and iii.) the allocation maximizes the central planner’s objective
function under the constraints given by the first two conditions.
Formally, these properties can be defined as follows. Let the second-best allocation of
goods be denoted by:
{x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} ∀ n ∈ N.
Here x∗ and y∗ are functions mapping from the type space to the good space, x∗ : N→ X
and y∗ : N → Y . We assume x∗ (·) and y∗ (·) are both twice differentiable in all their
arguments.9
Let X∗ denote the image or range of function x∗, and Y ∗ the image of y∗. We denote
by {X, Y }∗ the image of the allocation, and its complement by {X, Y }C∗. This image
contains the collection of all bundles assigned to agents in the economy. By definition,
the set of assigned bundles are a subset of the goods space, X∗ ⊆ X, Y ∗ ⊆ Y . The sets
X∗ and X (Y ∗ and Y ), are equal if each possible value of choice variables is assigned to
at least one agent. Similarly, {X, Y }∗ = {X, Y } if all possible combinations of goods are
assigned to at least one agent.
Since the economy should be able to produce all goods consumed, we know the optimal
allocation must satisfy the economy’s resource constraint. We assume the economy’s
9This assumption makes the rest of the analysis easier. However, by non-satiation of the utility
function we know that individual budget constraints are binding, while theorem 1 of Clausen and Strub
(2013) guarantees that the FOC binds with equality on interior choices. The combination of these two
constraints imply that on any region of the type space that separates our tax system is well defined and
our proof structure holds.
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resource constraint takes the form:∫
N
y∗ (n) dF (n) +R =
∫
N
q(x∗ (n))dF (n). (2.2)
In this equation, R is the exogenous revenue requirement of the planner measured in units
of y and q : X→ Y is a reduced form production function that describes the production
of y as a function of the total consumption of goods in x. The equation states that total
production of y should equal the sum of private consumption and the revenue requirement
of the numeraire good. Since the price of the numeraire good is normalized to one, the
derivative qxi represents the individual (negative) marginal rate of transformation between
good xi and the numeraire good y. qxi Is positive when good xi is an input and negative
when xi is an output of the production process. We assume weakly decreasing returns
to scale such that all qxixi are non-positive. Note that the conventional assumption in
the literature that q (.) is linear10 is a special case of our model. The generalization of
the production function allows researchers to investigate the case where individuals face
decreasing returns to scale because they, for example, have a lower marginal productivity
as they supply more hours of labor. An allocation that satisfies condition (2.2) is said to
be feasible.
Incentive compatibility requires that in a direct revelation game each agent reveals
his type. In a revelation game the planner presents the agents with a menu of choices
over bundles, {x∗ (m) , y∗ (m)}, from which each agent chooses his preferred bundle by
sending the corresponding p-dimensional message about his type, m ∈ N, to the planner.
An allocation {x∗ (m) , y∗ (m)} is incentive compatible if each individual truthfully reveals
all his unobserved characteristics through message m and receives the bundle designed for
him. That is, incentive compatibility implies the agent maximizes his utility by sending
the message m = n.
Hence, an incentive-compatible and feasible allocation can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. An allocation {x = x∗ (n) , y = y∗ (n)} ∀ n ∈ N is incentive compat-
ible and feasible if each agent truthfully reveals his entire type in a direct mechanism:
n = arg max
m
u (x∗ (m) , y∗ (m) ,n) ∀n ∈ N. (2.3)
and in addition satisfies constraint (2.2).
10See e.g. Mirrlees (1971), Mirrlees (1976), Diamond (1998), Saez (2001) and Jacquet et al. (2013).
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Note that incentive compatibility does not imply that there is no bunching of types.
Two different types may well receive exactly the same bundle of goods, provided it is in
both types best interest to choose this bundle over all other bundles in {X, Y }∗.
A second-best allocation must maximize the objective function of the planner among
the set of incentive-compatible and feasible allocations defined in definition 2.1. However,
at this point we deliberately leave the objective function of the social planner entirely
generic, such that the second-best allocation of the social planner may reside anywhere
within the incentive-compatible and feasible set. This allows us to study implementation
in the most generic setting possible. We will later show, that whether or not an allocation
can be implemented, can crucially depend on the assumptions made about the objective
function of the planner.
Characterizing the optimal allocation when agents differ in multiple dimensions may be
very complex and is beyond the scope of this paper. The common approach is to assume
that the second-order incentive constraints are not binding. Mirrlees (1976); McAfee
and McMillan (1988); Renes and Zoutman (2014a) describe characteristics of optimal
incentive-compatible allocations in the context of a first-order approach where second-
order conditions of maximization problem have to be checked after the entire allocation is
derived, while Rochet and Chone´ (1998) deals with the problems caused by second-order
incentive constraints. However, in this paper we are not interested in deriving the second-
best allocation. We start instead from an incentive-compatible and feasible allocation
that satisfies definition 2.1. Following proposition 2 in Renes and Zoutman (2014a) we
know that such an allocation can be described by the optimal wedges:
Wi(n) = qxi(x∗ (n))− si(x∗ (n) , y∗ (n) ,n) ∀n ∈ N. (2.4)
These wedges represent the difference between the marginal rate of substitution, si, and
the marginal rate of transformation, qxi , for each agent and each good on the second-best
allocation. If the wedge is positive the marginal rate of transformation is larger than the
marginal rate of substitution such that the distorted consumption level of the good is
below its laissez-faire value. If the wedge is negative the consumption of a good is above
its laissez-faire value.
2.3.3 Market Implementation
The social planner aims to implement the second-best allocation in a market economy
through a tax system. In the market, agents maximize their utility function (2.1) with
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respect to their choice variables x and y subject to their budget constraint:
y ≤ q (x)− T (x) , (2.5)
where the tax system, T , maps from the good space to the numeraire, T : X→ Y . How
much a consumer can spend on y depends on his choice of x, the production function q(·)
and the tax system T (·).
A tax system implements an allocation if each agent weakly prefers his bundle over
all other combinations of goods available to him in the market. This concept is formally
defined in definition 2.2:
Definition 2.2. A tax system T (x) implements an allocation {x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} in the
market if each agent selects the same bundle on the market as is assigned to him in the
allocation:
{x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} = arg max
x,y
{u (x, y,n) : y = q (x)− T (x) ,x ∈ X}
∀ n∈ N (2.6)
Note that we do not need to check whether the planner’s budget constraint is satisfied
as long as the tax system is successful in implementing the second-best allocation. By
definition 2.1 the second-best allocation is feasible and the non-satiation of the utility
function implies that on the market the agents’ budget constraints must hold with equality.
By Walras’ law the planner’s budget constraint must, therefore, also be satisfied.
The difficulty of implementability can be understood by comparing definitions 2.1 and
2.2. In the direct mechanism each agent maximizes his utility by sending the optimal
p-dimensional message, containing all p characteristics of his type, to the planner. In
doing so, he can choose his most preferred bundle in the set {X, Y }∗. Agents can deviate
by mimicking another type, but they cannot receive a bundle that has not been assigned
to any type. However, in the market each agent can choose his optimal bundle out of all
points in the choice space {X, Y } within his budget set. The market allows the agents to
create new bundles that were not assigned to any type in the direct mechanism. Such a
strategy is called a joint deviation since, in order to create a new bundle that satisfies the
budget constraint, an agent has to deviate in at least two goods relative to his bundle in
the second-best allocation. If a tax system allows for profitable joint deviations, it cannot
satisfy definition 2.2, even if the allocation satisfies definition 2.1. Because the market
allows agents to create joint deviations, the conditions for implementability are generally
stricter than the conditions for incentive compatibility. A graphical example based on the
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canonical Mirrleesian tax system will illustrate the issue in more detail in the next section.
Before discussing the example it is convenient to discuss the most important approaches
to implementation in the literature in our notation.
2.3.4 The principle of taxation and the Mirrleesian implemen-
tation
We are not the first to study tax systems that meet definition 2.2. The two most promi-
nent approaches to implementation in the literature are the principle of taxation and the
Mirrleesian tax system. The principle of taxation, derived in Hammond (1979), shows
that for any incentive-compatible allocation at least one tax system exists that can im-
plement it. This tax system has two properties. First, if the agent chooses the bundle
x∗ (n) designed for him, he will receive the corresponding value of y∗ (n). That is, the tax
function satisfies:
T (x∗ (n)) = q (x∗ (n))− y∗ (n) ∀ n∈ N.
Second, it restricts agents to making a choice within {X, Y }∗. The implementation creates
individual budget sets that are restricted to lie within the image of the allocation. This
restriction effectively prohibits all joint deviations. This immediately implies that the
underlying problems of the agents in definitions 2.1 and 2.2 are isomorph, and hence, the
outcome is identical. It follows that the conditions for incentive compatibility and market
implementability coincide. Hence, the principle of taxation shows that by sufficiently
restricting the choice space available to agents in the market, a tax system can always
implement the second-best allocation.
Mirrlees (1976) derives the second-best allocation with multiple goods under uni-
dimensional heterogeneity in earnings ability of the agents. The outcome of the planner’s
maximization defines the wedges, Wi(n), for each level of earnings ability, n, and each
good xi. Under certain regularity conditions the consumption level of each good can be
used to infer n.11 That is, there exists an inverse function of the allocation x∗ (n), such
that (x∗)−1 (xi) = n for each good xi.
Mirrlees (1976) proposes to implement the second-best allocation through a tax system
that has the following properties. First, like before, each agent should be able to afford
his bundle:
T (x∗ (n)) = q (x∗ (n))− y∗ (n) ∀ n ∈ N,
11To be precise this requires non-satiation of the utility function, the Spence-Mirrlees condition on
preferences and a monotonicity constraint on the allocation, as well as single-dimensional heterogeneity.
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However, unlike in the principle of taxation, Mirrlees does not limit the choice set to
{X, Y }∗. Instead, he proposes to set the marginal tax on each good xi equal to the
wedge:
T ′i (xi) =Wi (n) =Wi((x∗i )−1 (xi))
In the literature this approach is known as equating taxes to wedges (see e.g. Kocher-
lakota, 2005). The tax system is separable in the sense that the tax rate on good xi only
depends on the consumption of good xi. Additionally, if all xi ∈ X are awarded to a type
in the direct mechanism, this defines the unique separable tax system because a marginal
tax rate is assigned to each level of the choice variables. Furthermore, the tax system is
entirely defined by the optimal wedges in the direct mechanism. Therefore, the optimal
allocation in the direct mechanism contains all the information necessary to design the
optimal tax system.
Note that the tax system described does not prohibit choices of the agent in any
way, apart from setting a budget constraint. Unlike the tax system derived through the
principle of taxation, the Mirrleesian tax system does not change the agents’ choice set
compared to laissez faire, but only affects the relative prices through the marginal tax
rates. As a result, the agents can choose joint deviations if they so desire. Therefore,
unlike the tax system prescribed by the principle of taxation, there is no easy proof that
shows that this tax system can implement all incentive-compatible allocations. Conditions
under which this tax system implements the second best are derived in our corollary 2.8
further on.
Unfortunately, Mirrlees (1976) only defined implementation under uni-dimensional
heterogeneity. When agents are heterogeneous in multiple characteristics it is gener-
ally not possible to create a separable tax system, since the inverse allocation function
(x∗)−1 (·) = n can no longer be written as a function of a single good (see also the discus-
sion in Renes and Zoutman, 2014a). Since the tax system is no longer separable, there
may be multiple natural ways to extend the marginal tax rates to consumption bundles
that are not awarded to any type in the direct mechanism. Moreover, there might be
multiple tax systems that equate the marginal tax rates to the optimal wedges, since the
inverse allocation function is generally not unique. Because of this potential multiplicity
we do not focus on a particular tax system. Instead, we derive general conditions under
which tax systems that affect the relative prices, but do not restrict the choice space
can implement the second-best allocation, even if agents are heterogeneous in multiple
dimensions. However, given the focus on uni-dimensional heterogeneity of agents in the
literature, the most important example is the Mirrleesian tax system.
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2.4 Failure of the Mirrleesian implementation: A Sim-
ple Example
This section will use a graphical example to show intuitively why the standard Mirrleesian
implementation may fail to implement an incentive-compatible allocation. The purpose
of the example, depicted in figures 2.1 and 2.2, is to illustrate the issue of implementation
in the simplest possible setting. For that purpose the example is highly stylized and very
much simplified. The idea is specifically not to give a realistic example, but to show that
even in very simple settings, with agents that differ only in their earnings ability, the
Mirrleesian tax system can sometimes fail.12
The agents in the example are couples that maximize a joint utility function. For
simplicity we assume that spouses within a couple have matched perfectly assortative,
such that within each couple the spouses have exactly the same earnings ability. Moreover,
we assume couples differ only in their earnings ability, such that this is a model with uni-
dimensional heterogeneity of agents, p = 1. The spouses have to decide how much time
either partner works and how much each of them tends to the household and children. The
optimal allocation specifies how much labor income is generated by each spouse, x∗1(n) and
x∗2(n), and how much each couple consumes, y
∗ (n), as a function of the earnings ability
of the couple. We assume the standard production function xi = nli, where li represents
the labor effort of spouse i. Clearly, high ability couples have to provide less labor to
reach a certain income level than low ability couples. Moreover, we assume that couples’
marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in consumption, such that the planner has
an incentive to redistribute from high to low ability couples.
Since there is only one hidden characteristic for each couple, the bundles assigned to
the types in a second-best allocation form a line in X1 × X2 × Y space. This line is
represented by the thick black line in figures 2.1 and 2.2. In figure 2.1 the line is sloping
upward, indicating that the planner wants couples with higher ability to earn more in
equilibrium. In addition, an increase in gross income, x1 + x2, leads to a less than one-
to-one increase in consumption, y. This shows that the planner is redistributing from
higher to lower ability couples. Finally, on any point of the line x1 = x2, indicating that
the planner wants the spouses in each couple to supply the same amount of labor effort.
In both pictures the dot represents the bundle assigned to one particular couple in the
second-best allocation.
12In the appendix we describe one particular set of preferences for planner and the agents for which
this allocation is second best.
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The hyperplanes show the budget constraint that results from the Mirrleesian imple-
mentation. The budget constraint is uniquely determined by equating taxes to wedges
on the allocation and assuming it is separable in each choice variable. Each point on the
surface represents a bundle of labor income of the husband, x1, labor income of the wife,
x2, and the corresponding amount of consumption after taxes, y, given by the budget
constraint.
In figure 2.2 the vertical axis shows the utility level of the couple whose second-best
bundle is located at the dot. The surface represents the reduced-form utility function
after eliminating y via the budget constraint, for all combinations {x1, x2, y} given the
tax system imposed. In figure 2.2 we can see that the assigned bundle (dot) marks the
highest utility level on the allocation (line), such that the couple prefers their bundle
over any of the other bundles in the allocation. The allocation is therefore incentive
compatible for this couple, and indeed for all couples, in the direct mechanism. Mimicking
another couple, and receiving the corresponding bundle, would decrease their utility level.
Moreover, the depicted allocation is feasible.
However, in the market the couple is also allowed to trade working hours of the husband
for working hours of the wife and vice versa. In figure 2.2 we can see that such joint
deviations give the couple located at the dot more utility than their assigned bundle.
In the market this couple prefers bundles that are not part of the planner’s second-best
allocation over the bundles in the allocation. Therefore, the Mirrleesian tax schedule fails
to implement the second-best allocation in this case.
In this particular example, the failure results from divergence in preferences between
the planner and agents. Our fictitious couple prefers partial specialization, where one of
the partners earns most of the income and the other partner stays at home. This could
be rationalized in a model where spouses have increasing returns to scale or increasing
utility to specialization. However, in the planner’s optimal allocation both spouses work
the same number of hours. Such misalignments could have several causes. First, the
planner could be paternalistic, forcing households to equally divide the task between
both partners, simply because he thinks this is fair. Alternatively, the couples in the
economy might have children. The children in turn may be better off with attention of
both spouses than with attention of only the stay-at-home spouse. If the utility of the
child is not sufficiently weighted in the utility function of the couple, the planner may
want to correct the externality and make both spouses stay at home part of the time.
Note that both of these arguments can lead to exactly the same first-order optimality
conditions for the second-best allocation. This example indicates that both non-welfarist
motives and correction of externalities may lead to a failure of the Mirrleesian tax system,
Figure 2.1: An optimal allocation and a budget constraint.
Figure 2.2: Utility of a couple faced with the budget constraint in Figure 1.
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independently of the preferences of the agents. In section 5 we prove that absent this type
of misalignment any tax system that equates taxes to wedges and does not impose any
other restrictions on the choice set of agents, like the Mirrleesian tax system, suffices to
implement the allocation.
To complete the picture, note that the solution offered by the principle of taxation
is to disallow all consumption bundles that are not on the thick black line. That is, it
forces both spouses to work an equal number of hours. In that case the observation that
the assigned bundle (the dot) represents the highest utility level on the allocation (line)
directly implies implementability.
However, in this example, as in many other cases, implementing the allocation through
the principle of taxation may be undesirable. First, the planner should have the practical
means to disallow joint deviations. The planner could, for instance, tax joint deviations
at an infinite rate, or prohibit joint deviations explicitly, giving severe punishment to
trespassers. Such measures, if they are feasible to begin with, are sensitive to small
mistakes or a trembling hand. In our example, a slight deviation where one partner works
more than the other for some unforeseen reason would be outright prohibited or subject
to a severe punishment.
More generally, the planner could tax joint deviations by prohibitive, but non-infinite
tax rates. However the calculations required to determine the second-best allocation do
not provide us with information about when tax rates become prohibitive. Obviously,
this crucially depends on the preferences of the agents. Hence, another set of complicated
calculations is necessary to determine whether or not specific tax rates indeed lead agents
to refrain from joint deviations in equilibrium.
Additionally, it may be costly and complex to administer prohibitions or prohibitive
tax rates. In order to determine whether a specific bundle entails a joint deviation the
entire vector of x has to be known and compared to the bundles in {X, Y }∗ and this
may be a very costly process, in terms of computational complexity, monitoring and
administration.
This example clearly shows that a Mirrleesian tax system cannot implement all second-
best allocations, and that the principle of taxation provides policy makers with tax systems
that are unrealistic in market economies. Hence, in order to guide tax design for policy
makers, we have to find conditions under which more realistic tax systems can implement
a given allocation.
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2.5 Implementation through Taxation
Now that we have shown that the canonical Mirrleesian tax system may sometimes fail to
implement the second-best allocation. We will proceed by deriving sufficient conditions for
a tax system to implement the second-best allocation. These conditions are a useful test
to verify whether a specific tax system implements a specific allocation. However, in order
to perform this test, one first needs to derive both the allocation and the tax system. In
many cases an explicit closed-form solution for the second-best allocation does not exist.
Numerical solutions are available, but these describe only special cases by definition.
Implementation can only be verified for the specific tax system and parameterization
studied. Therefore, these explicit solutions cannot be used to say anything about tax
systems in general.
To overcome this issue we use to lemma derived in subsection 2.5.1 to derive two classes
of problems for which a tax system that equates taxes to wedges always implements the
second-best allocation in subsections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3. In the final subsection we discuss
the consequence of this result for the existing literature on optimal taxation.
2.5.1 Conditions for Implementation
The sufficient conditions for implementation can be found by formally solving the problem
in definition 2.2 in terms of the first- and second-order conditions of optimality of an
interior maximum. Although this approach is standard, the non-linear nature of prices in
our setting requires some attention. Lemma 2.3 describes conditions for a global, interior
maximum:
Lemma 2.3. An incentive-compatible and feasible allocation {x∗, y∗} can be implemented
through a twice differentiable tax system T (x) if a.e.:
i.)
y∗ (n) = q (x∗ (n))− T (x∗ (n)) , (2.7)
ii.)
T ′i (x
∗ (n)) =Wi(n), (2.8)
iii.)
−∂s (x
∗ (n) , y∗ (n) ,n)
∂x∗ (n)
+ q′′ (x∗ (n))− T ′′ (x∗ (n))l 0. (2.9)
where l0 denotes that the matrix on the left-hand side should be negative semi-definite.
26 When a Price is Enough
iv.)The maximum described in local terms by (2.7) - (2.9) is the global maximum of
utility under the budget constraint.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Equation (2.7) ensures that the amount of taxes paid for any bundle of x∗ (n) within
the allocation is uniquely determined. If the total tax level T (x∗ (n)) is too high, the
tax schedule cannot implement the allocation because people receive too little y∗ (n), and
vice versa. Equation (2.8) is the first-order condition for a market implementation. It
states that marginal taxes are equated to the wedges. There are always as many marginal
tax rates in T ′ as there are goods in X, for all n ∈ N. Such that there is always a
unique vector of marginal tax rates T ′ (x∗ (n)) that satisfies (2.8) within any possible
incentive-compatible allocation.
In effect, this means that the first order conditions of this problem can always be met
and that the solution is unique on the allocation, but undefined for consumption bundles
outside of X∗. In our example in figures 1 and 2, this translates to a tax system that is
well defined on the line, but undefined everywhere else. Hence, although equation (2.8)
tells us how to design the tax system on the allocation, it does not tell us how to extend
it to bundles that are not assigned in the second-best allocation. Therefore, in order to
design a complete tax system one has to make additional assumptions. In the case of the
Mirrleesian tax system this additional assumption is that marginal tax rates are separable
in each choice variable. One can think of other solutions, and the optimal tax system is
generally not unique. However, any tax system that successfully implements the second-
best allocation must also satisfy the second-order implementability constraints, equation
(2.9).
Equation (2.9) states that the indifference curves of any linear combination of x’s
with respect to y should be more convex than the budget constraint for the same linear
combination of x’s. This condition is different from the standard second-order condition
of utility maximization with two goods (see e.g. Mas-Collel et al., 1995) in two ways.
First, in standard micro-economic theory the budget constraint is linear and hence the
condition can be simplified to convexity of the indifference curves. Second, since there are
multiple choices, sufficiency requires that the indifference curve of all linear combinations
of x with respect to y are more convex than the budget constraint, with two goods only
one such combination exists.
Condition iv.) states that the maximum in the allocation, defined in local terms by
equation (2.7)- (2.9), is the global maximum in individuals’ utility, for which only sufficient
conditions can be given.
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2.5.2 Pareto Efficiency and Welfarist Planner
As we have seen in figure 2.2 a Mirrleesian tax system may sometimes allow agents to
create profitable joint deviations. In the next proposition we show that this issue does
not occur if an allocation is i.) incentive compatible and feasible as in definition 2.1 and,
ii.) within this set, on the Pareto frontier, such that no agent can be made better off
without reducing the utility of any other agent. The most important implication of this
proposition is presented in corollary 2.5, the second-best allocation of a welfarist planner
can always be implemented by equating taxes to wedges.
Proposition 2.4. If an allocation satisfies the constraints given by definition 2.1 and,
within this set, resides on the Pareto frontier, then it can be implemented by any tax
system, T (x), that; i.) equates taxes to wedges on the allocation, T ′i (x
∗ (n)) = Wi(n),
ii.) does not contain an internal maximum in any vector subspace of X∗, as long as
condition iv.) of lemma 2.3 is met.
Corollary 2.5. The second-best allocation of a planner that maximizes a welfare function
of the form
∫
N
W (u (n) ,n) dn with Wu (·) > 0 for all u,n ∈ N, commonly known as a
welfarist planner, can be implemented under the conditions in proposition 2.4.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Intuitively, consider again our example in figure 2.2. The increase in the reduced-form
utility of the couple is approximately the same whether the couple turns “left ” or “right”of
the bundle assigned to them. That is, in the example it does not matter which spouse
specializes in the official labor market, and which spouse specializes in house work. If tax
payments from the couple to the planner are not maximized at their allocated bundle,
then one of the two opposite deviation strategies must weakly increase tax revenue as
well. Hence, one of the two deviations must be resource feasible. By assumption the
utility of other couples is not directly affected by either deviation. Hence, there exists at
least one joint deviation that has the following properties i.) it increases the utility of one
agent, ii.) it occurs through voluntary transactions on the market and is hence incentive
compatible, iii.) it weakly increases the resources in the economy, and iv.) it leaves the
utility of other agents unaffected. This deviation must be a Pareto improvement. However,
an incentive-compatible Pareto improvement does not exist for allocations located on the
Pareto frontier, and hence, we arrive at a contradiction. The proof to the proposition
shows formally that this logic is not partial to our example. If taxes are equated to
wedges but second-order implementability constraints are not satisfied, then there always
exists at least one incentive-compatible deviation that increases the utility of an agent
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and weakly increases the economy’s resources. In our setting such a deviation is always a
Pareto improvement.
Proposition 2.4 is important for public economists and policy makers. It shows that
if the conditions of proposition 2.4 are fulfilled, the design of the optimal tax system
is relatively straightforward. If a second-best allocation is Pareto efficient, the optimal
tax system can be designed by equating the marginal tax rates to the optimal wedges.
By proposition 2.4 this tax system must satisfy first and second-order implementability
constraints, and can hence implement the planner’s optimal allocation.
In addition, by corollary 2.5 such a tax system can also implement the second-best
allocation of a welfarist planner. This follows from the fact that the second-best allocation
of a welfarist planner always resides on the Pareto frontier, as was already shown in
Werning (2007) and Brendon (2013). Intuitively, if the planner is welfarist, preferences of
the agents and the planner are aligned in the sense that welfare strictly increases in the
utility of all agents. Therefore, an allocation which is not on the Pareto frontier cannot
be optimal for a welfarist planner.
The conditions of proposition 2.4 are only satisfied if the tax system does not have an
internal maximum in any vector subspace of X∗, there are no externalities, the allocation
is on the Pareto frontier and the optimum is a global maximum. In practice, the first
restriction is almost always satisfied. The sign of the marginal tax rate is equal to the
sign of the wedge. In most models of optimal taxation the optimal wedge does not change
sign, such that the resulting tax system is monotonic, and hence, the tax system does not
have an internal maximum. Even in models where the optimal wedge does change sign,
such as Saez (2002b) and Chone´ and Laroque (2010), it changes sign from negative to
positive. As such, the resulting tax system has an internal minimum, but not an internal
maximum. We are not aware of any articles in the literature where this assumption is
violated.
More importantly, the logic of our proof does not carry over to a model with external-
ities or to situations where the planner is non-welfarist. With externalities the deviation
of any agent can influence the utility of other agents through the externality. Therefore,
if a deviation increases the utility of a single agent, and weakly increases tax revenue,
this no longer implies the deviation is a Pareto improvement. For instance, if a deviation
increases the amount of gasoline purchased by an agent, this may lead to an increase in
the utility of the agent as well as the tax revenue of the planner. However, the externality
generated by the extra carbon emissions may harm the utility of all other agents in society.
In fact, Kaplow and Shavell (2001) show that for a planner with a non-welfarist objective
function there exist at least one Pareto improvement for the agents that decreases the
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objective function of the planner. Hence, even if a Pareto improvement exists, it is unclear
whether this increases the objective function of the non-welfarist planner.
The last restriction for implementation is the hardest one to deal with. In the literature
only sufficient conditions for a global maximum are known, but several of these classes
deserve some attention because of their relevance for the literature.
Remark 2.6. Condition iv.) of lemma 2.3 is automatically met if preferences are convex
in {x, y}, the production function satisfies Constant Returns To Scale (CRTS) and taxes
are (weakly) convex.
If the tax schedule is weakly convex and the production satisfies CRTS the individuals
budget set is convex. Standard results in consumer theory, see for instance proposition
3.d.iii in Mas-Collel et al. (1995), guarantee that the demand correspondence of the in-
divdual is single valued and this is the unique stationary point, the maximum described
must thus be unique.
Remark 2.7. Condition iv.) of lemma 2.3 is met if condition 2.9 holds for all values of
{x, y} ∈ {X, Y } .
Under this condition the individuals maximization problem has only one stationary
point, and the utility goes down while moving away from this optimum. The equations
(2.7)- (2.9) can then only describe the unique optimum for all agents. Although this
result sounds quite trivial, it has a very interesting application. Because equation (2.9)
is a function of the tax schedule, the planner can set the taxes in such a way that this
condition is met. The implementation based on the principle of taxation shows a very
extreme version of a tax schedule that satisfies this constraint, but quite generally less
restrictive tax schedules will suffice.
Note that both of these remarks discuss sufficiency results. To the best of our knowl-
edge no necessary and sufficient conditions for finding the global maximum are known.
however, most applications satisfy the conditions in the first remark, or can be made
to satisfy the second. In order not to repeat the discussion, we will assume that the
maximum identified is the global maximum in the rest of the paper.
The Mirrleesian Tax System
As a corollary to proposition 2.4 we show when the Mirrleesian tax system can implement
a second-best allocation.
Corollary 2.8. Under uni-dimensional heterogeneity, p = 1, when an allocation i.) lies
on the Pareto frontier, or ii.) is optimal to a welfarist planner, and the Mirrleesian tax
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system, as defined in section 3.4, does not contain an internal maximum in any vector
subspace of X∗, the Mirrleesian tax system can implement the second-best allocation.
Proof. In the Mirrleesian tax system tax rates are equated to wedges such that all condi-
tions in i.) proposition 2.4, respectively ii.) corollary 2.5 are satisfied.
Corollary 2.8 is a simple extension of proposition 2.4 and corollary 2.5. The Mirrleesian
tax system, which is only defined under uni-dimensional heterogeneity, equates taxes
to wedges. Hence, it can implement any incentive-compatible allocation on the Pareto
frontier, as well as the second-best allocation of a welfarist planner.
This corollary is important primarily because the Mirrleesian tax system is separa-
ble. Hence, our result show that a separable tax system can implement the second-best
allocation of a welfarist planner under uni-dimensional heterogeneity of agents. In static
models this implies, for example, that the tax rate on capital income is independent of
labor income and vice versa. In non-stochastic dynamic models, it implies that an imple-
mentation exists with tax rates that are independent over time, such that the government
does not have to keep records over time to attain its optimal allocation.
2.5.3 Surjective allocations
There is an important second class of maximization problems in which equating taxes
to wedges will always implement the second-best allocation. If the optimal allocation is
surjective, such that all possible bundles of goods that are available in the market are
assigned to at least one type in the second-best allocation, then only one tax system
can satisfy first-order implementability conditions (2.7) and (2.8), and this tax system
implements the second-best allocation. Proposition 2.9 formalizes this result.
Proposition 2.9. If the mapping x∗ (n) is surjective, then the tax system is fully de-
scribed by equations (2.7) and (2.8), and this is the unique differentiable tax schedule that
implements the second-best allocation.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Note that surjectiveness of the mapping x∗ (n) is a relatively strict requirement. It
requires that every possible bundle of x ∈ X is assigned to at least one type. In this
situation every choice in the market corresponds to the choice of a type in the direct
mechanism. Since all types prefer their own bundle over the bundles assigned to other
types and all bundles are assigned to a type, it follows that all types prefer their bundle
above any other bundle in the economy.
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Note that the tax system described in proposition 2.9 is unique. Wedges are defined
for every possible value of x ∈ X, such that only one implementing tax system exists.
Moreover, since surjectiveness implies that X∗ = X the principle of taxation does not
restrict the choice set of agents in this particular case.
The allocation derived in Mirrlees (1971) is an example of a surjective allocation,
provided ability is continuously distributed in R+, and the second-best allocation assigns
all positive gross income levels to at least one type.13 In this case, the function x∗ (n),
mapping ability to gross income, is surjective.
2.5.4 Implications for implementation in the existing literature
Our paper provides new insights about tax systems for a number of articles in the litera-
ture. In most models considered in the existing literature the planner is welfarist, there are
no externalities, agents are heterogeneous in only one dimension and the optimal resulting
tax system is monotonic or convex (see e.g. Mirrlees, 1971, Mirrlees, 1976, Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1976, Saez, 2001,Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005, Golosov et al., 2013). Addition-
ally, a number of articles study the implementation of allocations on the Pareto frontier,
without specifically assuming a benevolent planner ( e.g. Werning, 2007 and Brendon,
2013). By proposition 2.4 and its corollary 2.8 the second-best allocation in these papers
can be implemented by a Mirrleesian tax system. In all aforementioned articles, except
Golosov et al. (2013), this tax system is also suggested. Golosov et al. (2013) proposes to
implement the allocation through a non-separable tax system that also equates taxes to
wedges. Proposition 2.4 proves that this tax system implements the allocation derived in
the article as well.
A growing literature considers optimal taxation under multi-dimensional heterogeneity
of agents, where the planner is welfarist, there are no externalities, and the tax system
that naturally results from equating taxes to wedges is monotonic or convex (see e.g.
Mirrlees, 1976, Chone´ and Laroque, 2010, Renes and Zoutman, 2014a, Rothschild and
Scheuer, 2014 and Jacquet and Lehmann, 2014). Proposition 2.4 also applies to these
models, such that any tax system that equates taxes to wedges implements the allocation
derived in these articles.14
A number of articles study optimal non-linear taxation in the presence of a non-
welfarist planner (see e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2006, Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2007,
Jacquet and Van de Gaer, 2011 and Gerritsen, 2013) under uni-dimensional heterogeneity
13We implicitly assume agents can also choose their gross income level in R+.
14Note that Rothschild and Scheuer (2014) also extend their analysis by introducing an externality.
For this extension proposition 2.4 does not apply.
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in earning ability. In each of these articles the agents only choose how much income to
earn and how much to consume. Therefore, provided the distribution of earnings ability
is continuous and unbounded, the allocation is likely to be surjective. The surjectiveness
of the allocation can easily be verified by checking whether all non-negative income levels
are assigned, as is usually the case. In that case proposition 2.9 shows that there is a
unique tax system that implements the second-best allocation by equating the tax to the
wedge.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The results presented in this paper cover the relatively understudied second step of tax
design for a general class of models. Propositions 2.4 and 2.9 show that a relatively simple
class of tax systems, that can be described by the optimal wedges in the second-best
allocation, can implement the optimal allocation found in most problems studied in the
existing literature. In these models implementation can proceed through any tax system
that equates taxes to wedges. In addition, lemma 2.3 provides the conditions that need to
be checked if the problem does not fit one of the two classes outlined in our propositions.
Importantly, our results are not restricted to the often-studied case of uni-dimensional
heterogeneity of agents, but are also directly applicable to the multi-dimensional problem
studied in the companion paper Renes and Zoutman (2014a).
Proposition 2.4 highlights a unique feature of the Mirrleesian optimal tax model.
Unlike the design problem of auctioneers and monopolists, the maximization problem of
a welfarist central planner is aligned with that of the agents he faces. In monopoly pricing
and auction theory on the other hand, the objectives of the principal and the agents are
usually opposed, in the sense that the payoff of the planner increases in the payment made
by the agents. An increase in a monopolist’s profits (at fixed quantities) automatically
comes at the expense of the consumers. As such, implementation will generally be more
difficult than in the Mirrleesian taxation literature. As a result, our results indicate that
the planner in these settings generally needs to restrict the choice space of its agents by
for example bundling goods or disallowing certain bids (see also Armstrong, 1996, Renes,
2011, Rochet and Chone´, 1998).
The alignment between agents and planner allows a relatively broad class of tax sys-
tems to implement the second best of a welfarist planner. In many cases the planner
can let the agents maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint, without further
restriction in the choice space, irrespective of the actual utility function of individuals.
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This result is important because restricting the choice space of agents in a real-world
economy is generally very complex, and in most cases unrealistic and undesirable in
a market economy. However, our results may also help explain cases where the price
mechanism fails and the government has to restrict the choice space of agents. This may
for instance be the case in settings where externalities play an important role.
Future work could focus on the possibility to extend this work to dynamically stochas-
tic settings. Additionally, finding implementing tax systems that allow individual freedom
of choice in cases when equating taxes to wedges does not lead to the optimal allocation is
of first order importance to the normative public finance literature that deals with issues
like externalities and non-welfarist motives.

Chapter 3
As Easy as ABC? Multi-dimensional
Screening in Public Finance1
3.1 Introduction
How should a government combine taxes on labor income with healthcare subsidies? What
is the relation between capital and labor income taxes? When should housing subsidies
depend on wealth and income?
The optimal interplay between tax instruments crucially depends on the relevant di-
mensions in which agents differ, such as earnings ability, wealth, and health. However,
up to now, the literature on optimal taxation has almost exclusively focused on models
where agents differ in only one dimension, namely earnings ability (e.g. Mirrlees (1971),
Diamond (1998), Saez (2001), Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Golosov et al. (2013)), and
on models where agents differ in various dimensions but the government can only tax
labor income non-linearly (e.g. Saez (2002a), Saez (2002b), Chone´ and Laroque (2010),
Jacquet et al. (2013), Rothschild and Scheuer (2014), Jacquet and Lehmann (2014)).
Therefore, the current literature can only guide policy makers on the optimal relationship
between these non-linear tax and subsidy instruments under the extreme assumption that
the difference between agents can be expressed in a single parameter.
1This chapter is based on Renes and Zoutman (2014a). We would like to thank Felix Bierbrauer,
Eva Gavrilova, Aart Gerritsen, Yasushi Iwamoto, Bas Jacobs, Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann, John
Morgan, Dominik Sachs, Dirk Schindler, Dana Sisak, Bauke Visser, Casper de Vries and Hendrik Vrijburg
for useful suggestions and comments on an earlier version of this paper. Furthermore, this paper benefited
from comments and suggestions made by participants at the 2011 Nake Conference, Utrecht, the 2013
CESifo Area Conference on Public Economics, Munich, the 69th IIPF Conference, Taormina; ; seminar
participants at the Erasmus School of Economics, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology,
the Norwegian School of Economics, the University of Konstanz and the Centre for European Economic
Research. All remaining errors are our own.
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The current literature on optimal taxation is based on the seminal work of Mirrlees
(1971, 1976). These papers characterize the welfare maximizing allocation in a setting
with individuals that differ in earnings ability alone. In two very influential contributions
Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) rewrite the solution of the model into a much more
intuitive form known as the ABC-formula for optimal taxation. This formula describes
the optimal wedge between the marginal rates of transformation and the marginal rates of
substitution (further: wedge) as a function of behavioral elasticities and the distribution
of income. This ABC-formula facilitates an intuitive explanation of the optimal wedges
in the second-best, and serves as a convenient way to approach data. Together these
papers have provided the basis for a very fruitful line of research in optimal non-linear
redistributive policies.
However successful this approach has been, economists have long recognized that it is
necessary to make more realistic assumptions and allow for multi-dimensional heterogene-
ity in models of optimal taxation (see a.o. Sandmo (1993); Saez (2002a); Judd and Su
(2006); Lockwood and Weinzierl (2012)). Furthermore, the urgency to extend our mod-
els has increased with recent policy discussions on health care subsidies in the US, that
followed the introduction of the affordable care act, as well as discussions on the taxation
of capital, inspired by the best-selling book Piketty (2014). In this chapter we extend the
Mirrleesian model of taxation by letting agents differ in a vector of characteristics and
make a vector of choices, to allow for a richer theoretical discussion of the problem of
redistribution.
In our model agents differ in p ≥ 1 hidden characteristics, such as ability, health-
status, initial wealth and/or patience. The agents make k observable continuous choices
pertaining for instance, labor income, consumption of healthcare products and savings.
Additionally, they choose how much to consume of an untaxed numeraire good. We will
often refer to the choice variables as goods, although they can be either inputs or outputs
in the production process. We assume each of the k goods can be taxed non-linearly.2 In
order to facilitate full revelation we make two assumptions. First, we assume preferences
allow the revelation of all characteristics given the proper mechanism.3 Second, we assume
k ≥ p, the number of choice variables is larger than the number of hidden characteristics.
2It may be possible to extend our model to allow for choice variables that can only be taxed at a
linear rate, as was done in the case of uni-dimensional heterogeneity of agents in e.g. Mirrlees, 1976,
Christiansen, 1984, Boadway and Jacobs, forthcoming. However, this would severely complicate our
analysis, as well as the interpretation of the optimal tax formulas, and is hence beyond the scope of this
paper.
3In particular, we exclude characteristics that do not influence the preference of any choice variable,
and multiple characteristics that influence the preference of only one choice variable. Such characteristics
are fundamentally non-revealable in any mechanism.
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These assumptions allow types to be revealed in the market mechanism, which allows
us to relate optimal policy to observable choice variables in the market. We treat the
problem faced by the central planner as a multi-dimensional screening problem. If all rel-
evant characteristics of all agents were known to the central planner, the Second Welfare
Theorem would imply the planner could select any efficient allocation and implement it
through a schedule of individualized lump-sum taxes. However, the planner cannot ob-
serve the type of each individual directly, so he has to incentivize each individual to reveal
his hidden and multidimensional type. The distortions created by the tax system are the
tools used by the planner to gain information about the type of each individual. This
information can then be used by the planner to redistribute from one type to another.
By reinterpreting the optimal tax problem as a screening or information problem in this
way, we can use insights from the multi-dimensional screening literature (most notably
McAfee and McMillan, 1988, Armstrong, 1996, and Rochet and Chone´, 1998) and apply
them to optimal taxation. This reinterpretation is not completely innocuous. The screen-
ing literature focuses on direct revelation mechanisms and not on the optimal tax system
we want to study. To be able to discuss optimal tax systems, we have to determine how
to find a decentralizing mechanism, a collection of tax rates in this case, that implements
a given second-best allocation in the market. In chapter 2 we show that the design of
the implementing (tax-)mechanism can be very complicated. However, as proposition 2.4
shows, if the government maximizes a welfarist social welfare function and there are no
externalities, the government can implement the second-best allocation by a tax system
that equates the marginal tax rates to the optimal wedges in the second-best allocation.
In this paper we (therefore) assume that the government is welfarist and there are no ex-
ternalities. Proposition 2.4 guarantees that the optimal wedges found through the direct
mechanism in this paper describe all relevant aspects of the optimal tax schedule in our
setting. This allows us to side-step the implementation question in this paper, while still
describing the characteristics of the optimal tax-schedule.
We compare our characterization of the second-best allocation to the second-best in a
uni-dimensional setting by establishing whether well-known results in the uni-dimensional
setting hold in our more general model. Our first proposition shows that the optimal wedge
can be characterized by a generalized version of Diamond’s (1998) and Saez’ (2001) ABC-
formula with an additive structure over the characteristics. The optimal wedge on each
good increases in A, the quality of the signal obtained from observing the good: how
much does a specific choice reveal about the hidden type. In the standard case with
uni-dimensional heterogeneity in earnings ability, an agent’s gross labor earnings reveals
more about his earnings ability if his elasticity of labor supply is smaller. Hence, in our
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interpretation, the optimal tax rate on labor income is decreasing in the labor supply
elasticity, because as the labor supply elasticity increases, the information gained from
distorting labor earnings decreases. In addition, we find that the optimal wedge increases
in B, the redistributive benefit of marginally distorting the price of the good, and decreases
in C, the size of the tax base for which the marginal choice is distorted. The two latter
properties have already been established in the uni-dimensional model. They scale the
optimal distortion for welfare and efficiency reasons respectively.
A corollary to proposition 2.4 shows that an optimal wedge on a good is zero if this
good does not reveal information about any of the hidden characteristics. This corollary
implies the Atkinson-Stiglitz (A-S) theorem in case of uni-dimensional heterogeneity and
weak separability of the utility function. In our interpretation, if disutility of labor is
the only aspect of utility that is not separable from type, the labor choice is the best
signal of the underlying type. Indirect taxation yields no extra information and is thus
not optimal.
The corollary also immediately implies the A-S theorem does not generalize to multi-
dimensional heterogeneity. With at least two types of heterogeneity, a single good can
never extract all available information. If the planner wants to separate agents in the
health and ability dimensions simultaneously, he will have to observe and distort at least
two choices. For instance by taxing both labor income, as well as a good that reveals the
health status of the agent, such as consumption of health care products.
Mirrlees (1976) shows that if agents are heterogeneous in only one dimension, the
optimal wedge on each good can be written as a function of only that good. In case
of multi-dimensional heterogeneity such separable wedges are practically impossible. We
show that in general, in order to facilitate full revelation of the p underlying characteristics,
the marginal tax on each choice is a function of p choice variables.4 Such interdependencies
between distortions on separate choices are very common in the stochastic dynamic models
of the New Dynamic Public Finance (NDPF).5 These models extend the Mirrleesian
framework to a setting where the type of the agents evolves stochastically over time. In
the NDPF the tax on labor income in period t may depend on the labor income earned in
periods prior to t (see e.g. Kocherlakota, 2005). Since in these models the history of play
contains information about the preferences of the agents, it forms a natural extension to
the type space. We show that the interdependencies found in the NDPF models can be
replicated in a deterministic Mirrleesian public finance model, provided the type space is
4This result describes the general case. Special cases may exist where the wedge can be written in a
simpler form.
5See Golosov et al. (2007) for an overview
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multi-dimensional. This suggests that the intertemporal interdependencies in the optimal
tax-schedule in NDPF models may stem from the multi-dimensionality of the type space,
rather than from the stochastics.
We also derive a generalization of the no-distortion at the top result (see e.g. Sadka,
1976 and Seade, 1977). As in the uni-dimensional case, the optimal wedge at the extreme
points of of the type-distribution are zero. If a type exists that has extreme values for all
characteristics, his optimal marginal wedge on all choices equals zero.6 Intuitively, since
there are no ”more extreme” types, setting a wedge to separate out more extreme types
yields no information to the planner. Hence, for any marginal distortion the efficiency cost
of the distortion is higher than the welfare gain at the extreme points of the distribution.
Note that unlike in the uni-dimensional case, in the multi-dimensional case these types
do not necessarily exist. For instance, the healthiest person in the economy may not be
the richest person in the economy. In that case, the healthiest person may face a positive
wedge on his labor income, whereas the richest person may face a positive wedge on his
consumption of healthcare products.
We overcome the technical complexities of deriving the second-best allocation under
multi-dimensional heterogeneity by using a first-order approach. That is, we derive the
optimal allocation in a relaxed problem that takes the first-order incentive constraints
into account, while assuming the second-order incentive constraints are met in optimum.7
This approach has become the standard in the optimal taxation literature with uni-
dimensional heterogeneity. It is well-known that solutions to multi-dimensional screening
problems obtained by the first-order approach consistently violate second-order incentive
constraints at the bottom of the type space if participation constraints are binding (see e.g.
Armstrong, 1996, Rochet and Chone´, 1998). Intuitively, if a principal tries to extract all of
the rents to private information from he bottom types, they will simply stop participating.
Therefore in the second-best allocation these types are bunched together on the outside
option. However, models of optimal taxation typically do not feature binding participation
constraints because it is assumed to be too costly to leave the jurisdiction. Hence, there
is no inherent conflict between participation constraints and incentive constraints. The
normal arguments that guarantee bunching in the second-best allocation, therefore, do
not apply. Although we cannot formally prove that bunching never occurs in our model,
we show in section 3.8 that if separation of types and bunching occur simultaneously,
separation will occur in a single convex subset extending from ”the top” of the type
6This result is reminiscent of the theorem derived in Golosov et al. (2011) where the wedge at the
bottom and top is zero if the stochastic process allows agents to be located at the extremes.
7An introduction to this technique can be found in Wilson (1996).
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space. In this separating set, our solution obtained through the first-order approach still
describes the second-best. Hence, even if the optimal allocation exhibits bunching of types
at the bottom of the type space, our solution remains valid in the upper-interior part of
the type space where full separation of types is optimal.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related
literature. Section 3.3 introduces the model. Section 3.4 derives the optimal allocation
using the first-order approach. Section 3.5 and 3.6 discuss the ABC-formula and our
generalization of A-S. Section 3.7 compares our results to results obtained in the NDPF.
Section 3.8 discusses the potential bunching problem and thus the validity of the first-
order approach and the final section concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
In this paper we rely on the first-order approach to elicit the properties of the second-
best allocation. Another approach to keep the model tractable would be to discretize
the type space (see e.g. Armstrong and Rochet, 1999 for a user’s guide). In a model
with discretely distributed types it is possible to (numerically) verify which incentive
constraints are binding, such that the optimal allocation can be derived without relying
on the first-order conditions allone. The downside of discretizing the distribution is that
the optimal wedge can only be determined on a discrete number of points. Moreover, as
the number of discretized types increases, the problem becomes less tractable. Because
in our model types are continuously distributed it is possible to calculate the wedge
for all levels of the choice variables, thereby deriving the entire shape of the optimal
tax system.Cremer et al. (2001) show in a setting with discretely distributed earnings
ability and wealth endowments that the A-S theorem fails to hold in this setting since the
government optimally taxes savings.
A similar result is derived by Saez (2002a), but now in a n a setting with continuously
distributed types. In a model where agents are heterogeneous in both earnings ability
and preferences the A-S theorem fails when preferences for a particular commodity are
positively correlated with earnings ability, or the preference for leisure. In this case the
government should optimally tax these commodities at a higher rate. Our corollary 3.5
will show that this result holds more generally. Unfortunately, two strong assumptions
make it difficult to use his approach to calculate the entire tax system. First, he assumes
that welfare weights are correlated to ability, but uncorrelated to the other hidden char-
acteristics. However, governments are also likely to give higher welfare weights to agents
with lower health status and lower wealth endowments. Second, in his model all goods
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except labor income are taxed linearly. However, modern governments have access to
a wider range of non-linear instruments such as the tax on capital income, health care
subsidies and education subsidies. Our approach poses no such restrictions and can be
used to calculate all optimal non-linear wedges.
Kleven et al. (2009) study the taxation of couples in a setting where partners have
different earnings ability. To maintain analytic tractability they assume the primary
earner chooses labor supply on the intensive margin while the secondary earner partner
chooses on the extensive margin. In our model agents only make intensive-margin choices.
We argue that many economic decisions such as savings and consumption choices are
more accurately portrayed as choices on the intensive margin. The best solution would
be to combine both approaches. for instance by extending our model with extensive-
margin decisions, as was done with uni-dimensional heterogeneity in Jacquet et al. (2013).
However, we leave this for future research.
Several papers study multi-dimensional screening in a setting where the number of
tools available to the planner is smaller than the number of characteristics, k < p. In
such a setting full separation in the decentralized mechanism is clearly not possible. Pass
(2012) shows that quite generally a less direct version of the revelation principle may
be applied. If the planner finds out how to bunch individuals of different types, he can
integrate out dimensions of the type space until the adjusted dimension of the type space
matches the dimension of the choice space. In the reformulated problem the dimensions
match and one can treat it as a ”normal” mechanism design problem. This method has
been successfully applied in Chone´ and Laroque (2010) in an optimal-tax model where
agents choose labor supply and are heterogeneous in both opportunity cost of work and
ability, while the planner only uses an income tax. They show the income tax rate may
be negative at the bottom of the income distribution if heterogeneity in the opportunity
cost of work is relatively important. Jacquet and Lehmann (2014) develop a similar
method and show that, because of the integration over the type space, the optimal tax
rates identified by an ABC-formula now depend on average behavioral elasticities at each
income level. To limit the complexity of our problem we restrict our attention to the
case where k ≥ p such that we can get full separation and apply the revelation principle
directly. However, it may be possible to extend our results to the case where k < p by
applying the method developed in Pass (2012) and Jacquet and Lehmann (2014).
Rothschild and Scheuer (2011, 2013, 2014) study the situation where the extra di-
mensions in heterogeneity relate to differences in the productivity of each individual in
different productive sectors. General equilibrium effects exists in this model because indi-
viduals can shift effort from one sector to the other. This forces the planner to adjust his
42 As Easy as ABC?
optimal tax rates, compared to the standard Mirrleesian tax rates, to reduce inefficient
shifting. In our model we do not explicitly model different sectors, but it does nest a
model where each individual decides on the intensive margin of effort in different sectors.
In our model we maximize a standard Bergon-Samuelson welfare function, such that
social welfare is a weakly concave sum of individual utility levels. In the field of social
choice there is a large discussion about the validity of using this welfarist objective in
case of preference heterogeneity. A welfarist planner will generally assign different wel-
fare weights to agents with similar ability levels, but different tastes. It is often argued
that such differences in welfare weights violate general notions of fairness. As a result, a
growing literature is studying the optimal tax schedule on labor income under a variety
of non-welfarist objective functions (see e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2006; Fleurbaey,
2006; Kanbur et al., 2006; Jacquet and Van de Gaer, 2011; Ooghe and Peichl, 2011). Their
results show that optimal policy depends strongly on the choice of the planner’s objec-
tive function. However, Kaplow and Shavell (2001) show that any allocation that does
not maximize the objective function of a welfarist planner, violates the Pareto principle.
In addition, Renes and Zoutman (2014b) show that implementation of the second-best
allocation can become very complex, unless it is assumed that the planner maximizes a
welfarist objective function. Finally, it is far from clear that governments should give
equal weight to two agents with similar ability if one is in significantly better health, or
has significantly more inherited wealth than the other. Therefore, in our setting, we apply
the welfarist approach, it offers a tractable objective under which one can define optimal
policy, as well as facilitates the comparison with the uni-dimensional models.
3.3 The Model
In this section we introduce the formal model that will consequently be solved and dis-
cussed in the later sections. First, we define the preferences of the agents in the economy
and the conditions for incentive compatibility. We then use these conditions as restrictions
in the planner’s maximization problem. The model closely follows that of the chapter 2
and of section 4 of Mirrlees (1976).
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3.3.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by a unit mass of individuals that are characterized by a
twice-differentiable utility-function:
u (x,y,n) ,
where x ∈ X ⊆ Rk denotes a vector of choice variables such as effective labor supply,
consumption of health care products and savings.8 y ∈ Y ⊆ R Is an untaxed numeraire
commodity. In principle the choice of the numeraire variable has no effect on the optimal
allocation (an undifferentiated tax on x can achieve the same effect as a tax on y). Decision
variables x and y are observable at the individual level, and the social planner can tax
all choices in x non-linearly, but cannot tax y. Since y will act as an untaxed numeraire,
whether a good is taxed or subsidized relative to laissez faire can be evaluated by direct
comparison to the untaxed y. We assume y is a normal good, such that uy > 0, uyy ≤ 0 for
any value of (x,y,n), this directly implies non-satiation of the utility function everywhere.
throughout the paper we will sometimes refer to the choice variables in {x, y} as goods,
even though they can be both inputs and outputs to the production process.
n ∈ N ⊆ Rk Denotes the type of an individual. Their type is private information to
each individual and unobservable to the government. Each element nj in the type vector
n is referred to as a characteristic. Characteristics may include for instance earnings
ability, health status and preference parameters. For technical convenience we assume
that the type space, N, is convex. The distribution of n is given by the twice-differentiable
cumulative density function F (n), with F : N→ [0, 1] with probability density function
f (n). Both are defined over the closure of N. For technical convenience we assume f > 0
in the interior of N .
Note that we do not restrict ourselves to static models: different choices can occur in
different periods. However, we do assume that both their type and the direct mechanism
are revealed to the individuals before they solve their maximization problem.9
To ensure full separation can occur in a market mechanism we need two additional
assumptions. First, we assume that k ≥ p ≥ 1, such that there are at least as many
decision variables in x as characteristics in n. Therefore, the choice space is large enough
8Note also that the conventional utility representation(See e.g. Mirrlees, 1971, Saez, 2001.) u˜ (y,l)
with l denoting labor supply is a special case of our utility representation. If one takes the standard
assumption that gross income equals x1 = n1l where n1 is earnings ability, it can be seen that this utility
function can be rewritten into our form: u˜ (y,l) = u˜
(
y, x1n1
)
= u (x1, y, n1)
9The model with uni-dimensional heterogeneity has been used often to describe a dynamic economy.
See Golosov et al. (2013) for a recent example.
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to contain all information in the type space. Second, let:
s (x,y,n) ≡ −ux (x, y,n)
uy (x,y,n)
,
denote the vector of shadow prices, such that each element, si, denotes the marginal
rate of substitution for decision variable xi with respect to the numeraire y. We assume
each characteristic denotes some independent aspect of the individuals, such that no
characteristic can be found as a deterministic function of the other characteristics. As
a sufficient condition for this independence we assume the Jacobian sn is of full rank,
p, for any combination {x, y,n}. This assumption excludes the possibility of having
characteristics that do not influence marginal preferences and the possibility of having
two characteristics that jointly affect the preference of only one choice. An example of
the later is a model where individuals differ in their degree of earnings ability and in their
opportunity cost of work. The utility cost of providing a unit of effective labor supply is
decreasing in ability and increasing in the opportunity cost of work. If both characteristics
act only on effective labor supply, it is fundamentally impossible to separate them both in
the choice of labor supply. By assuming sn is of full rank, we guarantee that there is always
a second observable choice which can be used to disentangle the effect of ability and the
opportunity cost of work. If, for instance, the planner could also observe the time spend
on video games, while the preference for video games increases in the opportunity cost of
work, the problem can be solved. In that case the planner can deduce both characteristics
by jointly observing labor earnings and the time spend on video games.10
For bookkeeping, the Jacobian of first-order derivatives φ′ (·) of any function φ (·) :
Ra → Rb, is of dimension b×a, while the second-order derivatives φ′′ (·) are of dimension
ab×a. For any multi-vector functions ψ (z1, z2, . . .) : Ra1×Ra2 . . .→ R the vector of first-
order derivatives ψzi are of dimension a
i × 1 and the matrix of second-order derivatives
ψzizj are of dimension a
i × aj where the dimension of the matrix follows the order of the
subscripts. Superscript T denotes the transpose operator. Vectors and multi-dimensional
constructs are denoted in bold, scalars are in normal font.
10Chone´ and Laroque (2010), Pass (2012) and Jacquet and Lehmann (2014) develop a screening model
with non-revealable characteristics. They solve this problem by aggregating the characteristics into a set
of revealable virtual characteristics. It may be possible to expand our approach using their methodology,
but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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3.3.2 Incentive Compatibility
Before we go to the problem faced by the social planner, we need to consider the problem
of the individuals in our economy. In particular, we derive conditions under which an allo-
cation is incentive compatible. These incentive compatibility constraints will subsequently
be used to solve for the optimal allocation. In a direct mechanism the social planner offers
bundles {x∗ (m) , y∗ (m)} for all m ∈ N. Each individual selects a bundle {x (m) , y (m)}
by sending a message m ∈ N to the social planner. Function x∗ maps from the message
space to the choice-variable space, x∗ : N→ X and y∗ maps from the message space to
the numeraire commodity space, y∗ : N → Y . An allocation {x∗ (m) , y∗ (m)} is incen-
tive compatible if each individual truthfully reveals all his unobserved characteristics and
receives the bundle designed for him.
n = arg max
m
u (x∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n) ∀ n ∈ N (3.1)
Let:
V (n) ≡ max
m
u (x∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n) (3.2)
denote the indirect utility function as a function of the characteristics. In an incentive
compatible allocation V (·) satisfies:
V (n) = u (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)
This equation simply states that maximized utility equals the utility function under op-
timal choices. Proposition 2.4 below largely follows Mirrlees (1976) and McAfee and
McMillan (1988). It derives the first and second-order conditions that are satisfied in a
differentiable incentive compatible allocation on an interior maximum.
Proposition 3.1. An allocation {x = x∗ (n) , y = y∗ (n)} ∀n ∈ N is incentive compatible
if:
y∗′ (n) = s (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)T x∗′ (n) , (3.3)
x∗′ (n)T sn l 0, (3.4)
where l0, signifies negative semi-definiteness of the matrix.
Through the envelope theorem a fully equivalent set of conditions can be derived:
V ′ (n) = un (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)
T , (3.5)
unn (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)− V ′′ (n)l 0. (3.6)
46 As Easy as ABC?
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Equation (3.3) states that an individual should be indifferent between truth telling
and mimicking at the margin for all characteristics. For each row j the left-hand side of
the equation denotes the gain in y as a consequence of marginally changing the reported
characteristic nj. The right-hand side denotes the utility loss in x measured in units of
y for the same change. Therefore, equation (3.3) states that in equilibrium the marginal
cost of mimicking equals the marginal benefits for all characteristics. Equation (3.4) is
the usual second-order condition as derived by Mirrlees (1976). If the marginal rate of
substitution for decision variable xi is increasing (decreasing) in characteristic nj, (si)nj >
0 ((si)nj < 0), and the allocated amount of the good is also increasing (decreasing) in
the characteristic, (x∗i )
′
nj
> 0 ((x∗i )
′
nj
< 0), the allocation induces self-selection. It implies
higher (lower) quantities of the good are assigned to people with a stronger (weaker)
preference for the good.
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) are fully equivalent formulations of the same incentive con-
straints. They are derived through the envelope theorem. Although their explanation is
less intuitive, they are extremely convenient mathematical expressions in the derivations
in subsequent sections.
Note that equation (3.4) combined with the assumption that sn is of rank p, implies
that full separation occurs on the market. This is shown in the next lemma:
Lemma 3.2. If the allocation satisfies (3.4), sn is of full rank and k ≥ p, then all char-
acteristics are revealed through the bundles chosen by the agents in the direct revelation
mechanism.
Proof. Note that (3.4) can only be satisfied if the product x∗′ (n)T sn is definite, and
hence of full rank, p. Since in a matrix product rank (AB) ≤ min (rank (A) , rank (B)),
it follows that (3.4) can only be satisfied if the Jacobian of the allocation, x∗′ (n)T , is also
of full rank p for all values n ∈ N. Since k ≥ p it follows that the allocation is locally
invertible around point n for all n ∈ N. Hence, at least one inverse function from the
image of the allocation function to the type space exists: (x∗)← : X∗→ N, where X∗
denotes the image or range of the allocation function. It follows that by observing the
bundle chosen by the agent, one can deduce all his characteristics.
By lemma 3.2 if the second order incentive constraints (3.4) are satisfied, it follows
that the type of the agent can be deduced by observing all his choice variables. This is
convenient for our analysis, since it allows us to relate optimal policy to observable choices
and underlying characteristics.
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3.4 The Second Best Allocation: A First-Order Ap-
proach
Now that we have established conditions for incentive-compatibility we can turn our
attention to the social planner. We solve the social planner’s problem using a direct
mechanism. We will use the first-order approach, and assume that the second-order
incentive compatibility conditions are met in the optimum. This can be verified ex-post
by checking whether equation (3.4) or, equivalently, equation (3.6) is satisfied. We will
return to the problem of violations of the second-order constraints in section 3.8.
3.4.1 The government
The social planner is assumed to maximize a concave sum of individuals’ utility:
SW =
∫
N
W (u (x,y,n)) dF (n) , (3.7)
W ′ > 0,W ′′ ≤ 0, (3.8)
where W (·) is a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function.11 We assume the social planner com-
mits to the allocation he offers, he cannot alter the allocation after types are revealed.12
Redistribution is considered welfare increasing because of (at least) one of two reasons.
First, concavity in the utility functions of the individuals would imply that individuals
with higher income have a lower marginal utility of income. Second, W ′′ < 0 would imply
the social planner gives a higher welfare weight to individuals with lower utility.
The social planner is bound by the economy’s resource constraint:∫
N
y (n) dF (n) +R ≤
∫
N
q (x (n)) dF (n) , (3.9)
where R denotes exogenous government expenditure and q (·) is the economy’s production
of y as a function of the decision variables in x. A partial derivative qxi may be either
positive or negative depending on whether choice variable xi is an input to, or an output
of the production process. We assume the production technology exhibits diminishing
marginal returns, i.e. qxixi ≤ 0 for all goods xi, to guarantee that an interior solution will
be reached in laissez faire.
11As we show in proposition 2.4 this assumption ensures that the second-best allocation can be imple-
mented by equating taxes to wedges.
12See Roberts (1984) for a discussion on the issue of commitment.
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3.4.2 First-order conditions
In the first-order approach the social planner maximizes social welfare subject to the
first-order incentive compatibility constraint, (3.5), the feasibility constraint, (3.9), and
a constraint that allows us to substitute out the utility function for the indirect utility
function:
max
V (n),x∗(n),y∗(n)
∫
N
W (V (n)) dF (n) , s.t. (3.10)
0 ≥ R +
∫
N
(y∗(n)− q(x∗ (n))) dF (n) ,
V ′ (n) = un (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)
T , (3.11)
V (n) = u (x∗ (n) , y∗ (n) ,n) , (3.12)
where maximized utility V (n) is explicitly modeled as a choice variable. The Lagrangian
to this problem is given by:
L=
∫
N
[
(W (V )− λ (R + y∗ − q(x∗))) f + θT (V ′T − un)+ η (u− V )] dn,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource constraint, θ (n) is
a p-column vector of Lagrangian multipliers for the set of local incentive compatibility
constraints, and η (n) is the Lagrangian multiplier that ensures maximized utility equals
the utility function for each type. Note that s, f , F , θ, u and their derivatives depend on n,
but for clarity of exposition this notation is suppressed. We let ∂N denote the boundary
of N and e the outward unit surface normal vector to the boundary of N. through
the divergence theorem (or multi-dimensional integration by parts) we can rewrite the
Lagrangian as:
L =
∫
N
[
(W (V )− λ (R + y∗ − q(x∗))) f − V
p∑
j=1
∂θj
∂nj
− θTun + η (u− V )
]
dn
+
∫
∂N
[V θTe]d∂N. (3.13)
Assuming the functions V and θ are smooth, this function can be maximized point wise
on the interior and boundary of the type space.
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On the interior of the type space the first-order conditions with respect to variables
x, y and V are:
∂L
∂y
= 0 : −λf − uynθ + ηuy = 0, (3.14)
∂L
∂x
= 0k : λq
′Tf − uxnθ+ηux = 0k, (3.15)
∂L
∂V
= 0 : W ′f −
p∑
j=1
∂θj
∂nj
− η = 0. (3.16)
The next proposition uses these first-order conditions to derive an ABC-formula for
the optimal wedge in the spirit of Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001).
Proposition 3.3. The optimal wedge on good i for type n can be described by the following
formula:
qxi (x
∗ (n))− si (x∗ (n) , y∗ (n) ,n)
si (x∗ (n) , y∗ (n) ,n)
=
p∑
j=1
Aij (n)Bij (n)Cij (n) (3.17)
∀ i = 1, . . . , k; n ∈ N,
where:
Aij (n) ≡ εxinj (n) = −
∂si (x
∗ (n) , y∗ (n) ,n)
∂nj
nj
si (x∗ (n) , y∗ (n) ,n)
,
Bij (n) = θj (n)
uy (x
∗ (n) , y∗ (n) ,n)
λ
, (3.18)
Cij (n) =
1
njf (n)
.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Note that proposition 3.3 provides the optimal wedges, but gives no direct information
about the optimal tax rate. However, as we show in proposition 2.4, if the allocation is
optimal to a welfarist planner and there are no externalities, a tax system that equates
taxes to wedges can implement the allocation. As such, the wedges derived above contain
all relevant information for an implementing tax system. We postpone discussion of the
ABC-formula to section 3.5 where we compare it to the optimal wedge formula under
uni-dimensional heterogeneity. In the next subsections we use proposition 3.3 to derive
some technical aspects about the optimal tax rate at the boundaries of the type space
and suggest an algorithm to solve the model.
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3.4.3 Boundary Conditions: No Distortion at the Corners
The boundary conditions can be found by differentiating equation (3.13) with respect
to V (·) at the boundary of the type space ∂N . Only the final term of equation (3.13)
depends on the boundary. Hence, we find:
θj
(
nj
)
= θj (nj) = 0, (3.19)
where nj (nj) represents the type that has the lowest (highest) value for characteristic
j. Define corner types nqy as agents that have either highest or lowest values for all their
characteristics. In a two-dimensional type space type n = (n1, n2) and n = (n1, n2) are
obviously corner types, but so are the types that combine the lowest value of n1 with the
highest value of n2 and vice versa: n = (n1, n2) and n = (n1, n2). There are at most 2
p
corner types although there may be less, or none at all, depending on whether there is a
positive density f (.) at each corner, and on whether or not the distribution is bounded.
Corollary 3.4 establishes that for each existing corner type the optimal wedge on all goods
equals zero.
Corollary 3.4. The optimal wedge for any type nqy equals zero if the types exist.
Proof. From the boundary conditions it follows that θj
(
nj
)
= θj (nj) = 0 for all j =
1, . . . , p. The optimal wedge at the corner types can be found by taking the limit of
equation (3.17) if n goes to an nqy:
lim
n→nqy
qxi − si
si
= lim
n→nqy
p∑
j=1
εxinj
uyθj (n) /λ
njf (n)
which equals 0 provided f
(
nqy
)
does not equal zero, that is, provided the type exists
in the economy.
Corollary 3.4 shows that the no-distortion at the top and the bottom results, as derived
in Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977), remain valid in a multi-dimensional framework as long
as the type distribution is bounded. Technically, the no-distortion at the corner result
follows from the transversality conditions of the optimization problem. Intuitively, if
there are no individuals of more extreme type, distorting their choices will not yield any
extra information. In terms of our motivating examples, if an individual is the healthiest,
most able person around, distorting his choices will not lead to extra information or
redistributive benefits, but will come at an efficiency loss. As such, the optimal wedges
at the corners of the type distribution must equal zero.
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Our results are similar to those of Golosov et al. (2011) who derive the optimal tax
rate at the boundary in a model where earnings ability follows a stochastic progress.
They show that the optimal tax rate for types that persistently have the highest or lowest
skill-realization equals zero provided such types exist.
Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) show that the optimal marginal tax
rate converges to a constant at the top in the uni-dimensional case, provided the upper
tail of ability follows a Pareto distribution. We are not able to derive such a result in the
multi-dimensional framework since this requires an explicit solution for all θj.
3.4.4 Finding the Optimal Allocation
The last step in the problem of the planner is to find the second-best allocation. Although
equation (3.17) gives a useful representation of the wedges, there is no closed-form solution
for the optimal allocation. Depending on the specification, deriving the optimal allocation
may be a computationally complex process and certainly goes beyond the scope of this
paper. However, in this subsection we sketch an algorithm that can solve for the optimal
allocation. The solution method described here is largely based on Mirrlees (1976).
First, the set of equations (3.11, 3.12) can be used to solve for {x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} as an
(implicit) function of V ′ (n) , V (n) and n:
{x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} = ψ (V ′ (n) , V (n) ,n) .
Second, by means of this equation and (3.14) and (3.15) we can solve for {θ (n) , η (n)}
as an explicit function of x∗ (n), y∗ (n) and n, and hence as an (implicit) function of
V ′ (n) , V (n) and n :
{θ (n) , η (n)} = φˆ (x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)) = φ (V ′ (n) , V (n) ,n) .
Finally, if we substitute this result into the last first-order condition 3.16 it forms a second-
order partial differential equation. This differential equation can be integrated numerically
under the boundary conditions (3.19) and (3.9). The solution provides us with V ′ (n) and
V (n) which can subsequently be used to find the allocation {x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)}. From here
the optimal wedges can be found by substituting the solution {x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} into the
ABC-formula (3.17).
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3.5 The ABC Formula
In this section we use the ABC-formula (3.17) to compare the optimal wedge under multi-
dimensional heterogeneity to the outcome in the uni-dimensional case. In addition, we
use the ABC-formula to revisit the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem under multi-dimensional
heterogeneity in the next section.
As in the uni-dimensional case, the left-hand side of equation (3.17) represents the
optimal wedge on good xi for type n. This distortion is broken down into different factors
of interest on the right-hand side.
The A-term is a measure of the informational value of good xi. Intuitively, if the
elasticity εxinj is large, it means that the preference for choice xi strongly increases in
characteristic nj. Hence, xi is a very strong signal of characteristic nj, and therefore the
optimal wedge is large. Our A-term is more general than the ones derived in Diamond
(1998), Saez (2001), and Jacquet et al. (2013) because we use a more general utility
function. In Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) the utility-function is of the form: u (y, l) =
u
(
y, x
n
)
, where y is consumption, n is productivity and x = nl is effective labor supply
(or labor income). Their A-term is inversely related to the compensated labor supply
elasticity. In Jacquet et al. (2013) the assumed utility function is u1 (y) + u2 (x, n). Their
A-term is also inversely related to the compensated labor supply elasticity. The inverse
relation between labor elasticities and marginal tax rates can easily be explained in terms
of an information problem. If the labor supply elasticity is large, this means that a small
change in the net wage rate leads to a large change in labor income. Therefore, distorting
labor income marginally leads to a large behavioral response and an imprecise signal of
ability. It follows that the optimal tax rate on labor is decreasing in the labor supply
elasticity, since the higher the elasticity the less information is gained from marginally
changing the labor choice. As this comparison of the A terms shows, our informational
elasticity is therefore related to the inverse of the labor elasticity. The intuition behind
the term is the same, whatever elasticity one uses.
The B-term represents the redistributive benefits of distorting choice xi for character-
istic nj. θj Is the Lagrangian multiplier of incentive compatibility constraint nj. Hence,
it represents the welfare cost of separating type n in characteristic nj. In equilibrium θj
should equal the marginal welfare benefit of making the allocation marginally less incen-
tive compatible in choice xi (i.e. increase the distortion on choice xi). By multiplying θj
with uy and dividing through λ the welfare gain for such a redistribution is expressed in
units of the numeraire good. An increase in the marginal welfare benefit of distortion,
higher θj, logically increases the optimal distortion. Since the shape of this term strongly
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depends on θ, and thus the solution to a set of PDEs, it is impossible to comment on it
more generally.
The C-term is related to the size of the tax base for whom the marginal incentives are
distorted by the wedge. The denominator represents the size of the tax base with respect
to characteristic nj. The larger this tax base is, the larger the incidence of the distortion
and, hence, the larger the efficiency cost associated with the distortion. Efficiency implies
that the size of the distortion is inversely related to the incidence of the distortion, as
the C-term clearly shows. In uni-dimensional cases, the C-term is often multiplied by
1 − F (n) to make it proportional to the (measurable) inverse hazard-rate of the ability
distribution. This is corrected for by dividing the A or B-term through the same factor. In
a single-dimensional distribution of types, such fractions have an intuitive interpretation
as conditional means. Unfortunately, this interpretation is lost when the type-distribution
is multi-dimensional. We therefore present the simplest form of the equation, rather than
the version with conditional means.
The largest difference between the uni-dimensional and the multi-dimensional ABC-
formula is the need to sum over all characteristics to get the optimal wedge for a good
xi in the latter case. That the optimal distortion with a multi-dimensional type space
can be described with a formula that resembles the uni-dimensional description so clearly
seems quite remarkable. The similarities are a clear testament to the strength of the ABC-
formula as a description of the equilibrium in the Mirrleesian tax model. Especially the
additive nature of the wedges over the different dimensions of the type space is surprising.
The summation indicates that the optimal wedge on good xi is the sum of the optimal
wedges for each characteristic. For example, if earning labor income is easier for agents
with higher ability and for agents with a better health state, the planner can calculate the
optimal wedge on labor income by adding the optimal wedge on the basis of redistribution
in ability to the optimal wedge of redistribution in health. This additive nature of the
wedge could be particularly useful for policy evaluation. In our example, if through the
uni-dimensional model of optimal taxation one could determine the optimal wedge on the
basis of redistribution in ability, this wedge can serve as a lower-bound on the optimal
wedge on labor income for a planner that also wants to redistribute from healthy to sick
(provided there is a non-negative correlation between health and income).
The summation also appears to indicate that wedges used to identify types in one
dimension can be treated separately from wedges used to identify the other dimensions
of the type-space. However, beyond the possibility to set bounds, this appearance is
deceiving. Intuitively, it seems unlikely that one can separate out individuals on wealth
and income independently of each other. Individuals will treat monetary wealth and
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monetary income as substitutes in their budgets, thus creating interdependence in choices.
This relation will lead to interdependencies between wedges in the second best. In the
optimum, the marginal tax on income will have to depend on wealth. Similarly, if the
planner wants to redistribute more toward the unhealthy individuals with a given ability,
than to similarly able individuals with good health, marginal tax rates will have to depend
on income and health. These complexities are discussed next.
3.6 The Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem
The Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976), further A-S theorem, states
that indirect taxation is superfluous in a setting where agents are heterogeneous in earn-
ings ability if preferences are homogenous and the utility function is weakly separable in
labor. The result has subsequently been generalized in Laroque (2005), Kaplow (2006),
Gauthier and Laroque (2009) and Hellwig (2010) to more general utility functions with
single dimensional heterogeneity. If the conditions of the A-S theorem (i.e. weak sep-
arability and uni-dimensional heterogeneity) are satisfied the government can reach the
second-best allocation by only taxing labor income. Equivalently the planner could tax
all commodities at an uniform rate. The main application of the theorem is, perhaps, that
commodities should be taxed at the same rate over time. That is, the optimal capital-tax
rate equals zero.
The next corollary uses our ABC-formula to investigate when the optimal wedge on a
good equals zero. If all wedges but one are equal to zero, the government can reach second-
best with a single tax tool and one could say the A-S theorem applies. The next corollary
thus shows us when the A-S theorem holds under multi-dimensional heterogeneity by
showing when only a single distortion is necessary to reach second best.
Corollary 3.5. The optimal wedge on good xi is zero if εxinj = 0 ∀ nj ∈ N, that is,
the optimal wedge is zero if the marginal rate of substitution for xi does not depend on
any characteristic nj for all types.
Proof. If the marginal rate of substitution, si, is independent of all characteristics nj,
then εxinj = 0 ∀ nj ∈ N, such that Aij ∀nj are zero and the optimal wedge on xi is
zero by equation (3.17).
Intuitively, corollary 3.5 shows that the marginal wedge on a good equals zero if the
preference for this good is not directly influenced by any characteristic. In that case
the choice for this good does not provide any first order information and distorting the
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choice away from laissez faire is not optimal. It follows immediately from corollary 3.5
that the optimal wedge on all goods except income equals zero in the model of A-S. The
assumption of weak separability implies that the marginal rates of substitution for all
goods except income are independent of type, such that all εxinj except the one on income
are zero. Because we have assumed sn has rank p, εxinj 6= 0 for at least p choices in our
model. Hence, if all characteristics are independent and revealable, the A-S theorem does
not hold under multi-dimensional heterogeneity. Intuitively, a government that wants to
redistribute in multiple dimensions, cannot do so by distorting the price of only one good.
In fact, under our full revelation assumptions of lemma 3.2 a Tinbergen rule applies. A
planner that wants to redistribute over p characteristics will need to distort (at least) p
choices.
In the literature many violations of the A-S theorem have been recorded. In Erosa and
Gervais (2002) preferences are not weakly separable over time since consumption at old
age is a stronger complement to leisure than consumption at a younger age. Therefore,
the distortion of the labor income tax is reduced by taxing capital income. In Golosov et
al. (2013) capital is optimally taxed if households with higher ability also have higher pa-
tience. Boadway and Pestieau (2011) show that the theorem fails if households optimally
choose a corner solution. Therefore, if some households are cash-constrained and do not
buy all commodities, the tax rate on these commodities should be different to identify the
cash constrained households. Farhi and Werning (2010) and Kopczuk (2013) show that
the bequest motive may generate a negative externality which can be remedied through
the taxation of capital. The argument that is closest to our is derived in Cremer et al.
(2001) and Saez (2002a) who show that under bi-dimensional heterogeneity commodity
taxation is not superfluous. However, the former result is derived in a setting with dis-
crete types and the latter is derived under the assumption that welfare weights are only
correlated with earnings ability and commodity taxes are linear.
Our result adds to this literature by showing generally that the A-S theorem cannot
hold under multi-dimensional heterogeneity, provided that all (or at least two) underlying
characteristics can be revealed. This has large implications for the evaluation of govern-
ment policy. According to the A-S theorem we can obtain a second-best allocation if the
only government intervention is the taxation of labor income. We show that if a govern-
ment cares about redistribution in multiple dimensions, such as from healthy to sick and
from rich to poor, it needs to distort multiple choices in order to attain the second-best
allocation. Therefore, government intervention in many markets, like the health care and
the rental market, may be optimal. In addition, the optimal wedge on capital income
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may be non-zero if households differ in their investment skills, for no other reason than
this difference in skill.
3.7 Interdependencies in the Tax System in Mirrleesian
and New Dynamic Public Finance
The NDPF, pioneered in Golosov et al. (2003), generalizes the Mirrlees model with uni-
dimensional heterogeneity to a dynamic stochastic setting. For each agent, earnings ability
follows a known stochastic process that takes a different value in each period. Each agent’s
earnings ability is revealed to him at the beginning of the period. Agents therefore do not
know what their earnings ability will be in future periods, but they can have expectations
about it. The planner does not observe ability, but does observe all choices made by the
agents in the economy, and can keep records over time.
One of the most intriguing results in the NDPF is the complexity of the optimal tax
system. Kocherlakota (2005), for instance, shows that the optimal tax on labor income in
period t may depend on the entire history of labor income up to period t.13 However, so far
there is no clear explanation why interdependencies are present in the NDPF in the first
place, or alternatively, why they are typically absent in the classical (static) Mirrleesian
public finance. In this section we show that interdependencies in the wedges generally do
occur in Mirrleesian public finance models, provided agents are heterogeneous in multiple
dimensions. Subsequently, we give our model a dynamic interpretation, and provide a
link between the result found in Kocherlakota (2005) and our model.
The next corollary uses proposition 3.3 and lemma 3.2 to show that the optimal wedge
on each choice depends on p choices.
Corollary 3.6. The optimal wedge on good i depends on p choices.
Proof. By lemma 3.2 there exists an inverted mapping of the allocation (x∗)← : X∗ → N
for all n ∈ N. This inverse mapping generally depends on p choice variables, since the
allocation is of rank p everywhere on the type space. Therefore, we can write the optimal
wedges for any type as a function of p choices. Equation (3.17) shows that the wedges
solve a set of partial differential equations that are of rank p as a result of lemma 3.2 (see
section 3.4.4), hence each individual wedge can be written as a function of p choices.
13Subsequent papers have made some progress on limiting the number of interdependencies in special
cases. In particular, Albanesi and Sleet (2006) show that the intertemporal interdependencies disappear
when the stochastic process is iid. In that case, they show the optimal wedge in each period depends on
current labor income and wealth, such that only an intratemporal interdependency remains between the
optimal wedge on capital and labor income.
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If all wedges are functions of p choices, then by construction so are all marginal taxes
(see Mirrlees, 1976 and Renes and Zoutman, 2014b). Therefore, a separable tax system
where the wedge of each good depends only on consumption of that good will not generally
exist if p > 1. Intuitively, the choice for each good depends on the budget set and the
rest of the choices made. Since each individual will optimally trade consumption of one
good for consumption of all other goods, the wedge on each good will in general have to
condition on the consumption of all other goods. For instance, if the optimal labor income
choice depends on both earnings ability and health, the government needs to condition
its tax rate on two observable choices that reveal both characteristics (e.g. labor income
and consumption of health care products) to be able to generate full separation.
There is a number of mathematical reasons why the optimal wedge for each good is
almost always a function of all underlying characteristics. First, most probability density
functions, f(n), are a function of all characteristics such that the C term in equation
(3.17) depends on all characteristics. In addition, the partial differential equations (3.16),
which solve for the θ’s, are a function of indirect utility. In equilibrium, indirect utility
always has to be a function of all n in order to fulfill the incentive compatibility constraint
(3.11). The solution to the set of partial differential equations in equation (3.17) therefore
depends on all equations. It may be possible to construct special cases where the optimal
wedge on each good depends on only one characteristic by, for instance, assuming (weak)
separability of preferences, a uniform type distribution and quasi-linearity of the utility
functions. In general, however, we expect any optimal tax system that redistributes in
multiple dimensions to have an amount of interdependencies equal to the dimensionality
of the problem.
3.7.1 A Dynamic Interpretation
Consider a T -period economy and assume that agents’ abilities evolve over time. Denote
ability in period t by nt and assume the agents know their entire (future) history of
ability levels, the vector n = [n1, . . . , nT ] at the beginning of the first period. Clearly,
this is a strong assumption on the information available to the agents of the model. In
contrast, in NDPF models agents only learn their ability in each period at the beginning
of that period, such that their knowledge of future types is limited to knowledge about
the stochastic process. Note, however, that this model can be seen as a special case of
a NDPF model where ability evolves according to a fully deterministic process known to
the agents, but not the planner. The government cannot observe the individual ability
levels but is aware of the probability density function of the cross section f (n), and
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cumulative density function F (n) and both are time independent. In addition, assume
for simplicity that each agent makes one independent choice each period, the amount of
labor income he earns, xt. Our model can be used to calculate the welfare-optimizing
wedge on each period’s labor income xt. By proposition 3.3 the optimal wedge is given by
equation (3.17). From corollary 3.6 it follows that the optimal wedge in each period can
be written as a function of the entire history of labor income (including future periods in
this case). Intuitively, the optimal wedges depend on terms A, how much information a
choice reveals, B, the redistributive value of the wedge, and C, the incidence of marginal
distortions. Each of these terms may depend on the entire vector n. In turn, in order to
reveal the entire vector the planner needs to observe all choices in x, the entire history of
labor income. Due to information restrictions the taxes in NDPF models are generally not
conditioned on future income. Since neither the planner nor the individuals know future
types, all they can do is calculate expectations. These expectations will depend on the
stochastic process (public knowledge) and the realizations of this process, i.e. the history
up until that moment. On any truthful path an optimal tax schedule that can non-linearly
use the history up until that time, thus envelopes all available knowledge about future
types. Adding terms that explicitly condition on unknown future realizations thus add
no value.
It may perhaps seem surprising that Kocherlakota’s result can be replicated so easily
in a deterministic setting. However, as was noted in Pavan et al. (2011), in a deterministic
model agents can plan their entire choice vector x in the first period, with full knowledge
about their type n. In a stochastic setting information concerning the type is revealed
over time. As such, a stochastic model may allow for less (profitable) deviations than a
deterministic model. At any time agents can see what choices they still have to make,
such that their choice-vector is known. However, in a stochastic setting agents always
have weakly less information than in the deterministic setting. This implies the incentive
constraints are more binding in our model than in the NDPF. Hence, if intertemporal
interdependencies are optimal in a stochastic setting, they are likely also optimal in a
deterministic setting. It also follows that interdependencies in the tax system can stem
from the multi-dimensionality in the type space, irrespective of the (dynamic) stochastic
processes assumed.
The practical implications of this result are less clear. A literal reading of the model
described in this subsection would suggest the government should build intertemporal in-
terdependencies in the tax system. One could let the labor income tax increase in previous
income, for instance. However, it is unclear how much welfare is gained by introducing
these interdependencies. Simulations on a NDPF model in Farhi and Werning (2013)
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show that much of the welfare gain of optimal taxation can be obtained by tax systems
that do not exhibit any interdependencies. While implementation and administration
costs of these interdependencies can be quite high.
3.8 Bunching
So far we have worked from a relaxed problem that assumes away second-order incentive
constraints. We have therefore ignored possible violations of the second-order incentive
compatibility conditions, (3.4). In most multi-dimensional screening problems the second-
best allocation contains bunching at the lower end of the type distribution. Bunching
occurs if the solution to the first-order approach violates the second order conditions (3.4)
on part of the type space. In this case, certain types would prefer the bundle of another
type over the one assigned to them. In our examples wealthy, highly able individuals
might prefer the bundle the planner intents for low ability individual, and consume a lot
of leisure.
In this section we address this issue by showing what happens to the solution if bunch-
ing occurs. The next proposition shows that if bunching occurs, it occurs at the bottom
of the type space. Denote by NB the bunching partition of the type space, and by NS its
complement, the separating region, where full separating is optimal. Then by definition
NB ∪NS = N. The next proposition shows that NS is a single convex set that extends
from the upper boundary of the type space.
Proposition 3.7. If NS exists, it is a single convex set that extends from the upper
boundary of the type space.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Intuitively, the proof of proposition 3.7 follows from the fact that incentive problems
are more likely to occur at the bottom of the type space. The planner wants to extract as
much informational rents from types at the top of the type space as possible, such that
it can redistribute these rents to the bottom types. Therefore, bunching at the top of the
type space is particularly costly to the planner. To facilitate full separation of the types
at the top, it may be optimal to bunch together types at the bottom of the distribution.
In screening problems with binding participation constraints there is always bunching at
the bottom of the type space. This was proven in Zheng (2000) for auctions, Armstrong
(1996) for non-linear multi-product monopoly pricing and Rochet and Chone´ (1998) for
general screening problems. In all cases, an attempt to extract all rents from agents at
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the bottom of the type space will inevitably lead to non-participation of some of these
agents, and thus a non-participation bunch at the bottom.
Although there is no participation constraint in our model, we cannot exclude the
possibility that the first-order approach will violate second-order conditions on part of the
type space. However, by proposition 3.7, if separation is optimal in a partition of the type
space NS, this partition is convex. Lemma 3.2 shows that our solution still describes the
optimal wedge in the partition of the type space where full separation occurs. It follows,
that the optimal wedges in the separating partition are still described by proposition 3.3.
Hence, even if the first-order approach does not yield the optimal wedge for every type,
this does not necessarily invalidate our approach.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
Although significant progress has been made in multi-dimensional mechanism design, the
equilibrium in a multi-dimensional Mirrleesian optimal tax model had so far not been
characterized. In this paper we characterize it and show some similarities and differences
with the uni-dimensional Mirrleesian model. Furthermore we show how the equilibrium
relates to the stochastic dynamic NDPF models and the wider class of multi-dimensional
screening models.
Our model can be used to study the relationship between several tax tools. Our
characterization of the second-best equilibrium shows that the government should search
for consumption patterns that provide as much information on the underlying types as
possible. More importantly, the multi-dimensionality in the type space forces the govern-
ment to make the redistributive taxes depend on several observable choices to separate
out different aspects of the hidden types. It might not be optimal to separate out types
everywhere in the type space, in which case some bunching occurs at the lower end of
the type space. This prescription fits reasonably well with the tax schedules observed in
welfare states. The lowest earning individuals get welfare assistance, or income subsidies,
creating a bunch at the lower end of the income distribution. Most assistance programs
are conditioned on (the absence of) wealth, to make sure that no abuse occurs. This is
the kind of interdependencies between underlying characteristics (wealth and ability) our
model predicts. Many welfare states also subsidize medical expenses or housing for a large
group of people. In theory the government could directly transfer the required money to
recipients, rather than paying part of the price. A direct transfer, however, would make it
impossible for the government to find out whether or not you are in need of health care,
i.e. the government cannot determine your hidden type through a direct transfer, but
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can do so through the subsidy. We would therefore indeed predict the government uses
subsidies that depend on income and expenses (or other observables) rather than direct
transfers for differentiated assistance.
The equilibrium in our model depends on solving a set of partial differential equations
for which no general solution exists, therefore we can only characterize equilibrium through
a set of necessary conditions. These conditions strongly limit the possible outcomes, but
can never give a full description of the second-best. The next step in this line of research
clearly is to find specific, realistic and relevant settings and simulate the model. This is,
however, a difficult step. The multi-dimensional heterogeneity sets strong requirements
on the optimization algorithms. In addition, the problem of implementation, which is
discussed in chapter 2, might add further difficulties. Implementation can proof especially
difficult because implementation on the interior of the separating partition will likely
require a different set of instruments than the implementation on the bunching partition.
However, once these difficulties have been overcome the model presented in this paper
can be used to provide a more precise insight in the optimal relation between the income
tax system and the myriad of social schemes like health care subsidies, housing subsidies,
and welfare assistance that characterize modern welfare states.
Since this model contains the multi-dimensional type space that is also found in the
NDPF without the dynamic stochastics, it could also provide a convenient middle ground
between the complex stochastic dynamics in these models, and the known intuitions
in the classical Mirrlees model. The problems of joint (or double) deviation and the
interdependencies in the optimal wedges that plague NDPF models are, for instance, also
prevalent in our setting, but can be traced much more conveniently. These results indicate
that at least part of the difficulties in the NDPF literature are due to the structure of
hidden information. This shows that we can gain intuition for these tax schedules from
multi-dimensional screening models, in particular our model. In fact, the discussion in
section 3.7 already suggests that our findings might be generalized to dynamic settings.
This would allow an elasticity approach and a new focus on implementation in these
models as well.

Chapter 4
Who Dares? Interactive survey
evidence on perceptions and risk
attitudes in the boardroom.1
4.1 Introduction
Individual risk attitudes are an important aspect of economic and finance theory. They
are used to explain a.o. the existence of insurance markets, risk premia in asset prices, and
option contracts in executive compensation. Risk attitudes have been studied intensively
in lab settings using students (see. e.g. Eckel and Grossman (2008)). Most relevant risky
decisions, however, are not taken by students but by professionals. Corporate executives in
particular are responsible for large investments and risky ventures, almost on a daily basis.
Because decision making under risk is such an essential part of the job of an executive
and their decisions have a large impact on their companies and employees, studying their
decision processes is of first-order importance. Ideally, one would study management
decisions related to risk directly and then see the effect on company outcomes. This level
of access (and devotion) has proven infeasible so far. The difficulty of bringing together a
large group of relevant respondents seems to have caused researchers to look for alternative
methods. In behavioral finance, for instance, many authors use demographic attributes
or observable behavior of top executives as proxies for their cognitive styles, knowledge
base and risk attitudes. These proxies are then used to explain corporate decisions, or
stock exchange outcomes to show how the top- management team (TMT) influences the
company. While this type of research has uncovered many interesting relationships, it
1This chapter is based on De Groot et al. (2012)
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leaves many open questions, as it inevitably treats the company as a black box. In
this paper we present the results of a new survey methodology that allows researchers
to study the decisions of hard to reach groups, like executives, more directly. With this
methodology we study how corporate directors view their own and each other’s willingness
to take risks and compare these beliefs to behavior in realistic investment scenario’s.
We use a dynamic website to tailor each survey to the respondent, while guaranteeing
anonymity. Each respondent is only asked to respond to vignettes that mimic investment
scenarios in areas in which he has expertise and the investment is scaled to the size of
decisions he takes in his professional life. This process automates some of the aspects of
a structured interview, allowing us to question respondents on relevant aspects of their
experience, without ever breaking the guarantee of anonymity, or having to bring large
groups of respondents together at any one point in time. This approach allows us to apply
some of the methodology of experimental economics, most importantly randomization,
pre-structured interaction, exogenously imposed variation in treatments/decisions and
anonymity, to a group of relevant decision makers that is near to impossible to get into a
lab. With our limited number of respondents we are able to find corroborating evidence
for earlier findings from the behavioral finance and upper echelon literature. Furthermore,
the exogenous variation allows us to compare between subjects and shed light on the risk
attitudes of the different members of the boardroom and their perceptions of each other.
We believe that acquiring more quantitative data in this manner provides a viable and
valuable method for future research.
The results of our survey show that there is a discrepancy between the perceived
willingness to take risk of the average CEO, CFO and Non Executive Director (NED,
member of the supervisory board) and the ranking of average willingness to take risks
that follows from our vignettes. Our respondents rate the average CEO as more willing
to take risks than the average CFO and NED, who are not perceived to be significantly
different. In our investment scenarios, the average CFO and CEO ask the same return,
while the average NED asks significantly more. The real divide in the boardroom appears
to be between the executives and the non-executives. Simultaneously, the average CEO
and NED report to experience more risk of a given investment than the CFO. Together
these findings indicate it is actually the CFO that is most willing to take risks, followed
by the CEO and, after some distance, the NEDs. Since we control for demographics
and investment specifics, this effect seems to be driven by the role of the director in the
decision process.
Using the survey responses we show corroborating evidence for the use of demographic
variables as proxies for the cognitive styles and knowledge base of board members at the
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level of individual decisions. Our results indicate that age and experience decrease the
willingness to take risks of individual board members, which was also found through more
indirect methods (e.g. Berger et al. (2013); MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990); Sanders
(2001); Wiersema and Bantel (1992)). We also find that (over-)confidence has a clear
negative effect on the return demanded by our respondents and the risks they perceive
from investment. This effect is not driven by a specific member of the TMT: we find
no significant differences between the distribution of confidence in the groups of CEOs,
CFOs and NEDs, and all groups show signs of overconfidence.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 discusses some related
literature, section 4.3 details our methodology and survey, section 4.4 discusses some
empirical predictions that are tested in section 4.5, section 4.6 discusses the results and
concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Most closely related to ours are papers that study the effects of individual characteristics
of the board members on their decisions and company outcomes. Many examples can be
found in behavioral finance and upper echelon theory (see Barberis and Thaler (2003),
Hambrick (2007) and Baker and Wurgler (2011) for surveys). Getting access to the
members of the corporate elite is the biggest challenge to this type of research. Leblanc
and Schwartz (2007) give an overview of the most used solutions. In this paper we present
the results of a first study that combines the possibilities of dynamic webpages with more
traditional survey techniques. This methodology could allow a new way of studying the
behavior of hard to reach respondents.
Fehr and List (2004) and List and Mason (2011) tackle the problems of access and
incentives through a very creative, and effective solution. They visited a conference of
Costa Rican coffee companies, which solved the issue of bringing the CEOs together. Due
to the wage differences between Costa Rica and the US these authors were able to provide
credible monetary incentives to this group of corporate executives, allowing them to run
lab experiments. Fehr and List (2004) study the effects of incentives and punishment
on the trust and trustworthiness amongst this group of Costa Rican coffee CEOs. They
find that these CEOs are more trusting than a reference group of students, but respond
similarly to the possibility of using punishment. List and Mason (2011) show that this
same group of CEOs presents large deviations from expected utility theory and that their
risk aversion seems to increase when the probability of large losses increases. To the best
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of our knowledge, these are the only papers to present direct laboratory evidence on the
risk attitudes of executives.
In a survey study MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) find that success is positively
correlated with willingness to take risk. They also find that failed risky decisions obstruct
career plans. Furthermore, more successful executives rate themselves as more willing to
take business risks and rank higher on a sensation seeking scale than the less successful
executives.2 The willingness to take business risk and the need to seek sensation are both
negatively correlated to age. We present corroborating evidence for the last finding, older
respondents tend to be less willing to take risks in our vignettes.
Graham et al. (2013) administer psychological tests as well as ask their survey respon-
dents about their companies’ characteristics to be able to relate the two and guarantee
anonymity. Their results indicate that personality traits of the CEO, like overconfidence
and optimism, have the expected effect on leverage and other corporate choices. While
patience and risk tolerance of the CEO are negatively related to the fraction of flat salary
in his total compensation package.
Ben-David and Graham (2013) use statements gathered from CFOs over time to mea-
sure CFO overconfidence. Their overconfidence proxy is created by asking CFOs for an
80% confidence interval on the market return at some future moment. Individuals that
are too confident in their own prediction will specify too narrow an interval. Of the 13.300
observations 64% of market returns was outside of the provided interval, showing a large
amount of overconfidence in the CFO population. The authors show that overconfident
CFOs use lower discount rates to value cash flow, invest more, acquire more other firms,
use more debt, are less likely to pay dividends and more likely to repurchase shares, and
have a higher ratio of long term to short term debt. We use survey-based measures for
confidence and relate this to behavior in vignettes.
Instead of surveying the executives, Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b, 2008) use proxies
constructed from publicly available data, like CEO stock-option holdings or press state-
ments, to classify CEOs as overconfident. Using these proxies they find that overconfident
CEOs overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers more often,
overestimate the returns internally and believe outside investors undervalue their compa-
nies. Based on our proxy for overconfidence we find that overconfident board members
require a lower expected return and perceive less risk of a given investment, and thus in-
2The Sensation Seeking Scale was developed in Zuckerman et al. (1964) and asks respondents to make
a choice between two opposing statements, for instance: ”I would like to try parachute jumping.” and ”I
would never want to try jumping out of a plane with or without a parachute.”
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deed take more risks. Our findings indicate, however, that overconfidence is not restricted
to the CEO or CFO, but is present throughout the board.
The literature listed above focuses either on the CEO or the CFO. Jensen and Zajac
(2004) already argue that to get a full picture of top level decision making, one should
study all the individuals involved, which includes both our NED and TMT respondents.
Furthermore, we account for the role a respondent has in the boardroom. The importance
of this role for individual behavior has received relatively little attention in the literature.
The effect is, however, strikingly visible in the experiments of Gillette et al. (2008). Ex
ante similar student subjects are randomly assigned a role as supervisory or executive
director. The authors show that outside directors can fulfill a watchdog role, and their
effectiveness depends on the board structure. Even in this setting with ex ante similar
individuals, assigning them a specific role affects behavior. As our findings will show,
these role effects are also visible in the behavior of experienced and professional executives.
However, the role patterns do not match commonly held beliefs about willingness to take
risks. It appears that it is the CFO rather than the CEO that is willing to take most
risks in the boardroom. This result is a clear reminder that researchers and practicioners
alike need to carefully check their assumptions about individual behavior, so far we have
not been able to find (m)any individuals that correctly predicted this relationship.
4.3 Methodology
We collected our data using a survey that ran off a dynamic website. English translations
of the questions can be found in Appendix C.1. Our survey ran via a survey website, Eras-
mus University Consumer and Leading Indicator Database (EUCLID), that is managed
on behalf of Erasmus University. This allowed us to approach all potential respondents
via their personal e-mail address while guaranteeing their anonymity. Before the data
was used for analysis the website administrators removed all indicators that could be
used to identify individual participants.3 Each respondent received a hyperlink with a
unique token that allowed the respondents to start, break-off and continue their survey at
their own convenience. Before sending the survey to our respondents we created several
prototypes of the survey. These prototypes were tested first on people within academia
that had some boardroom experience, and later on a small sample of executives enrolled
in an educational program at the University. With these individuals we were able to ask
3In the interest of full disclosure: one of the authors, Rene Segers, is partner at the company that
manages the EUCLID website. To ensure the integrity of the EUCLID website, his firm and this research
project, the identifying tokens and the email addresses were at no point part of the created research
database.
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post survey questions to find out whether the manipulation of the investment sizes used
and the way of presenting the questions had the desired effects. Only after their responses
confirmed that the questions were clear and that the vignettes were realistic enough, we
proceeded to send the survey to our respondents.
The token in the hyperlink allowed us to identify individual respondents, randomize
the order of the vignettes, and use the possibility of dynamic web design to tailor the
vignettes to every single respondent. Unlike standard survey data about risky investments,
our measures do not suffer from recollection biases, or biased reporting. By using the same
method to calculate initial investments and presenting the investments in the same way
to all subjects, our approach makes it possible to compare realistically sized investment
scenarios both within and between subjects. Simultaneously, illusion of control, a high
degree of commitment to good outcomes, and abstract or unknown reference points make
it hard to compare performance across individual in a traditional survey even without
measurement errors. Since recollection bias does not play a role and the variation is
exogenously determined by the researchers, these biases do not occur in our survey.
Even though the questionnaire was administered by an affiliated third party (which
was clearly visible on the webpage), the emails were all sent in the name of the first
author, a professor at Erasmus University. Since many of the email addresses used were
gathered via the network of the University, mostly through alumni networks and business
networks connected to the city of Rotterdam and the University, attaching the name and
logo of the Erasmus University gave the emails some extra credibility.
We cannot incentivize the respondents through monetary earnings, as is usually done
with student subjects and as was done by Fehr and List (2004) and List and Mason
(2011) with executives. The simple reason is that a substantial part of our respondents
earn more than our research budget, such that any money we offered would likely have
been considered an insult. This constraint will likely remain if one wants to do research
on Western executives. Instead of a monetary reward, we offered our respondents an
individualized report of the results of the research they were involved in. These reports
showed the respondents both the distribution of the answers given and their position
within this distribution for the relevant questions, allowing them to learn more about
themselves in relation to their peers. The need to collect sufficient responses to generate
the repports, created some time between the survey and the feedback. This also ensured
that the easiest way for our respondents to reflect on the results of the survey, was by
filling in the survey honestly. Furthermore, because of the external management of the
database and guaranteed anonymity, there was no strategic reason to lie. Neither the
researchers nor any other respondent can find out how any particular respondent replied,
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such that answering honestly cannot have direct negative consequences. We believe that
the relatively high response rate, a gross response rate of 43% (see subsection 4.3.2)
compared to a response rate of roughly 10% in other recent surveys, (e.g Graham et al.
(2013, 2005); Trahan and Gitman (1995)), shows that the ability to learn about themselves
and their environment is an important reason for many of our respondents to reply, and
reply honestly.
4.3.1 Survey
The survey first elicits some basic information from the respondents (questions 1 to 4). We
ask for their position within the company, the approximate size of the company revenues
(with five choice options, ranging from below e50 million to more than e1 billion), the
company sector and number of employees (ranging from less than 50 to more than 10.000).
We then ask the respondents to indicate the number and size of investments they have
decided upon in five categories (new market expansion, expansion of production capacity,
R&D projects, ICT projects, and mergers and acquisitions) in the last 15 years (questions
5 and 6).
Respondents who indicate to have experience with investments in a particular category
are asked to evaluate two vignettes with investment possibilities in this setting (except
for M&A). The investment possibilities are described as originating from the relevant
department in their company and these hypothetical investments are paired with an
estimated probability success (0.80 or 0.95) and a non-recoverable investment cost. The
size of the investment cost depends on the typical size of investment decisions made by the
respondents (derived from the first part of the survey) multiplied with a random factor
(0.5 or 1.25). Respondents are asked to indicate the minimum Net Present Value (NPV)
they, in their professional role, would require to approve of this investment (questions 7
to 14). After they have done so, they are asked to self-reflect and indicate ”how risky”
they perceive this investment to be on a 7-point scale.
Based on Dohmen et al. (2011) we ask our respondents to rate, on 11-point scales
ranging from ”Not willing to take any risk” (0) to ”Very willing to take risks” (10), how
they perceive the willingness to take risks of: themselves in general, of themselves in their
professional role (where the role they have is inserted automatically by the survey), of the
average CEO, of the average CFO, and of the average NED (questions 15 till 19).
At the end of the survey respondents are asked about their general background, gender
and age. A final question asks whether respondents used a calculator during the survey.
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4.3.2 Respondents
We gathered a panel of CEOs, CFOs, NEDs and a reference group consisting of (non-
executive) managers, consultants and analysts of roughly the same size(appendix C.2
shows the proportions of roles in our survey). The individuals in our survey work for
Netherlands based national, international or multinational companies, both listed and
unlisted, in a range of industries. All individuals reported experience in investment deci-
sions for their company. Our database contains personal data and it is protected. That
is, the listed persons are treated anonymously and the database is for scientific use only.
We sent the questionnaire to 682 respondents of whom 43% responded. 160 (23%)
Respondents completed the entire survey and it took them on average 17 minutes to
do so. Another 131 (20%) respondents did not answer all the questions (they spent on
average 9 minutes on the questions), but we can still use their answers for part of the
analysis. Summary statistics can be found in Appendix B. To reduce potential noise in
the responses, we removed respondents who:
 demand the same NPV or report the same risk perception on all vignettes, demand
an NPV above e100.000 mln, or demanded an e0 NPV for one or more of the
investments choices (n=25);
 based on their reported birth date are minors (n=1);
 have a confidence proxy equal to - 6, since this was a clear outlier (n=1).
All of the reported results are based on the remaining data.
4.4 Empirical predictions
Our vignettes are meant to simulate realistic investment scenario’s. If our respondents
treat the vignettes as such, both the NPV and the perceived risk should increase if the
probability of success decreases and if the investment size increases.
Prediction 4.1. The NPV and perceived risk increases in both the initial investment and
in the probability of failure.
Depending on the experience of the participants, we asked the participants to consider
investments in R&D, market expansion, IT, and/or an increase in production capacity.
Some authors argue that different types of investments are treated differently by the
corporate executives. Sanders (2001) indicate this could be caused by option based com-
pensation pay. This pay structure yields an incentive to place large bets on risky type of
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investments. If the investment categories have different risks, they should be differently
affected. However, differences in investment behavior could also be due to experienced
differences between the types of investment. If risk attitudes are influenced by the con-
text of the investment as suggested a.o. by Malmendier and Tate (2008), it would be
virtually impossible to disentangle these effects in observed behavior alone. As we do not
use (option based) incentives, the observed differences can only be due to the context. In
our setting there is no a priori indication about which investment types would be consid-
ered more risky, while all respondents only get vignettes in investment types they report
to have experience with, so we predict that no difference is made between the different
categories:
Prediction 4.2. Neither the NPV nor the perceived risk is influenced by the investment
type.
The question about general willingness to take risk, was validated in Dohmen et al.
(2011). Based on their results, individuals that rate themselves higher on this scale, have
a higher risk tolerance.
Prediction 4.3. The NPV and perceived risk decreases in the risk tolerance of individuals.
In the upper echelon theory and behavioral finance literature, indirect measures and
demographic characteristics of individual executives are used to explain corporate out-
comes like stock behavior and merge decisions. This approach treats the company as a
black box, which makes interpreting the uncovered relationships challenging (Lawrence
(1997); Huse (2005)). Because of the potential confounding effects, one has to be careful
when using individual characteristics as proxies to explain company outcomes. Our sur-
vey provides a complementary approach to this type of research by probing the black box
of the company. We can test some of the effects identified in this literature directly on
the individual decision makers.
Based on earlier findings we predict that the willingness to take risks decreases in
age and experience, such that the NPV and perceived risk should increase in both age
and experience (Berger et al., 2013; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Sanders, 2001;
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).
Prediction 4.4.
a The minimally required NPV and perceived risk increase in age.
b The minimally required NPV and perceived risk increase in experience.
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The first 4 predictions treat all respondents similarly, however, one of the biggest
advantages of using dynamic web surveys is that it allows us to present respondents
with investment scenarios that differ exogenously, while still tailoring each scenario to
the experience of our respondents. Since every respondent’s experience, background, and
risk propensity are part of why he has a certain professional role, the decisions taken
by each respondent in their professional careers are at least in part endogenous. The
variance in investment size and success rates in the vignettes is exogenously imposed by
the experimenters, which allows us to get a cleaner measure of the effect of professional
roles on individual decision making under risk.
There is relatively little other evidence on the effect of professional roles on behavior
of executives, while there is also no consensus in theory. It is often assumed that the CEO
is the Entrepreneur on the board, while the NEDs are supposed to act as ’some sort of
discipline’ (Mace, 1972), to a lesser extend this later role is supported by the CFO as ’bean
counter’ (Favaro, 2001; Zorn, 2004). This division of tasks calls for more cautious NEDs
and CFOs and thus increases the demanded NPV from agents in those roles. Conversely,
in much of the agency theory literature that deals with the remuneration contract of
the CEO/manager, it is assumed that risk neutral investors (who are represented in the
remuneration boards by the NEDs) contract with risk averse CEOs (Shavell, 1979; Stiglitz,
1987a; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). The existence of option contracts could then be
seen as indications that the risk neutral NEDs are trying to incentivize a risk averse
manager. This would indicate the opposite conclusion, namely that the CEO (and to
lesser extend) and CFO are more risk averse than the NEDs. Without clear theoretical
guidance, we rather skip ahead to the rankings given by our respondents, which we will
discuss just below. Based on the survey responses, we predict that CEOs are most risk
tolerant, while NEDs are least risk tolerant, with CFOs somewhere in between.
Prediction 4.5. Both the NPV and the perceived risk is larger for NEDs than for CFOs,
and for CFOs than for CEOs.
4.5 Analysis and results
We first analyze our respondents’ rankings of self-reported and perceived willingness to
take risks. The average risk tolerance scores are depicted in Figure 4.1, where we dis-
tinguish between the answers given by CEOs, CFOs and NEDs. Significant differences
(based on t-tests) are shown through the arrows. The dotted arrows represent a signif-
icant different at a 95% level, while a solid arrow denotes a significant difference at the
99% level. In their professional roles CEOs report a higher willingness to take risks than
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CFOs and NEDs, as can be seen in Figure 4.1a. We do not find significant differences
between the self-reported risk tolerance of CFOs and NEDs. The reported willingness to
take risks in general, depicted in Figure 4.1b, yields the same conclusions. CEOs again
report a higher willingness to take risk than CFOs and NEDs. We do not find a significant
difference between the answers given by CFOs and NEDs.
Figure 4.1: self-reported willingness to take risk
Figure 4.2 shows how the board members perceive each other’s willingness to take
risks (questions 17 to 19). The results are in line with the self-perceptions in Figure
4.1. CEOs are considered to be significantly more willing to take risks by all members
of the corporate elite. CFOs and NEDs are perceived to have more or less the same risk
tolerance on average.
4.5.1 vignettes
In the analysis of the investment scenarios, or vignettes, we examine whether the perceived
differences in risk tolerance across the three roles of the corporate elite are associated with
the reported investment choices. We regress the natural logarithm of the minimally re-
quired NPV (model (1)) and the experienced risk (model (2)) on a variety of possible
explanatory variables. For both models we consider the size of the investment, the prob-
ability of success and the investment category as investment specific variables and we
include individual characteristics such as age, the respondent’s professional role, and a
set of measures of the respondent’s experience level. Both models are estimated using
unbalanced panel techniques including individual random effects.4
4The parameters of model (1) can be estimated relatively straightforward using maximum likelihood,
see Breusch (1987) among others. The perceived risk is rated on a multinomial scale. Model (2) belongs
to the class of generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs). The parameters of this model can conveniently
be estimated using the Penalized Quasi-likelihood method Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004, 2005). Estimation
methods for our two models are available in Stata through the packages xtreg and gllamm, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Perceived willingness to take risk
The estimated coefficients of model (1) and (2) (excluding auxiliary parameters and
random effects), together with their standard errors, are presented in Table 4.1. For
identification purposes we use ICT-projects as the reference investment category. As
the reference group for the individuals we consider the pool of analysts, managers and
consultants (i.e. respondents outside of the board).
The demanded NPV has an estimated elasticity of approximately 0.7, implying that
a 1% increase in the size of the initial investment translates to a 0.7% increase in the
demanded NPV. Respondents report to perceive more risk when they are confronted
with larger investments. As the probability of a successful investment outcome increases,
individuals are prepared to accept a lower NPV and experiences less risk. In both models,
these two effects are significant at the 1% level. Thus, we find support for predictions 4.1,
showing that our manipulations had the expected effect.
In line with prediction 4.2, the differences between the four types of investment are
not significant (Wald test p-value ≥ 0.16). The table does not present the results for
Prediction 3, since the coefficient on the risk propensity measure is consistently insignifi-
cant. Although Dohmen et al. (2011) spent considerable effort in validating the question,
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1 2
Variables Log(NPV) Perceived risk of investing
Properties of the investment
Log(Investment) 0.698*** 0.234***
(0.0391) (0.0387)
Probability of success -1.818*** -5.875***
(0.493) (0.555)
Type of investment: expansion to a new market 0.0694 0.00572
(0.106) (0.112)
Type of investment: R&D-project 0.0366 -0.0359
(0.103) (0.110)
Type of investment: increase in capacity -0.0758 -0.0324
(0.104) (0.109)
Individual characteristics
Role: non-executive 0.387 0.892***
(0.418) (0.237)
Role: CEO -0.310 0.714**
(0.348) (0.280)
Role: CFO -0.703** -0.0808
(0.308) (0.180)
Age 0.272** 0.288***
(0.116) (0.0730)
Age2 -0.00306** -0.00284***
(0.00122) (0.000762)
Avg. size of previous investments 0.0446** -0.0338*
(0.0220) (0.0173)
Avg. size of previous investments2 -0.000496* 0.000445**
(0.000285) (0.000208)
Avg. number of previous investments 0.0905 -0.0532
(0.0937) (0.0605)
Used a calculator -0.858*** -0.342**
(0.315) (0.175)
Number of observations 716 758
Number of individuals 113 117
The superscripts ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%. 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4.1: Estimation results of models (1) and (2)
it seems its predictive value in our smaller sample is negligible. The measure did contain
some predictive value after a transformation, however this changes the interpretation of
the measure considerably. We discuss this new measure in the next subsection.
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After controlling for the role effect we still find a significant effect of age in the data.
As professionals get older they tend to become ’sadder but wiser’ in the sense that they
become more careful investors. The demanded NPV increases as well as the perceived
risk. This effect diminishes over time and it peaks at the age of 45 for the NPV and 52
for the perceived risk, as indicated by the negative quadratic terms. In line with the age
effect, we find that investors who have experience with higher investments levels tend to
be more cautious by demanding a higher NPV. However, the opposite is true for the level
of perceived risk. Investors who have more experience with higher levels of investments
perceive less risk. There seems to be no additional effect of experience measured in terms
of the number of investments. Thus, we find partial support for predictions 4.4a and 4.4b
and our findings indicate that using observable demographics as proxies for individual
behavioral characteristics, as is done in behavioral finance and upper echelon theory, can
be a viable approach.
The most novel result of our survey is the possibility to identify the effect of professional
roles. Looking at table 1 it becomes clear that NEDs ask a higher NPV than CEOs (Wald
test p-value is 0.09) and CFOs (Wald test p-value is 0.01) and thus demand the highest
risk premium overall. Based on our survey results, we hypothesized CFOs to be more risk
averse than CEOs, but both groups tend to demand the same NPV (Wald test p-value
is 0.22). In terms of NPV there seems to be a sharp distinction between the NEDs on
the one hand and the executive board members on the other hand. In contrast, when
we look at the perceived risk metric, the divide is between the risk tolerant CFOs and
the relatively risk averse CEOs and the NEDs. The responses to our vignettes thus do
not support prediction 4.5. Like our respondents expected, NEDs are consistently most
risk averse, both in terms of demanded NPV and in terms of perceived risk. Unlike our
expectations, however, CFOs are more risk tolerant in both dimensions than NEDs, and
even weakly more risk tolerant than our CEOs.
Finally, respondents who reported the use of a calculator tend to ask a lower NPV and
perceive less risk. This can plausibly be contributed to a feeling of control. Since these
respondents could calculate the expected return on investment and, as a result, felt more
in control, they might have perceiving less risk.
4.5.2 The effect of (over-)confidence
The responses to the risk tolerance question (question 16) do not predict individual be-
havior very well. However, for our executive respondents we can transform the measure.
We subtract the risk tolerance rating the board members gave to their average peer from
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the rating they gave themselves (question16 - question17/18/19). Both ratings are on the
same scale, such that we could take the simple difference to normalize the measure. The
transformed measure ranges in value from -2 till 5 (after deletion of the single -6 obser-
vation), with a mean of 0.78 and a mode of 1, figure 4.3 shows the entire distribution of
our confidence measure.
Figure 4.3: The distribution of con-
fidence in the board
Through this normalization the interpretation of
the measure changes. A CEO that claims to be
more willing to take risks than the average CEO, is
not just saying he is willing to take risks. He com-
pares his risk tolerance to that of people in the same
position, for all of whom making risky investment
decisions is part of the job. Excessive willingness
to take risks can be explained in several ways. It
could just indicate that the executive is simply less
risk averse than the average person, however, since
our measure has a mean and mode above 0, this
would create a statistical anomaly. It is more likely,
therefore, that this measure picks up on a form of (over-)confidence. Either our subjects
overestimate their own ability or risk tolerance because they show ’peer group neglect’
(Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), or it could simply measures a better-than-average type of
overconfidence. We therefore interpret this measure as a proxy for overconfidence.
Overconfidence is an important driver of individual choice behavior (Griffin and Tver-
sky, 1992), in earlier studies it has been studied in CEOs and CFOs. However, based on a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we do not find significant differences across the groups of board
members, including NEDs. To assess whether an individual’s confidence level drives the
demanded NPV and the perceived risk in the investment scenario’s, we included our con-
fidence metric in models (1) and (2) specified above, and reran our regressions. In these
regressions, we treat our pool of CFOs as the reference group. The results are presented
in Table 4.2.
Before we turn to the interpretation of the results, note that our samples are now ap-
proximately 30% smaller as overconfidence is only measured for board members, such that
we have to drop our reference group. This causes the standard errors in the regressions
to be larger than in Table 4.1.
In this second set of regressions we again find a strong effect of the size of the outlay
and the probability of success on the demanded NPV and perceived risk. The differences
between the professional roles are also still apparent from the results. While the effect
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1’ 2’
Variables Log(NPV) Perceived risk of investing
Properties of the investment
Log(Investment) 0.662*** 0.184***
(0.0458) (0.0450)
Probability of success -1.944*** -5.876***
(0.609) (0.650)
Type of investment: expansion to a new market 0.112 -0.00409
(0.131) (0.131)
Type of investment: R&D-project 0.0740 0.0395
(0.128) (0.129)
Type of investment: increase in capacity -0.0238 0.0615
(0.128) (0.128)
Individual characteristics
Role: non-executive 0.761** 0.854***
(0.388) (0.270)
Role: CEO 0.249 0.628***
(0.294) (0.242)
Role: CFO
Age 0.0389 0.226*
(0.154) (0.120)
Age2 -0.000642 -0.00226*
(0.00160) (0.00120)
Avg. size of previous investments 0.0648*** -0.00450
(0.0234) (0.0180)
Avg. size of previous investments2 -0.00074** 5.22e-05
(0.000297) (0.000220)
Avg. number of previous investments 0.0366 -0.118
(0.102) (0.0759)
Used a calculator -0.914*** -0.212
(0.352) (0.216)
Confidence -0.240*** -0.186***
(0.0861) (0.0704)
Number of observations 526 552
Number of individuals 79 81
The superscripts ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%. 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4.2: Estimation results of models (1’) and (2’) with the confidence metric included
of age and the usage of a calculator are weakly significant in model (2’), the effect of
experience, as measured by the typical size of previous investments, only survives in
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model (1’). This is probably due to the smaller sample size. All of our main conclusions
seem robust to inclusion of measures of individual confidence.
Finally, and most importantly, we indeed find a strong and negative effect of con-
fidence both on the demanded NPV and on perceived risk. Board members that are
more confident about themselves tend to demand a lower NPV, thus requiring a smaller
risk premium for their investments. Additionally, they perceive less risk than their less
confident peers.
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper we studied the risk perceptions and risk assessment of CEOs, CFOs and
non-executives using a dynamic web based survey. We found that CEOs are generally
perceived to be more risk tolerant than CFOs and NEDs, however, when we asked our
respondents to assess realistic investment scenarios tailored to their personal experience,
the picture changed. Firstly, non-executives demand more return on investment than
executives. Comparing the CEO to the CFO, we find that CEOs report to perceive more
risk than CFOs, and demand non-significantly more returns, indicating the CFO is most
willing to take risks. These results remain after controlling for individual and investment
characteristics.
This discrepancy between peer perception and individual risk assessment could lead to
miscommunication in the boardroom. It suggests that practitioners as well as researchers
should be careful about what we assume about the relative risk tolerance of board mem-
bers. The relationship might not be what we expect and can be influenced by professional
roles.
Role dependent risk attitudes can have several causes. Selection effects, leading in-
dividuals with similar risk tolerance to choose the same role in board could play a role
(Goel and Thakor, 2008). It seems unlikely, however, that this explains our findings, as
we control for individual characteristics. Moreover, all directors operate in a high stakes
environment and many of the NEDs have TMT experience. A more likely explanation
is the adaption of professional roles by directors. If we look at the role of the NED as
a safeguard, he or she might feel the urge to be more careful than the TMT. As NEDs
can be assumed to be aware of their role in the decision process, they will likely act
accordingly. Information asymmetry is another, closely related, explanation (Lorsch and
Young, 1990; Lorsch, 1995). If NEDs know that in general they do not have the same
amount of information as the TMT, one response to this problem is to create extra (fi-
nancial) safeguards. This means that when a board member is approached in his or her
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NED mindset, he or she starts creating these safeguards as a matter of course, and a
more cautious professional role is created as a strategic response. Especially for NEDs
who serve on several subcommittees, like remuneration and audit committees, the adop-
tion of different professional roles could be a good mechanism to cope with the different
requirements posed by the different tasks.
Our findings support the basic premise of behavioral finance and upper echelon theory
that demographics can be used as proxies for individuals’ cognitive styles and knowledge
base. We look at individual choice behavior of corporate directors and find that age
and experience lower the willingness to take risk, while (over-)confidence increases risk
tolerance, as was found through more indirect means in earlier papers.
4.6.1 Limitations and future research
When studying the upper echelons of the corporate sector it is challenging to bring to-
gether a large group of relevant respondents. By using a dynamic website we are able
to apply several methodological features of lab research to a group of respondents that
is almost impossible to get into the lab. The dynamic website allows us to tailor each
survey to the respondent, while guaranteeing anonymity, and randomizing treatments.
Although it is virtually impossible to incentivize high ranking corporate officials through
monetary payments, as is usually done in experimental economics, we believe the individ-
ual reports we generated provide a good reason to reply honestly. The possibility to learn
about oneself and ones’ peers is probably worth more to many key decision makers than
the small sums of money usually offered to experimental subjects. The fact that, with
our limited number of respondents, we are able to find corroborating evidence for earlier
findings from the behavioral finance and upper echelon literature, shows that indeed our
survey measures the effects we expect to be there. Simultaneously, the exogenously im-
posed variation allows us to compare both within and between respondents, allowing us
to answer more types of questions than with normal surveys.
Like any methodology this one has its weaknesses. We do, for instance, not have
the same amount of control as lab experiments, nor can we easily study interactions, or
easily rerun a failed ’treatment’. This means researchers have to do without some of
the advantages and methods of experimental economics. We deal with this problem by
extensively testing prototypes of our survey, first on people within academia and then
on a small group of board members from an educational program on the Erasmus (i.e.
in a controlled setting were we could question the respondents afterwards). Because of
the dynamic nature of the survey, the questions change between subjects. This increases
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the time and effort required for developing the survey considerably. A stronger test of
the strength of the methodology would be to link the findings to actual, rather than
hypothetical, choices. This is quite difficult in our setting due to both the limited number
of observations and the anonymity we guarantee.
An issue we failed to account for in our prototype testing was the time aspect. Our
respondents could fill in the survey at their own leisure and the survey software allowed
them to break off and complete the survey later, without losing their responses up till that
point. Despite the convenience, our attrition rate is close to 50%. In retrospect we believe
that we should have paid more attention to this aspect. We severely underestimated the
time it took a respondent who was unfamiliar with the survey environment to complete
the entire survey, and this might have caused a higher than necessary attrition rate. This
issue had received some, but apparently not enough attention in designing the survey.
During the prototype tests neither the academic respondents, who were quite well aware
of the importance of the test, nor the executives and managers, for whom it was part
of their homework for the course, seemed to have minded the time it took. Clearly, our
actual respondents felt differently.
Lastly, it is hard to create direct interaction between subjects/respondents through a
website. Especially with executives it seems unlikely that one can get a significant number
of respondents to log on at the same time. An alternative would be to develop games
that are played sequentially. Then each respondent would only have to continue when the
other player(s) has (have) made his (their) move(s). For this first pass, however, we focus
on decision making under risk, an area of research where this aspect is less relevant, but
alternatives exist and this could be an interesting avenue for future research.
In this paper we found that the behavioral tendencies like overconfidence and the effect
of age and experience are prevalent throughout the board. Existing research has focused
primarily on the CEO. We believe that future research should try to focus on all members
of the board. We hope therefore that the fact that we find signs of overconfidence for
these other board members encourages researchers to start this with this hopefully fruitful
line of enquiry.

Chapter 5
Can (Managerial) labor Markets
undo Signal Jamming by Career
Concerned Managers? Experimental
Evidence1
5.1 Introduction
The idea that managers strive to “provide the most positive signals to the managerial
labor market” to influence this market’s perceptions of their abilities and that “markets
appropriately use current and past information to revise future wages” was one Fama’s
(1980) key contributions to the debate on how the separation of ownership and control
can be an efficient form of organization.2
Holmstro¨m (1999) was the first to explore this idea formally.3 His analysis shows that
in equilibrium the behavior of the manager and the market fit together in a subtle way.
With rational markets, any efforts of the manager to inflate the market’s perception are
to no avail. The labor market rationally anticipates that the manager uses his actions to
influence any signals the market can somehow relate to the manager’s ability. Neverthe-
less, although the manager cannot fool the market, this does not stop him from trying
to impress the market. Not doing so would damage the inferences that the market draws
from the signals it receives, and thus damage the manager’s career.
1This chapter is based on joint work with Bauke Visser
2The quotes are on pages 293 and 296, resp. See also “In short, (...) we impute efficiency or rationality
in information processing to managerial labor markets” on page 296.
3Holmstro¨m’s piece was originally published in a hard-to-find Festschrift in 1982.
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On the theoretical front, this idea has proven very productive. In his seminal contri-
bution, Holmstro¨m showed how market-based incentives or career concerns may lead the
manager to exert additional effort (as future marginal benefits complement current ones),
but can also give rise to distorted investment or project choices. Subsequently, models
have been developed that explain e.g., how the nature of the ability that is important for
a manager’s career affects the way in which career concerns influence a single manager’s
actions,4 how career concerns give rise to herd behavior and the negligence of private
information among groups of managers or financial analysts,5 and how such concerns
obstruct the exchange of information in decision-making committees, influence the votes
cast and lead such committees to show a united front to the outside world.6
Despite the importance of the equilibrium mechanism uncovered by Holmstro¨m and
others – managers jamming signals and markets undoing this jamming – very little is
known about its existence and operation in reality. The main reason is clear: to observe
whether managers distort decisions to influence market perceptions, one should know
what the correct decision is. This is typically hard to establish for an outsider. Probably
as a result, empirical work has limited attention to intertemporal patterns of a manager’s
compensation that can be explained by career concerns.7 As uncertainty about a man-
ager’s ability declines over time, the sensitivity of market-based compensation to observed
performance should go down as well. To compensate, a firm should offer the manager
incentives that get stronger with his tenure. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find evidence
for this pattern in a sample of executives of US-based companies. Chung et al. (2012) and
Lim et al. (2013) find evidence that market-based rewards of private equity and hedge
funds managers also decline with tenure. In the case of financial analysts, the information
asymmetry about what the right decision was at the the time of the decision can be re-
duced ex post. As there is always a number of analysts looking at the same stocks, one can
use the actions of the other analysts to get an idea of what the right decision is and when
distortions occur. A very influential contribution in this line of research is Chevalier and
Ellison (1999), who study the termination decision of mutual fund managers and show
that younger managers both have and heed an incentive to herd into popular sectors. This
paper is followed, a.o. by Hong et al. (2000), who show similar herding incentives and
behavior with respect to securities analysts earnings forecasts. Clement and Senyo (2005)
4For example, in Milbourn et al. (2001) managers differ in their ability to develop profitable projects;
in Suurmond et al. (2004) managers differ in their ability to identify the state of the world.
5See e.g. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) for models in which agents
are privately informed at zero cost.
6See Visser and Swank (2007).
7For a discussion of confounding factors in this line of research, see Hermalin and Weisbach (2014).
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extend this line of research to include analysts’ characteristics. These authors show that
more experienced, more precise, more specialized analysts are more likely to deviate from
the herd and that deviators are more precise on average.
In this paper, we present the results of a laboratory experiment that was designed
to study Fama’s idea and the mechanism identified by Holmstro¨m and others. As in
Fama (1980), we study a management committee rather than a manager operating in
isolation. The set-up closely follows the model of Visser and Swank (2007). In the model,
a committee has to make an investment decision. Each manager receives a private signal
about the profitability of the investment. During the meeting, they discuss whether to
invest or not, and next cast a vote. Managers care about the profitability of the investment
and the way the decision affects their careers. These career concerns are summarized by
the updated belief held by the labor market that a manager is highly able at assessing
the quality of investment projects. Once the decision has been taken and observed by the
labor market, a manager can send a statement to the labor market about the degree of
confidence he has in the decision, how they reached the decision etc. This means that, just
as in Fama’s account, labor markets receive many signals that they have to sift through
to determine the ability of the managers. What the market does not observe is whether
the investment actually pays off or not. This is consistent with Fama’s focus on top
management and the fact that the consequences of decisions made by top management
often do not become visible until after quite a while. Thus, markets are facing a hard
inference problem. Nevertheless, the model provides clear predictions that can be tested
in the lab.
In the experiment, half of the subjects are managers who decide in pairs whether or
not to invest. The other half of the subjects are market participants, who bid for the
services of the managers after observing the decisions of the managers and the statements
they make. We find convincing evidence that managers want to fool the market and
that market participants take this into account in their bids. In line with theory, bidders
value managers more when they have invested, than when they did not invest. As a
result, managers sometimes deviate from maximizing investment profitability by choosing
to invest although they know that the expected profit is negative. Market participants
see through these attempts to fool them, and the difference in wage offers is close to what
theory predicts it should be in the presence of signal jamming (and is indeed smaller than
what it would have been without such attempts).
In the experiment, markets also reward managers if managers show a united front by
expressing the same high level of confidence in the decision they took. In theory, however,
these statements should be considered cheap talk and not lead to changes in valuations:
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once the investment decision has been taken, rational managers could costlessly exploit
any change in valuation stemming from a change in statement. Thus, in equilibrium, the
market’s valuation is determined by the investment decision – a costly signal – and not by
the cheap talk statements used. Are the market participants fooled by these statements?
Or is there useful information about a manager’s ability in his statements? Analysis of
the statements shows that the latter is indeed the case. Moreover, our analysis suggests
that bidders are close to making efficient use of this information.
There are few papers that study experimentally whether reputational concerns affect
decision-making. Koch et al. (2009) implement a simple version of Holmstro¨m’s (1999)
effort model: performance of a subject equals the sum of his chosen level of costly effort
and her ability level. They compare two treatments, one in which performance and
ability are separately observed before “firms” make a wage offer and a second treatment
in which firms only observe performance. In line with the theoretical prediction, they find
that subjects exert more effort to influence a firm’s inference concerning their ability if
ability is not observed by firms. Subjects’ incentives to jam signals about their ability is,
however, only taken into account to a limited extent by firms.
The aim of the experiment of Berg et al. (2009) is to explain the well-established phe-
nomenon of a decision maker’s “unwarranted commitment to past choices” (p. 135), i.e.
her commitment to a previously made choice in the face of new information that shows
that another choice is better. They compare three hypotheses that have been proposed in
the literature: internal justification (a need to justify past decisions to one-self), external
justification (a need to do so to others or to appear consistent), and reputational concerns
(a desire to establish a reputation for ability). By manipulating the informational setting
within which subjects make decisions, they find evidence that the third explanation is the
better one: subjects stick to unwarranted decisions only if they are privately informed
about the state and if there is a market that observes them. We differ from both studies
in our focus on committee decision-making and on a multi-dimensional information envi-
ronment that combines both costly signals and cheap talk signals from which observers
have to infer relevant information.
Fehrler and Hughes (2014) is the only other experimental study of reputational con-
cerns in a committee setting we are aware of. Its focus is quite different. They compare
how secret and transparent decision making affects the quality of information exchange
within the committee, members’ willingness to change views in the meeting, and, as a
result, the quality of decisions taken. They do so in a situation in which a committee
member is only motivated by her reputation and is privately informed about her ability
level. Moreover, the principal learns the state before he updates his belief about the ability
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of committee members. If members deliberate and vote in secret, all private information
(signals and ability levels) is pooled and everybody votes in favor of the decision that is
most likely to match the state given the available information. Transparency hampers
information aggregation in the committee, for example as members don’t want to state,
or lead the principal to infer, they are of low ability. The experimental results show broad
support for theoretical predictions. However, and just as in our experiment, subjects
reveal more information about their ability than theory predicts. It is indeed a recurrent
finding in the experimental literature involving cheap talk, that subjects are more truthful
than they should be, see e.g. Cai and Wang (2006) and Goeree and Yariv (2011).
This chapter is built up as follows. In the next section we describe some theoretical
predictions. In section 5.3 we describe the experimental design and the procedures used.
The results are discussed in section 5.4. We report on robustness checks in section 5.5.
Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 The Model
This section provides the outline of a simplified version of the theoretical model in Visser
and Swank (2007; VS from now on) on which our experiment is based.8 A two-member
committee, with members i = {1, 2}, has to decide whether to implement a project,
I = 1, or to maintain the status quo, I = 0. By normalization, status quo delivers a
project payoff equal to zero. Project payoff in case of implementation is uncertain and
state dependent. It equals p + µ, where µ ∈ {−h, h} with Pr (µ = h) = 1/2. With slight
abuse of notation, we let µ represent both the state and the state dependent value. The
parameter p is the ex ante expected payoff from I = 1. As p < 0, the committee has a
bias against project implementation. Therefore, VS call the decision to implement the
unconventional decision. Also, p+ h > 0, implying that the optimal decision depends on
the state.
Figure 5.1 depicts the time line of the game. Nature determines both the state, µ, and
the ability level of each member, ai ∈ {a, a¯}, with Pr (ai = a¯) = pi. Where a¯ stands for
high ability, while a denotes low ability. Nature does not inform anyone about either
µ or ai. Next, the game proceeds with four consecutive stages, an information stage, a
deliberation stage, a voting stage, and a statement stage. In the information stage, each
member receives a private signal si ∈ S =
{
sb, sg
}
about the state µ (b is bad and g is
good). A signal refers to a member’s assessment, forecast or view of µ. The quality of
8See Visser and Swank (2007) for generalizations of many aspects of the model outlined here and for
proofs of the results. Other generalizations can be found in Swank and Visser (2013)
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Figure 5.1: Time line, CM stands for committee member.
the signal member i receives depends on his ability, ai. If i is of high ability, he always
receives an informative signal about µ, Pr (sg | µ = h, a¯) = Pr (sb | µ = −h, a¯) = 1. If i
is of low ability, he always receives an uninformative signal about µ, Pr (sg | µ = h, a) =
Pr
(
sb | µ = −h, a) = 1/2. In the deliberation stage, both members send a message mi ∈
M =
{
mb,mg
}
to the other member. This message may be related to his private signal.
In the voting stage, members cast a vote on the project, vi ∈ V =
{
vb, vg
}
, where
vi = v
b (vi = v
g) denotes that i votes for I = 0 (I = 1). Of course, i’s vote can
be based on his private signal and on the messages received. The voting rule in the
committee is unanimity, such that implementation requires that both members vote in
favor of implementation. The decision taken by the committee becomes observable to the
market. Finally, in the statement stage, committee members can decide what statement
to make to the market concerning what happened inside the committee. This statement
could theoretically involve claims about their private signals, the messages they exchanged
and the votes they cast – anything to which the outside world would otherwise not have
direct access.
Each member cares both about the value of the project and about his reputation (a
short hand for career concerns). The reputation of member i is defined as the posterior
belief pˆii (I, ω) = Pr (ai = a¯|I, ω) held by the market that i is highly able. This reputation
is based on the investment decision taken, I, and on whatever else the members decide to
tell the market, ω. As the market does not observe the state µ, it cannot base its belief
on the state. Member i’s preferences are represented by:
Ui (I = 1) = p+ µ+ λpˆii (I = 1, ω)
Ui (I = 0) = λpˆii (I = 0, ω) . (5.1)
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The parameter λ measures how much a committee member cares about his reputation.
Parameter values are such that, from a project value perspective, the project should be
implemented iff (s1, s2) = (s
g, sg), and that the status quo should be maintained in case
of conflicting signals (and thus also if (s1, s2) =
(
sb, sb
)
).
5.2.1 Theoretical results
From a project-value perspective it is first-best for both members to truthfully reveal
their private information within the committee. Undominated voting strategies are then
to vote favorably if both messages are positive, and to vote against implementation in the
remaining three cases.
If members use the first-best deliberation and voting strategies, then the market in-
fers from implementation that both members have received the same (positive) signal,
whereas the decision to maintain the status quo may have resulted from either two con-
curring negative signals, or from two conflicting ones. As a consequence of the assumed
relationship between ability and signals received, conflicting signals are an unambiguous
indication that at least one member is of low ability, while observing two concurring
signals increases the probability that members are of high ability. As a result, project im-
plementation (which in first best requires two positive signals) yields a higher reputation
than maintaining the status quo (which could be due to conflicting signals). If we suppose
for the moment that the decision on the project is not accompanied by any statement by
the committee, reputations following first-best behavior of the committee members are:
pifb (I = 1) =
1 + pi
1 + pi2
pi > pi
pifb (I = 0) =
3− pi
3− pi2pi < pi. (5.2)
The implication of equations 5.1 and 5.2 is that committee members who care sufficiently
about their reputations are willing to give up project payoff for a stronger reputation.9
Since the loss in project value is smaller in case of conflicting signals than in case of
two negative signals, this provides an incentive to committees to implement the project
in case of conflicting signals.10 VS show that there is an upper bound to the likelihood
with which the committee wants to implement the project in case of conflicting signals,
β = Pr (I = 1|s1 6= s2) < 1/2. For implementation to be an equilibrium choice in case of
9This holds for λ > −p/
(
1+pi
1+pi2pi − 3−pi3−pi2pi
)
.
10Note that we write “in case of conflicting signals” rather than “in case of conflicting messages”.
Indeed, as members’ interests are perfectly aligned, truthfully sharing their private information remains
part of equilibrium behavior. Hence, messages can be equated with signals.
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conflicting signals, the expected loss in project value, p+ E
[
µ|sg, sb] = p < 0, should be
compensated by a stronger reputation, pˆi (I = 1; β) > pˆi (I = 0; β). This requires that β <
1/2, such that committees with conflicting signals are more likely to maintain the status
quo than to implement the project. In other words, in any equilibrium the unconventional
decision commands the higher reputation. In equilibrium β is such that:
p+ λpˆi (I = 1; β) = λpˆi (I = 0; β) . (5.3)
Thus, in case of conflicting signals, a member is indifferent between implementing the
project and maintaining the status quo. We can rewrite this condition as
−p = λ [pˆi (I = 1; β)− pˆi (I = 0; β)] .
In this form it is clear that, in equilibrium, changes in λ and/or pi leave the difference
in reputational utility unaffected and equal to −p. The equality also means that in
case of two concurring signals, a committee member has a strict preference: project
implementation in case of two positive signals, and project rejection in case of two negative
signals.
What information is the committee willing to share with the market once a decision
has been taken? If members were to truthfully state the messages they exchanged in
the meeting or the signals they received, then their reputations would be based on those
statements, rather than on the decision taken on the project. Clearly, the larger is the
degree of agreement among those messages or signals, the stronger is the reputation of
each member. Of course, if the market indeed believes that the committee behaves in
this way and adjusts its beliefs accordingly, the best reply of a committee is to present a
united front in favor of whatever decision was taken, even if there was no agreement in
the meeting. In general, if, for a given decision on the project, the market were to attach
a higher reputation to one statement than to another, the committee members will use
the former statement, whether it is true or not. The theoretical consequences are clear:
the only source of information about the ability of committee members is the decision on
the investment project. The investment decision – thanks to its payoff implications – acts
as a costly signal. VS draw a second conclusion that is not dictated by game-theoretic
logic: members will show a united front. That is, out of the many ways in which a
committee can communicate with the outside world that are consistent with equilibrium,
they emphasize the equilibrium in which members speak with one voice. This behavior is
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clearly plausible and finds support in reality.11 Game theory does dictate that the market
should then be able to determine the reputation of a member in the out-of-equilibrium
event the committee were not to show a united front. It is consistent with the model to
assume that disagreement gives rise to a drop in reputation. The following predictions
summarize the above discussion.
Theoretical predictions - Committee behavior
1. Committee members share their private information in the meeting;
2. In case of conflicting signals, the project is implemented with probability β as de-
termined in Equation (5.3);
3. The committee shows a united front to the market in support of the decision it took.
Theoretical predictions - Reputation
1. Implementation commands a higher reputation than maintaining the status quo,
irrespective of the value of the parameters;
2. The difference in reputational payoff λ [pˆi (I = 1; β)− pˆi (I = 0; β)] equals −p > 0,
irrespective of λ and pi.
3. In equilibrium, the reputation of committee members does not vary with the state-
ments they make. Statements are considered pure cheap talk.
5.3 Experimental design and hypotheses
The experiment closely follows the sequence of events in Figure 5.1. Table 5.1 provides
the parameter values used in the experiments, both the ones that are common to all
treatments, and the ones that are treatment specific.
At the start of the experiment the computer randomly (and anonymously) matches
all subjects to create groups of two. Next, all groups are assigned a role, with half of the
groups becoming committees, and half of the groups becoming pairs of bidders,. Each
committee is matched with two pairs of bidders and each pair of bidders is matched with
two committees. Depending on the number of subjects that shows up for a particular
session, committees and pairs of bidders were either connected in the 2× 2-scheme as in
the left-hand panel of Figure 5.2 or in a 2× 2× 2-scheme as depicted in the right-hand
11Indeed, it would seem odd for a committee to claim that, say, eight out of ten members agreed with
the decision taken, if the statement were purely cheap talk. See p. 340 in VS. See also Swank et al.
(2008)
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Parameter Value
Common
Probability high quality investment 0.5
Value of CM
smart 50
dumb 5
Pay-off of no investment (X = 0) 0
Pay-off of investment (X = 1)
high quality 100
low quality -120
pay-off CM Investment pay-off + 2nd bids (wi)
Pay-off bidder
won auction Value CM - 2nd bid
lost auction 0
Treatment specific
Probability CM smart
high prob. treatment 0.65
low prob. treatment 0.5
Table 5.1: Parameter setting of the experiment
Figure 5.2: Matching schedules
panel of Figure 5.2. Since matching groups do not interact, this allows us to gain up to
2 independent observations in a session with 16 or 20 subjects. The assigned roles and
the composition of each committee and pair of bidders remain the same throughout the
experiment.
In each round, the sequence of events begins with the computer determining the ability
ai ∈ {a, a¯} of each committee member and the state of the world µ ∈ {−h, h} through a
series of random draws. Nature reveals neither ai nor µ to any subject.
In the low probability treatment, the likelihood that a committee member is highly able
equals pii = 0.5, while in the high probability treatment it equals pii = 0.65. As a subject
may consider his ability as something that cannot be manipulated by the experimenter,
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the instructions read that the likelihood of him getting correct information was 0.5 or 0.65
depending on the treatment, and that his information is random with the complementary
likelihood. There is thus no difference with the definition of ability in VS.
After receiving their signals, each committee member can use a chat window for free-
form communication with their fellow committee member. This communication is not
observed by any other participant in the experiment. Given the information structure
of the experiment, theoretically a straw poll would have been sufficient for the required
information exchange. However, free-form communication adds realism and has been
in experiments on committee decision making before (e.g. Fehrler and Hughes (2014)
and Goeree and Yariv (2011)). The free-form communication also allows subjects the
possibility to talk about the statements they want to make after investment and thus
coordinate on a closed front if they so desire. Examination of the chat logs shows that
some committees indeed do.
Next, a committee member votes in favor or against investment. Investment takes
place if and only if both members vote favorably. In case of the good state the investment
pay-off, p+ µ, equals 100 points, while in a bad state p+ µ equals −120 points.
Once both committee members have cast their votes, each committee member observes
the investment decision made by his committee and makes a statement to the labor
market. This statement indicates his degree of confidence in the decision taken. This
captures the essence of the public statements that accompany the committee decisions
in VS. Confidence is expressed on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘very doubtful’ to ‘very
confident’. Here also a free-form message was possible. However, because we want to
show the effect of these statements on the bidding behavior later on, we choose a form of
statements that is more easily (and without arbitrary intervention by the experimenters)
used in later analysis.
In the (experimental) labor market, our bidders compete to hire individual committee
members. The value of a high ability member to a bidder is 50 points, while the value of a
low ability member is 5 points. A bidder observes both whether the committee invested in
the project and the statements that both members send to the market. However, actual
project returns p+µ, signals si, messages mi and votes vi are not disclosed to the bidders.
The experiment is set up so that each pair of bidders observes two committees and
submits four bids, one for the services of each individual committee member in these two
committees. As a result, there are four bids for every committee member. To determine
which bidder hires which member and at what wage, we use four second-price sealed-bid
auctions within each pair of bidders. Thus, in each pair of bidders the bidder submitting
the highest bid for a given committee member, wins the services of that member and pays
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the losing bid. This payment to the committee member is called his wage. Each committee
member receives two wages, one from each pair of bidders he is matched with. Bidders
were allowed to bid any number between 0 and 50, such that a committee members’ wage
in any period is between 0 and 100. Ties in the auction are broken at random.
During the experiment, information about the experimental task is presented to the
subjects on their screens. At the moment a member receives information about the
investment opportunity of his committee, he is reminded of the likelihood of receiving
correct information and of the voting rule. At the moment he is prompted to send a
confidence statement to the bidders, he is reminded of what other information the bidders
would see. Finally, at the end of each round, a member observes the investment payoff,
his wage, the sum of his earnings for that round, and the cumulative earnings including
that round.
Likewise, at the moment she is prompted to submit bids, each bidder is shown, for
both committees she is matched with, the decision taken and the confidence statements of
both committee members. She is also reminded of the second-price nature of the bidding
procedure and the unconditional probability distributions. At the end of each round,
each bidder sees which, if any, auction she has won, and what she and her opponent bid
particular committee members and the value of these committee member. In this results
screen she also sees her total net pay-off for this round and the cumulative earnings
including this round. The position each committee and committee member has on the
results screen of a bidder is the same as during the auction. Across rounds, however,
these positions are randomly determined, so bidders cannot identify individual committee
members or committees over several rounds. This is known to all subjects.
5.3.1 Procedures
The experiments took place in the ESE-econlab at Erasmus University Rotterdam. All
subjects were invited via the ESE-econ subject pool using ORSEE, see Greiner (2004).
The experiments were run using z-tree, see Fischbacher (2007). Sessions lasted about 1
hour and 45 minutes on average (including instructions and payment). Subjects earned
e21 ($28) on average, but there was considerable variation amongst subjects. Each day
of experiments two sessions with different treatments were scheduled back to back. The
order was determined by the flip of a fair coin.
In all sessions and treatments the structure of the experiment was the same. Upon
entering the lab all subjects received verbal instructions about lab protocols and a gen-
eral description of the experiment. Every subject received a set of written instructions
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Variable Low prob. treatment High prob. treatment difference
Gender .5243902 (.5024781) .61 (.4902071) not significant t-test
year 3.402439 (1.961731) 2.66 (1.918649) 0.1% significant χ2
Risk tolerance 5.536585 (2.121001) 5.52 (1.920017) not significant t-test
age 21.92683 (3.643972) 21.12 (2.475251) not significant t-test
econ background 0.9404762 (0.0259705) 0.92 (0.27266) not significant t-test
Table 5.2: Subject Characteristics
describing the experiment in detail. Subjects were then assigned a seat at random and
were given time to read the instructions. The instructions detailed both roles that sub-
jects could play in the experiment, bidders and committee members. The instructions
included the particulars of pay-offs and probability distributions and screen-shots of all
stages of the experiment, for both roles.12
Before the actual experiment began, the computer prompted subjects to answer a set
of questions about the pay-offs and probabilities to ensure they understood the set-up. If
a subject answered one or more questions incorrectly a pop-up screen would inform him
which question he had answered incorrectly, what the correct answer was, and why. The
subject was then asked to try again. After all subjects answered all questions correctly, the
actual experiment began. In total subjects completed 18 rounds, the first 3 rounds were
unincentivized practice rounds. The points earned in the last 15 rounds were converted
into Euro’s at a fixed exchange rate of e1 per 50 points at the end of the experiment. After
these 18 rounds subjects filled out a questionnaire with some background characteristics
before getting paid in cash and leaving the lab.
5.4 Experimental Results
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics
In total 184 subjects participated in our two treatments, 84 in the low probability treat-
ment, 100 in the high probability treatment. Half of the subjects were bidders. Each
bidder made 4 bids per round for 15 (incentivized) rounds, such that we have 5520 bids,
and 2760 wage offers (loosing bids) to work with. Every committee made one investment
decision per round while each committee member sent messages, casted votes and made
statements individually, yielding 1380 decisions and 2760 messages, votes and statements.
Table 5.2 presents some characteristics of the subjects. Although there is a difference
between the two treatments in terms of gender it is not significant. A χ2 test shows that
12A set of instructions can be found in Appendix D.2.
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there is significant difference between the two groups in terms of the year of study they
are in. The difference stems from a relatively high number of first-year bachelor students
in the high prob. treatment and pre-master students in the low prob. treatment. Since
all subjects were recruited in the same way, we have no explanation for this difference.
The summary statistics of all variables in the database are in the “summary stats” table
in the appendix.
All regressions are presented in tables with a similar set-up. The top row lists the de-
pendent variable. Below the horizontal line are the independent variables, with estimated
coefficients and the accompanying standard errors in brackets below the coefficients. The
bottom of the table shows what, if any, selection is made from the data, as well as the
level at which standard errors are clustered, and whether or not period and subject fixed
effects are used.
5.4.2 Bidder’s behavior - what determines the reputation of a
committee member?
The theory of VS leads to three predictions concerning the determinants of reputations,
see page 91. In this section we test these predictions using an OLS regression,13
wijt = α + γID(investment (i, t)) + γ4D (sttmnt (i, t) = 4) + γ5D (sttmnt (i, t) = 5)
+γcD (closed front (i, t)) + FE + ijt,
where wijt is the wage paid by bidder j for committee member i in period t, α a constant,
D(investment (i, t)) a dummy that is 1 if the committee of which i is a member invested
in period t , D (sttmnt (i, t) = 4) a dummy that equals 1 if member i in period t stated
a confidence level of 4 (similarly for D (sttmnt (i, t) = 5)), D (closed front (i, t)) a dummy
that equals 1 if the committee i is part of shows a closed front in period t, FE denotes a
full set of period and subject fixed effects, and ijt a zero-mean disturbance term.
The theory predicts, that in both treatments the market pays a higher wage if a
committee invests, and second that the difference is related to the expected loss in project
value in case of conflicting signals, −p = 10. Note that the experiment is set-up in
such a way that committee members receive wages from two bidders, one from each pair
of bidders that is matched with a committee. Thus the difference in wages between
13Since the bidders play a second-price auction the highest bid should theoretically contain an upward
bias, while the second price should be an unbiased estimate of the value of the item. We therefore only
report the regressions based on the second price, the wage, in each auction. Running the regression on
all bids does not qualitatively effect the outcomes of the regressions.
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investment and no investment should equal 5, γI = 5, in both treatments. Finally, the
theory predicts that in either treatment the wage is not affected by statements that
committee members make, γ4 = γ5 = γc = 0.
Table 5.3 presents convincing evidence for the first two predictions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
investment 6.642*** 4.855** 6.097*** 5.568***
(1.179) (1.980) (1.176) (1.058)
Sttmnt=4 1.047 -1.101 2.114 0.421
(1.257) (1.264) (1.709) (1.123)
Sttmnt=5 2.303** 0.344 -0.0285 0.176
(0.969) (1.055) (1.334) (0.923)
closed front 6.849*** 5.198*** 5.954***
(1.141) (1.540) (1.030)
high sttmnt -3.163***
(0.907)
low sttmnt -7.960***
(1.173)
Constant 16.72*** 18.31*** 16.93*** 14.36*** 15.11*** 20.39***
(1.178) (1.581) (1.341) (1.666) (2.351) (1.413)
Observations 2,760 2,760 2,760 1,260 1,500 2,760
R-squared 0.397 0.340 0.389 0.383 0.399 0.442
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
cluster labgroup labgroup labgroup labgroup labgroup labgroup
Treatment H&L H&L H&L L H H&L
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.3: Formation of reputation
From the table it is clear that investment increases the reputation of committee mem-
bers. F-tests do not reject the hypothesis that the coefficient equals 5 in each treatment.
Thus, as predicted by the theory, the difference in wage is such that the members of a
committee that receives conflicting signals are (made) indifferent between investing and
not investing: on average, what a member gains in terms of wage thanks to investing
equals what he loses in terms of expected project payoff.
The table also shows that statements made by committee members influence the wages
paid: a united front and higher statements lead to higher wages. This goes against the
equilibrium prediction of the theory. In sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 we investigate possible
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of Statements and Closed fronts
reasons for this finding. Repeating regressions (4) and (5) with interaction terms between
closed front and investment, and between closed front and the statement variables did
not change much. All interaction terms where negative and neither the size nor the
significance of the other coefficient was influenced much. The increase in wage thanks
to these statement-related variables seems to be independent of the investment decision.
Also note that the effects of the closed front and high statements are somewhat hard to
disentangle as statements become both higher and more likely to be aligned over time,
see Figure 5.3. Since 5 is the highest possible statement, high statements are more
likely to concur. Despite this issue, table 5.3 clearly indicates that making statements
lower than 5 would cause the bids to decrease. With an average statement above 4.5,
it is clear that committee members realize this. Similarly a committee that presented a
closed front received wages about 6 points higher than committees that did not. To ensure
that this effect is not caused by the ceiling effect, we create two dummies. The dummy
high sttmnt (low sttmnt) is set to 1 if the statement made by a committee member was
strictly higher (strictly lower) than the statement of his fellow committee member in the
same period. Regression 5 shows that if a committee does not show a closed front, both
the member making the relatively high statement and the one making the relatively low
statement receive a penalty for the apparent disagreement. The behavior of the market
should cause committee members to concur on the highest statement. Looking at Figure
5.3 it seems that committee members indeed picked up on this incentive.
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Signals / Statements -1 0 1
-1 518 104 6
1 5 98 501
Table 5.4: Statements as a function of signals
Investment No Investment
high prob 43% 57%
low prob 34% 66%
Table 5.5: Investment prob. per treatment
5.4.3 Committee behavior
We already observed in the previous section that, in case of conflicting signals, what
a member gains in terms of wage thanks to investing equals what he loses in terms of
expected project payoff. This is an important aspect of optimal committee behavior.
The theory generates three more predictions concerning the behavior of a committee.
First, it predicts that members share their private information in the meeting. To see
whether this is indeed the case, we coded all the messages exchanged in the chat box.
Messages explicitly talking about the signal received are coded 1 if the committee member
claims to have received a positive signal, and -1 if he claims a negative signal. Messages
that only state ”invest” or ”we should invest” are coded as 0, since it is unsure whether
it is a suggested course of action, or whether it pertains to the signal received.14 For
the purpose of this analysis every conversation between two committee members in a
particular round was coded as two messages, one for each committee member.
Table 5.4 shows that, by and large, members indeed shared their private information.
Only 11 out of the 1232 coded messages contained an outright lie (all in different com-
mittees), while 1019 messages directly reveal the true signal received. Both the lies and
the messages we coded as 0’s seem to be distributed equally over positive and negative
signals. This suggests that they are not used strategically within the committee.
A second prediction deals with the relationship between signals and the likelihood
of investment. In either treatment, a committee should invest in case of two positive
signals and should not invest in case of no positive signals. In case of conflicting signals,
investment should happen with a positive probability, and this probability should be
higher in the high probability treatment. On the whole, the a priori unlikely decision -
investment - should remain the decision that is taken less often.
14Appendix D.1 shows the conversion table.
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# positive signals received 0 1 2
High prob. treatment 9.8 25 97.6
Low prob. treatment 1.162 24.1 77.1
Table 5.6: Investment prob. as a function of signals received
To start with the latter, Table 5.5 reports the incidence of either decision in both
treatments. In both treatments investment was indeed the least likely decision, while a
binomial probability test rejects the hypothesis that the investment happens at least 50%
of the time (pr<0.000 for low prob, pr<0.01 high prob).
Table 5.6 shows the percentage of committees that invest as a function of the number
of positive signals its members received.
Clearly, the additional investment in the high probability treatment stems from com-
mittees with zero or two positive signals, not from committees with mixed signals as
would be predicted by theory. This is confirmed by a logit regression (unreported) on the
effect of the treatment on the likelihood of investing for the sample of committees that re-
ceived conflicting signals. The coefficient on the dummy for a high-probability treatment
is positive, but small and statistically insignificant. Note, however, that in theory and
in the data a committee with conflicting signals is indifferent between investing and not
investing. For the given difference in wage that bidders pay, any probability of investment
is a best-reply. What is not consistent with optimizing behavior is the 23% of committees
in the low probability treatment that received two positive signals but decided not to
invest.
A final prediction of the theory is that committees show a united front to the outside
world. We have seen in figure 5.3 that there is indeed a strong tendency to show united
fronts and express high levels of confidence in the decision taken. Furthermore, both
the confidence and the percentage of closed fronts increases with practice. Committee
members seem to learn over time to report the same, highly confident message, especially
in the high probability treatment. Nevertheless, it is also clear from the bidders’ behavior
that some committees leave money on the table by not showing a united front. Although
the committees’ strategy is not a perfect best response to bidder behavior, in general
they seem to pick up on the incentives generated by the ”reputational market”. In the
next subsection we take a closer look at how these responses change over time to see if
committees learn.
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES Investment Closed front
sum sign=1 4.719*** -1.027***
(0.350) (0.200)
sum sign=2 10.18*** 0.346
(0.464) (0.237)
Period 0.0935*** 0.196***
(0.0271) (0.0169)
sum sign=1 X Period -0.212*** -0.0748***
(0.0318) (0.0220)
sum sign=2 X Period -0.160*** -0.110***
(0.0408) (0.0232)
Investment 1.142***
(0.125)
Observations 5,280 5,280
Number of labsubjects 88 88
cluster NONE NONE
Treatment H&L H&L
Period FE NO NO
Subject FE YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5.7: Committees learning
Do committees learn?
The theory predicts that committees perfectly take into account the market responses to
their behavior. However, neither markets nor bidders are perfectly playing equilibrium
behavior. One explanation, based on figure 5.3, could be that subjects learn to play
equilibrium over time. We focus on Investment and Closed front since we know from table
5.3 that the reputation of committee members increases most in these variables, and hence
learning should be most pronounced. In table 5.7 we show the effect of time by examining
how the decision making process of committee members changes over time. Investment
becomes marginally more likely over time for committees that have two negative signals,
while it becomes mildly less likely for committees with 1 or 2 positive signals. Overall,
however, these coefficients are dwarfed by the coefficients on sum sign=1 and sum sign=2.
Even in the 15th, and last, period the effect of the signals is as expected: most investment
occurs if both signals are positive etc.
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high prob low prob
smart 71.11% 66.45%
dumb 61.45% 48.13%
Table 5.8: Percentage of Closed Ranks
Committees do appear to learn to present a closed front. The coefficient on Period
is larger than either interaction term, indicating that all committees were showing more
closed fronts over time. Interestingly enough, the learning effect seems strongest in com-
mittees that received 0 positive signals, even though table 5.10 indicates that it is the
group with mixed signals that is least likely overall to present a united front, and thus has
“most to learn”. The positive coefficient on Investment is somewhat puzzling, it appears
that investing committee members are less likely to admit internal conflict. Although
game theory provides no reason why this would be so, perhaps having money on the line
through investment makes it more important for them to appear convinced or united
(recall that most closed fronts occur for the highest stated confidence).
5.4.4 Do bidders use the available information efficiently?
In section 5.4.2 we noted that bidders pay higher wages if they observe a united front and
if committee members express high levels of confidence in the decision taken. This finding
is in conflict with the equilibrium prediction that there is no relevant information about
ability in the statements made. Are bidders irrational or is there relevant information
about ability in these statements? If the latter is the case, do bidders make the most of
this information, i.e., is their behavior a best reply? The analysis in this section shows
that statements indeed contain useful information and that bidders make use of that
information.
Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 show the marginal distributions of the cheap talk statements
as a function of ability and the signals received by the committee. Thus, the bottom
right cell of table 5.8 indicates that in the low probability treatment 48.3% of low ability
committee members make the same statement as their fellow committee member.
In both treatments it appears that high ability members are more likely to make the
same statements. Markets should therefore increase their bids for committees that show
a closed front.
If we look at the distribution of statements over the 5 possible levels of confidence, it is
quite clear that high ability members more often indicate that they are “very confident”.
The difference in distributions is significant in a χ2-test (p < 0.000).
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Confidence level 1 2 3 4 5 total
High ability 1.38 1.63 4.76 14.04 78.2 100
Low ability 3.44 3.09 10.82 18.56 64.09 100
Table 5.9: Statements made
Both observations could be caused by the signal distributions. A high ability member
is more likely to have the same signal as his fellow committee member. His committee is
therefore more likely to take a decision in accordance with his signal. To show the strength
of this explanation table 5.10 displays the number of closed fronts as a function of the
number of positive signals received in a committee. A χ2-test rejects the independence
# of positive signals 0 1 2 total
different Sttmnt 136 254 122 512
Closed front 320 228 320 868
total 456 482 442 1380
Table 5.10: Signals and Closed fronts
of these distributions (p=0.00): committee members are more likely to present a closed
front if they have concurring signals.
These findings imply that statements contain relevant information about ability. Com-
mittee members that presented a closed front and/or made high statements were more
likely to be of high ability. The question then becomes whether bidders made efficient use
of this information.
Theoretically, the wage, the price paid in the second-price auction, should equal the
estimated value of the services of a committee member, i.e., wijt = E(vit|Xijt), where vit
is the value of member i in period t, and Xijt contains all information bidder j has on
committee member i in period t. Using the properties of OLS predictors as conditional
expected values, we could run two separate regressions, one for wijt, wijt = α1+γXijt+ηijt,
and one for vit, vit = α0 + βXijt + it. Bidders use information efficiently if β = γ. In
that case, the wage changes in exactly the same way as the expected value of committee
members as a function of observed covariates. Any systematic deviations of this equality
would indicate inefficient use of information by the bidders. However, the fact that ability
influences not only vit but also the observables in Xijt gives rise to a missing variable
and/or endogeneity problem. Using these two regressions might cause undesirable biases.
We therefore did two things. To check for missing variable bias we include the actual
value vit of a committee member as a regressor in table 5.11. The insignificance of the
coefficient on vit indicates that the Xijt capture all information used by the bidders.
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To deal with the (theoretical) correlation between vit and wijt we created the variable
Difference, ∆ijt = vit − wijt. This variable measures any difference between the value
of a committee member and his reputation, such that it should capture any systematic
deviations from the efficient use of information. In both treatments Difference runs from
-45 till 50, which are the minimum and maximum values implied by the constraint on
the bids and the value distribution. The variable has an average value of around 5 and
a standard deviation of roughly 25 points. Figure 5.4 shows a histogram of the empirical
distribution. The distribution clearly shows the peaks caused by the bi-modal value
distribution, implying we should be careful with the standard-errors in the regression.
Because the standard errors are clustered in all regressions below, this should not cause
large over-estimations of the precision of the coefficients.
Figure 5.4: Distribution of Difference
We can now run the suggested test, in the form of a single regression orthogonality
test:
∆ijt = α + γII (i, t) + γ4D (sttmnt (i, t) = 4) + γ5D (sttmnt (i, t) = 5)
+γcD (closed front (i, t)) + FE + ijt,
with ijt a zero mean error term. The strategy of a bidder is a best-reply, and bidders use
the available information efficiently if γI = γ4 = γ5 = γc = 0.
Furthermore, to ensure we capture the individual decisions we include both period
and bidder fixed effects in the regressions. In the final regressions we try to explain the
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effect of the bidder FE on bids, by comparing the regressions with and without FE and
background variables. Table 5.11 shows the outcomes by treatment.
Before discussing the outcomes, first note that the standard errors in the regressions
in table 5.11 are clustered on the matching group level instead of the individual level. If
bidders use information efficiently, the theoretical predictions are identical to the statis-
tical null-hypothesis: all coefficients are zero. Clustering too finely would increase the
standard errors too much, which would make the orthogonality test too likely to accept
the null hypothesis. Since bidders and committee members could influence each other’s
behavior, not clustering would be falsely assuming full independence between the obser-
vations. The largest unit on which committees and bidders could influence each other
was the matching group. This level of clustering is the most critical test available that
still corrects for correlation in the actions of individual subjects, and therefore we cluster
the standard errors at this level.
Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 5.11 show that individual bidders make quite efficient
use of all observable information: all estimated coefficients are insignificant. The small
size of the coefficients indicate that, even without clustering standard errors, there is
no reason to think that investment is over- or undervalued as a sign of ability by the
bidders. The coefficients on the message and closed-front variables are larger in absolute
size, such that the clustering potentially has more influence on the statistical significance.
In fact, if standard errors are not clustered, sttmnt=4 and closed front become significant
at the 10% level in the high probability treatment. It seems that some extra information
in the message variables could have gone unnoticed by the bidders in that treatment.
This pattern is also visible in an F-test for joint significance of the regressors. In the low
probability treatment this yields a p = 0.71, clearly indicating that these variables are not
likely to carry much importance. In the high probability treatment the same test yields a
p = 0.086, indicating that there is some indication that bidders missed some information
in that treatment. Overall, however, these effects seem quite marginal, bidders appear to
have been quite effective in weighing the information presented to them.
The findings in regression 3 and 4 seem to strengthen the argument that information
is used efficiently. The coefficient on Value is insignificant in both regression 3 and 4. The
effect of the unobservable random variable seems to be captured entirely by the visible
aspects of committee behavior. Thus we feel quite certain in concluding that bidders’
strategies are (close to) best-replies and the variables Investment, closed front, Sttmnt=4
and Sttmnt=5 contain the information used by the bidders to determine their bids.
106 Career Concerned Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Difference Difference Wage Wage
Investment -0.597 -1.587 4.960* 6.118***
(5.159) (1.772) (2.657) (1.133)
closed front 1.644 -2.716 5.366** 5.969***
(3.527) (2.386) (2.071) (1.189)
Sttmnt=4 3.104 -4.974 -1.052 2.100
(3.186) (2.812) (1.132) (1.772)
Sttmnt=5 2.386 1.229 0.411 -0.0228
(1.931) (2.401) (1.132) (1.291)
Value -0.0245 -0.00472
(0.0173) (0.0162)
Constant 2.029 10.89** 14.76*** 15.24***
(4.202) (4.827) (1.908) (2.377)
Observations 1,260 1,500 1,260 1,500
R-squared 0.108 0.092 0.384 0.399
cluster Match group Match group Match group Match group
Treatment L H L H
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 5.11: Efficient use of information
5.5 Robustness analysis
5.5.1 Bidders comparing committees
In the theory of VS, agents are assumed to know the game and the equilibrium strategies
completely and thoroughly. In our experiment, after subjects had read the instructions,
their knowledge was tested through a questionnaire. To ensure subjects are aware of the
relevant information, the computer program continuously presented relevant distributions
and aspects of the game to the subject during the experiment. Besides this information,
the bidders submit their bids through a screen that allows them to compare the two
committees they are bidding on. From the game-theoretic point of view, comparing
behavior of two committees whose investment opportunities are unrelated makes no sense.
Behaviorally, however, there is the possibility that bidders compare the behavior of each
committee with that of the other committee, as if they are comparing the behavior with
equilibrium strategies. This would, for instance, imply that the increase in wage following
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investment of any committee depends negatively on the investment of the other committee.
If bidders follow this behavioral pattern, a bid should be higher (i) for the committee that
invests if the other does not invest; (ii) for the committee that shows a united front if
the other does not; (iii) if a member makes a statement that is higher than the average
statement made by the other committee.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Wage Wage
Sttmnt=4 -0.730 2.335
(1.085) (1.730)
Sttmnt=5 1.156 0.446
(0.932) (1.238)
investment 5.901** 7.840***
(2.131) (1.376)
other not invest 3.542*** 1.471
(0.914) (1.041)
Invest. X other not -2.634 -3.034
(2.574) (1.868)
closed front 3.129* 5.853***
(1.560) (1.245)
other not closed 0.597 1.811
(1.103) (1.130)
closed X other not 3.172* -0.409
(1.546) (1.968)
extra confident 2.704 2.117
(2.343) (2.750)
Constant 11.85*** 13.14***
(1.881) (2.412)
Observations 1,260 1,500
R-squared 0.411 0.406
Subject FE Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes
Cluster individual individual
Treatment L H
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5.12: Contrasting two committees
To test these hypotheses we created several variables that keep track of the information
on the bidders’ screen. The variable other not invest is a dummy that is set to one if the
other committee on the bidders screen does not invest, similarly other not closed equals
1 if the other committee does not show a closed front. The variable extra confident,
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measures the difference between the statement made by a committee member and the
average of the statements made by the members of the other committee. If the bidders
compare the committees on their screen these variables, or the interaction between these
variables and the behavior of the committee members, should have a significant effect on
the wage levels.
Overall the results in table 5.12 seem to give some credence to the idea that bidders
compare committees, mostly in the low probability treatment. If we compare the regres-
sions of the low prob. treatment with the regressions in table 5.3, it seems that part of
the increase in wages following a closed front or investment is caused by the comparison
with the other committee on the bidders’ screen. In the high probability treatment no
such effects are found. In both treatments and both tables investment and closed front
have a positive effect, such that the comparison with other committees does not actually
change the incentive effects created by career concerns. Interestingly the effect of state-
ments made disappears completely in table 5.12 compared to table 5.3. As predicted by
theory the effect of cheap talk statements on wages is not very robust. Although the
information on a bidders’ screen about another committee can have some effect on the
wage of a particular committee member, the main predictions from VS still carry through.
An expert that cares about his reputation should invest more than first-best and always
make sure the members of his committee present a closed front.
5.5.2 Background variables
To get a better idea of the which committee members were in favor of investment we
present a logit regression that relates the voting behavior of each subject with his or her
background variables and some situation variables. The results are shown in table 5.13.
As expected the amount of positive signals increased votes in favor of investment.
Committee members are more likely to vote in favor of investment in the high probability
treatment, consistent with the larger amount of investment in that treatment. The effect
of age on voting behavior is economically insignificant. The coefficient is quite small and
our subjects do not differ much in age, the youngest being 18 and the oldest 30 while
most subjects are between 19 and 24. Our measure of willingness to take risks, risk prox,
does not affect voting behavior of committee members in general, it does help predict
whether or not a committee member votes in favor of investment in case the committee
has mixed signals. Subjects that are more willing to take risk, are also more likely to
invest in a uncertain project to increase their reputation. Since this is a risky investment,
this effect is as expected. A similar regression on bidding behavior showed no significant
(1) (2)
VARIABLES vote Bid
Itreatment 2 0.596** 5.088***
(0.302) (1.798)
risk prox -0.00743 -0.262
(0.0945) (0.466)
gender -0.0788 2.520
(0.355) (1.718)
econ bg 0.434 2.332
(0.537) (2.647)
year 0.0473 -0.165
(0.0821) (0.580)
age 0.0657** -0.222
(0.0323) (0.369)
Isum sign 1 1.836***
(0.265)
Isum sign 2 5.301***
(0.452)
IsumXrisk 1 0.207**
(0.101)
IsumXrisk 2 0.196
(0.179)
IQMsg2 2 0.331
(1.609)
IQMsg2 3 1.012
(1.430)
decision 5.075***
(0.834)
closed front 4.662***
(1.001)
Constant -4.160*** 23.76***
(0.892) (7.390)
Observations 5,520 2,728
R-squared 0.195
Subject FE NO NO
Period FE Yes Yes
cluster individual individual
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5.13: Effect of background variables
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effects of subject background variables on the bids made. The insignificant effect of year
is quite reassuring given the difference in the distribution between the two treatments. In
general the background variables seem to have little impact on the qualitative results of
our experiment.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have reported on an experiment in which committee members cared
both about their reputations and about the returns on the project. The control in the
lab allows us to discern when project value is maximized and when career concerns cause
subjects to distort their choices. This level of observability allows us to test the theoretical
mechanisms predicted by the career concerns literature. Our results indicate that the
model of VS captures the reputational mechanisms accurately enough to predict their
consequences. This allows us to predict theoretically when and how career concerns can
have undesirable consequences, as well as allow us to use theory to design better decision
making procedures.
5.6.1 Future research
In both our treatments our expert committees have career concerns, it would be useful
to compare our findings with those of a situation in which committee members do not
care about their reputations. We can then study how in the absence of career concerns
committee members deal with the uncertainty concerning the profitability of investment
and how markets evaluate the ability of committee members. The theory of VS predicts
that the difference in perceived ability is higher in the absence of career-driven behavior
and that a committee invests only if both its members have positive private information.
It is common in experimental research to allow inexperienced subjects to “learn to play
the game.” Besides providing instructions, quizzes and incentives, the most important
element that should favor learning is repetition: letting subjects act repeatedly within
the same situation. An alternative, or complementary, way of stimulating learning relies
not on repetition but on decomposition. Rather than letting subjects experience the full-
fledged version of the game, subjects can be allowed to play first a simple version, to which
additional layers of complexity are being added over time. In this paper, we followed the
standard practice. An experimental analysis of the theory of VS also allows for the second
approach. Subjects can first gain experience with a situation in which career concerns
play no role. This not only simplifies the objective function of committee members. It
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also gets rid of the interaction between committee members and markets. Thus, the
task of markets – to evaluate committee members – should also become easier, as their
actions does not influence the behavior of the committee members. In a second step,
committee members can be made to care about both the investment and their careers. In
fact, this incremental approach is also used in VS to explain the theory as well as in the
theory section above. It would be interesting to see whether the two ways of stimulating
learning yield different outcomes, and whether one type is more conducive than the other
in bringing subjects to equilibrium play.
In our experiment committee members are forced to make a statement about their
confidence, while this might not always be the case in the field. Although it seems that
subjects use the statements strategically, a stronger test of the strategic nature could,
for instance, be to allow members to refrain from making a statement and/or make the
statement itself, but not its content, costly. If experts still make a statement, it seems
more likely that they are using it strategically.

Appendix A
Appendices When a Price is Enough
For bookkeeping, the Jacobian of first derivatives φ′ (·) of any function φ (·) : Ra → Rb, is
of dimension b×a, while the Hessian of second derivatives φ′′ (·) is of dimension ab×a. For
any multi-vector functions ψ (z1, z2, . . .) : Ra1×Ra2 . . .→ R the vector of first derivatives
ψzi is of dimension a
i×1 and the matrix of second derivatives ψzizj is of dimension ai×aj
where the dimension of the matrix follows the order of the subscripts. In addition, let
superscript T be the transpose operator. Vectors and multi-dimensional constructs are
denoted in bold, scalars are in normal font.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. Due to non-satiation of the utility function we know that the budget constraint
will hold with equality such that we know that:
y∗ (n) = q (x∗ (n))− T (x∗ (n))
Direct substitution of the budget constraint into the utility function allows us to write
the first-order conditions to problem (2.2) as:
0 = ux + (q
′ − T ′)T uy (A.1)
which directly implies equations (2.7) and (2.8).
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Now take the second-order derivative of the utility function with respect to x to get
the second-order conditions:
uxx +
(
2uxy + uyy (q
′ (x∗)− T ′ (x∗))T
)
(q′ (x∗)− T ′ (x∗)) + uy (q′′ (x∗)− T ′′ (x∗))l 0
(A.2)
Differentiate the marginal rate of substitution, s, toward x, using the definition of s and
the implicit function theorem to define y (u,x,n), to get:
∂s (x,y (u,x,n) ,n)
∂x
= −
(
uxx + 2uxys
T
)− uyyssT
uy
(A.3)
Now combining (2.8) with (A.3) allows us to simplify (A.2) and obtain the third condition:
−
(
∂s (x,y (u,x,n) ,n)
∂x
+ q′′ (x∗)− T ′′ (x∗)
)
uy l 0⇔
−∂s (x,y (u,x,n) ,n)
∂x
|{x=x∗(n),y=y∗(n)} + q′′ (x∗)− T ′′ (x∗) l 0
where the final step follows from the assumption that uy > 0.
The last condition of lemma 2.3, follows directly from the fact that the maximum has
to be the best option in the entire choice-space, while conditions i.) to iii.) only guarantee
it attains a local maximum in {X, Y }∗ .
A.2 Proof to Proposition 2.4 and corollary 2.5
Proof. Start by assuming that condition iv.) of lemma 2.3 holds. Suppose taxes are
equated to wedges for a, presumed optimal, incentive-compatible allocation. Consider a
joint deviation of an agent from the bundle assigned to him when the original allocation is
incentive compatible, resource feasible, and within this set on the Pareto frontier. Denote
the joint deviation by α∆x where α > 0 and ∆x is a k × 1 vector which we normalize to
length one, on the market by a particular agent of type m. The budget constraint (2.5)
defines the amount of y the deviating agent receives as:
y = q (x∗ (m) +α∆x)− T (x∗ (m) +α∆x) .
Note that the resulting allocation after the joint deviation is incentive compatible since
the original allocation was incentive compatible and the exchange occurs at market prices.
Through the utility function, the utility gain, U (α∆x) , of such a deviation can therefore
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be written as:
U (α∆x) = u (x∗ (m) +α∆x, q (x∗ (m) +α∆x)− T (x∗ (m) +α∆x) ,n)− u∗ (m) ,
where u∗ denotes the utility the agent obtains without deviation. By a second-order
Taylor approximation around u∗ (m) the utility gain can be written as:
U (α∆x) ≈ (uTx + uy (q′ − T ′))α∆x +
1
2
α2∆xT
(
uxx +
(
2uxy + uyy (q
′ − T ′)T
)
(q′ − T ′) + uy (q′′ − T ′′)
)
∆x,
≈ 1
2
α2∆xT
(
uxx +
(
2uxy + uyy (q
′ − T ′)T
)
(q′ − T ′) + uy (q′′ − T ′′)
)
∆x,
≈ 1
2
α2uy∆x
T
(
−∂s (x,y (u,x,m) ,m)
∂x
|{x=x∗,y=y∗,u=u∗} + q′′ (x∗)− T ′′ (x∗)
)
∆x,
where the first order terms equals zero by the assumption that taxes are equated to
wedges, T ′i (x
∗ (m)) =Wi(m), and we have used equation (A.3) for simplification.
Now suppose second-order implementation constraints (2.9) are not satisfied such that:
H = −∂s (x,y (u,x,m) ,m)
∂x
|{x=x∗,y=y∗,u∗} + q′′ (x∗)− T ′′ (x∗) ,
is not negative semi-definite. In that case there exists at least one deviation strategy α∆xˆ
which yields a positive utility gain: U (α∆xˆ) > 0. To see this note that if this were not
the case, by definition H would be negative semi-definite. In addition, since H is a matrix
of second-order derivatives and therefore symmetric, the opposite deviation −α∆xˆ yields
approximately the same utility gain. A second-order Taylor approximation then yields:
U (α∆xˆ) ≈ U (−α∆xˆ). Since, the approximation error of the Taylor expansion limits to
zero as α → 0, there must exist at least two deviation strategies α∆xˆ, and −α∆xˆ that
yield positive utility for sufficiently small α.
The change in tax revenue due to such a deviation can also be approximated by means
of a second-order Taylor expansion:
T (α∆xˆ) = T (x∗ (n) +α∆xˆ)− T (x∗ (n))
≈ αT ′∆xˆ+1
2
α2∆xˆTT ′′∆xˆ.
The first-order term will always be non-negative for deviation strategy α∆xˆ or for -α∆xˆ.
If for one of the choices, the first-order term is positive, the first-order term dominates
the second-order term for sufficiently small α. Hence, there is a deviation that results in
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higher tax revenue. If on the other hand the first-order term is zero, we need to consider
the second-order term. If it is negative the tax schedule contains an internal maximum in
at least one vector subspace of X which violates the assumption stated in the proposition.
Therefore, if the first-order term is zero the second term must be non-negative. Hence,
tax revenue always weakly increases in either −α∆xˆ or α∆xˆ for sufficiently small α. It
follows that at least one of the two deviations is resource feasible.
Therefore, under the conditions stated in our proposition, if the tax system is not
successful in implementing the allocation on the Pareto frontier, there exist at least one
deviation which increase utility of at least one agent, leaves the allocation resource feasible
and incentive compatible. The utility of all other agents remains unaffected, since there
are no externalities by assumption, and is therefore a Pareto improvement. Hence, we
run into a contradiction, since a Pareto improvement cannot exist over an allocation that
is already on the Pareto frontier proving the main part of the proposition.
The stated corollary follows from the fact that the second-best allocation of a welfarist
planner always lies on the Pareto frontier. To see this note that if the allocation were not
on the Pareto frontier, by definition the planner could increase the utility of at least one
agent without decreasing the utility of any other agent. Such a deviation increases the
value of the planner’s objective function, and hence the original allocation could not have
been the second best (this is also shown in Werning, 2007,Brendon, 2013).
Such that if the tax schedule off the allocation is set in such a way the maximum is a
global one and condition iv.) of lemma 2.3 holds, the tax implements the allocation.
A.3 Proof to Proposition 2.9
Proof. Note that in the direct mechanism, reporting your type to the planner is equivalent
to choosing a bundle {x, y} among the set of bundles that are assigned to a type, {X, Y }∗.
Hence, we can rewrite the optimization problem for the agents in the direct mechanism
(see definition 2.1) as follows:
{x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} = arg max
x,y
{u (x, y,n) : {x, y} ∈ {X, Y }∗} .
In addition, by equation (2.7), for each bundle of x∗ (n) the tax system provides the
corresponding level y∗ (n). Hence, if the tax system, T (x), satisfies the equation (2.7) we
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can further simplify the optimization problem to:
{x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} = arg max
x,y
{u (x, y,n) : y = q (x)− T (x) ,x ∈ X∗} ,
= arg max
x,y
{u (x, y,n) : y = q (x)− T (x) ,x ∈ X} ,
where the final step follows from the fact that the allocation is surjective such that the set
of assigned bundles is equal to the set of all available bundles on the market: X∗ = X. This
is exactly equal to optimization problem 2.2, and hence, the tax system that satisfies (2.7)
can implement any surjective allocation. Note that we do not need to check whether the
tax system also satisfies equations (2.8), (2.9) or condition iv.). Since we have assumed
that the original allocation is incentive compatible, it follows immediately that these
constraints are also satisfied provided the allocation is surjective.
Finally, note that the tax system that implements a surjective allocation is unique.
Equation (2.7) implicitly defines the value of the tax function for all x ∈ X∗:
T (x∗ (n)) = q (x∗ (n))− y∗ (n) .
Therefore, equation (2.7) uniquely determines the value of T (x) for all x ∈ X∗. Since
by surjectiveness X∗ = X it defines the value of T (x) over its entire domain. Hence,
there is only one function T (x) that satisfies (2.7). Since (2.7) is a necessary condition
for implementation, it follows that there is only one tax system that can implement a
surjective allocation.
A.4 Example
A.4.1 The Second-Best Allocation
Our graphical example in section 4 is based on the following model. Suppose the economy
is inhabited by couples and their children. Each couple j derives utility from their joint
consumption, which is assumed to be the untaxed numeraire commodity Y j. In addition,
the couples derive disutility from hours worked by each spouse i in couple j, lji , as well as
disutility from the interaction between hours worked, lj1l
j
2. This gives couples an incentive
for partial specialization where one partner works more hours, while the other spends more
time at home. For simplicity we assume preferences for labor are symmetric, such that
the couple does not have a preference for which of the two spouses supplies the highest
amount of labor. Each partner i in couple j is assumed to have identical ability, nj. This
118 Appendices When a Price is Enough
could be the result of perfect assortative matching. As is standard in the literature, we
assume gross income is the product of hours worked and ability: Xji = n
jlji . We assume
the following functional form for the utility function of the parents:
Up (Y, l1, l2, l1l2) = γY log (Y )− γl
α
2∑
i=1
lαi −
1
β
(l1l2)
β ,
= γY log (Y )− γX
α
2∑
i=1
(
Xi
n
)α
− 1
β
(
X1X2
n2
)β
,
where utility is assumed to be logarithmic in consumption of Y , CES with parameter
α > 1 in each spouse’s hours worked, and CES with parameter β in the interaction of
hours worked. γY and γX are scaling parameters which allows one to weight the relative
importance of each of the three terms in the utility function.
Each couple is assumed to have one child. Their utility function does not weight the
utility of the child.1 The child does not make any decisions but its utility is affected by
the decisions of his parents. This creates a classic externality where the preferences of the
child are not included in the transactions made by the parents, but do affect total welfare.
The child is assumed to receive utility of consumption of the household. In addition, it
receives disutility from ±labor, since leisure time of each parent is spend with the child.
Finally, the child enjoys spending time with both of his parents, and therefore receives
utility if the parents do not specialize but share the task of rearing him. We capture this
by letting the child’s utility increase in l1l2. We assume the following utility function for
the child’s utility function:
Uc (Y, l1, l2, l1l2) = δY log (Y )− δl
ξ
2∑
i=1
lξi +
1
ζ
(l1l2)
ζ ,
where ξ > 1 is the parameter for CES disutility of labor, ζ the parameter for utility from
the interaction of hours worked, and δY and δl scaling parameters.
In the simulations we take a discrete approximation of our model, such that n follows
a discrete distribution with J possible outcomes nmin, . . . , nmax.
2 We assume each group
has similar size f such that the mass of a particular type is equal to g = 1
J
. We assume
the welfare function of the planner is a concave increasing function of joint family utility
1Note that the main intuition carries over to the case where the parents take account of some, but
not all of the utility of the child.
2Note that our model formally does not apply to discrete models of taxation. However, as we increase
the number of types, we can approximate the case fior continuous type with increasing precision.
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U = UP + UC . Hence, social welfare can be written as:
SW =
1
f
J∑
j=1
1
1− νU
1−ν
j , (A.4)
where ν measures the rate of relative inequality aversion.
We normalize all prizes to one such that the resource constraint of the economy can
be written as:
0 ≥ 1
f
J∑
j=1
Y j −X1 −X2,
0 ≥
J∑
j=1
Y j −Xj1 −Xj2 . (A.5)
In the direct mechanism, the planner is assumed to offer bundles
(
Xj1 , X
j
2 , Y
j
)
to each
household j on the basis of a their reported type. The allocation is incentive compatible
if each couple truthfully reports their type to the planner:
j = arg max
k=1,...,J
Up
(
Y k,
Xk1
nj
,
Xk2
nj
,
Xk1X
k
2
(nj)2
)
∀ j = 1, . . . , J. (A.6)
Note that incentive compatibility only depends on the utility of the parents, and not of
the children since they do not take any decision. In the simulations we take the first-order
approach and calculate the optimum under the condition that each couple j has at least
as high utility by telling the truth as by mimicking type j − 1:
Up
(
Y j,
Xj1
nj
,
Xj2
nj
,
Xj1X
j
2
(nj)2
)
≥ Up
(
Y j−1,
Xj−11
nj
,
Xj−12
nj
,
Xj−11 X
j−1
2
(nj)2
)
∀ j = 2, . . . , J.
(A.7)
At the end of the simulation we check whether the allocation calculated under the first-
order approach also satisfies (A.6) and in the reported simulation this is indeed the case.
The optimal allocation was calculated numerically by maximizing equation (A.4) subject
to (A.7) and (A.5).
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A.4.2 Market Implementation
The market implementation is the standard Mirrlees implementation as described in the
end of section 3. That is, the budget constraint of the households is given by:
Y = X1 −X2 − T (X1)− T (X2) ,
and marginal tax rates are found by equating taxes to the optimal wedges in the second-
best allocation, while assuming separability of the marginal tax rates.
A.4.3 Parametrization
For the figures in the main text we used the following parameterization: α = β = ξ =
ζ = 1.5. In addition, we chose γY = γl = δY = δl = 1. Finally, the planner is assumed to
be utilitarian such that ν = 0. This yields the following set of equations:
SW =
1
f
J∑
j=1
1
1− νU
1−ν
j
U = Up + Uc
Up = log (Y )− 1
1.5
2∑
i=1
(
Xi
n
)1.5
− 1
1.5
(
X1X2
n2
)1.5
,
Uc = log (Y )− 1
1.5
2∑
i=1
(
Xi
n
)1.5
+
1
1.5
(
X1X2
n2
)1.5
,
0 ≥
J∑
j=1
Y j −Xj1 −Xj2 .
We programmed this optimization problem in Matlab. Codes are available upon
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Appendices As Easy as ABC?
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. The first order condition for incentive compatibility, in a local maximum, is given
by:
0p =
∂u (x∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n)
∂m
|m=n,
= x∗′ (n)T ux (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) + uy (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) y∗′ (n)
T , (B.1)
where 0p denotes a p-column vector of zeros. This can be rewritten to:
y∗′ (n) = s (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)T x∗′ (n) ,
proving equation (3.3).
We can derive (3.5) from (3.2) using the envelope theorem:
V ′ (n) = x∗′ (n)T ux + uyy∗ (n)
T + uTn ,
V ′ (n) = un (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)
T , (B.2)
where the latter equality follows from the first-order conditions.
The second-order conditions of a local maximum are :
∂2u (x∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n)
∂m2
|m=n l 0, (B.3)
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Where l0 denotes the negative semi-definiteness of the matrix.
Taking the derivative of (B.2) with respect to m gives:
∂2u (x∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n)
∂m2
=
(
ux (x
∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n)T ⊗ Ip
)
x∗
′′
(m)
+x∗′ (m)T uxx (x∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n) x∗′ (m)
+uyy (x
∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n) y∗′ (m) y∗′ (m)T
+uy (x
∗ (m) ,y∗ (m) ,n) y∗
′′
(m) . (B.4)
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
To simplify this expression we take the total derivative of the first order condition
(B.1):
Dn0p = Dn
[
x∗′ (n)T ux (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) + uy (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) y∗′ (n)
T
]
(B.5)
0p×p =
(
ux (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)T ⊗ Ip
)
x∗
′′
(n)T + x∗′ (n)T uxx (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) x∗′ (n) +
uyy (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) y∗′ (n) y∗′ (n)T + uy (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) y∗
′′
(n) +
x∗′ (n)T uxn (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) + y∗′ (n)
T uyn (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) , (B.6)
Now combine equations (B.5,B.3,B.4) to get the following expression:
0 m
(
ux (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)T ⊗ Ip
)
x∗
′′
(n)T + x∗′ (n)T uxx (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) x∗′ (n) +
uyy (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) y∗′ (n) y∗′ (n)T + uy (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) y∗
′′
(n)− 0p×p
0 m x∗′ (n)T uxn (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) + y∗′ (n)T uyn (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) . (B.7)
Then partially differentiate the vector of shadow prices with respect to n to get:
sn =
−uxnuy + uxuyn
(uy)
2
uxn = −snuy − suyn,
and substitute this result and (3.3) into (B.7) to yield
0 m x∗′ (n)T (−snuy − suyn) + y∗′ (n)T uyn
0 l x∗′ (n)T snuy ⇔
0 l x∗′ (n)T sn,
where the final inequality, equation (3.4), follows from the fact that uy > 0.
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An equivalent expression can be derived by totally differentiating, equation (B.2) with
respect to n:
V
′′
(n) = Dun (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)
= x∗′ (n)T uxn (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n) + y∗′ (n)
T uyn (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)
+unn (x
∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)
Now combine this last expression with (B.7) to get the final equation:
V
′′
(n)− unn (x∗ (n) ,y∗ (n) ,n)m 0.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Starting from the first order conditions (3.15), (3.14) and (3.16). First solving
(3.14) for yields η:
η =
λf + uynθ
uy
.
Now substitute this expression into (3.15) and simplify to get the desired equation:
λq′Tf − uxnθ+λf + uynθ
uy
ux = 0k,
λqxif − uxinθ+
λf + uynθ
uy
uxi = 0k,
λf (qxi − si) = uxinθ+uynθs,
qxi − si = (uxin+uynsi)
θ
λf
,
qxi − si =
p∑
j=1
− ∂si
∂nj
θj
uy
λf
,
qxi − si
si
=
p∑
j=1
εxinj × θj
uy
λ
× 1
njf
.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. Proposition 3.7 consists of 2 statements. First, we prove that the separating par-
tition NS is either convex or empty.
Define the types α, β, γ s.t. α, γ ∈ NS and ∃k ∈ (0, 1) s.t.
(1− k)α+kγ = β. Denote by {x˜, y˜} the solution to the full problem, and by u ({x, y},n) =
max{x,y} u(x, y,n|{x˜, y˜}← ⊆ NB) the bunching choice that delivers type n the highest util-
ity from the set of bunching allocations.
Then define the function L(n) = u ({x∗ (n) , y∗ (n)} ,n) − u ({x, y},n). By individual
rationality we know that 0 < L(α),L(γ). Equation (3.6) implies that L is convex and
monotone, and continuity of u implies L is piece-wise continuous. For any 0 < k < 1 it
must be the case that 0 < L( β), and β must also be part of the separating set.
Second we prove that bunching occurs below the boundary ∂NS∩ ∂NB, and only one
such boundary exists.
Since V (n) is continuous, individual rationality requires any type at b ∈ ∂NS∩ ∂NB,
u ({x∗ (b) , y∗ (b)} ,b) = u ({x, y},b). While on the separating set equation (3.5) guar-
antees that the first derivative of u has to be equal to the first-order derivative of v. By
equation (3.6), however, the second-order derivative on the optimal allocation has to be
higher than the second derivative of the utility function on {x, y}, such that the utility
profile of the separating and the bunching partition cross only once for each type, and
they cross at {x∗ (b) , y∗ (b)} for type b. The single-crossing property (3.4) then implies
that this is the unique border and that separation occurs on side of the border where
types have relatively high utility.
This can easily be seen if we assume ∂u
∂ni
> 0 ∀i. In that case, for any type g, with
bj ≤ gj j ∈ {1, .., p} and at least one inequality strict, the utility profile of the optimal
allocation, V (n), has to be higher than u ({x, y},g). For any type g, therefore, (3.5) holds
and the allocation found above the boundary ∂NS∩ ∂NB induces separation. Simulta-
neously, below the boundary equation (3.6) cannot hold, which (together with (3.5) and
continuity of V ) implies that bunching yields a higher utility, such that bunching occurs
there.
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Appendices Who dares?
 1. What is your current professional role? 
 
O  Supervisory board member 
O  CEO, president or director 
O  CFO or controller 
O  COO 
O  Board member 
O  Consultant 
O  Manager 
O  Analyst 
 
2 In which sector does the company operate in which you are active? 
 
O  Automotive 
O  Construction / Materials 
O  Chemistry 
O  Retail / Wholesale 
O  Services 
O  Electronics 
O  Engineering 
O  Pharmacy 
O  Financial institutions 
O  Information 
O  Media 
O  Metal 
O  Non-profit 
O  Oil / Mining 
O  Education / Science 
O  (Semi-)government 
O  Paper / Packaging 
O  Telecommunications 
O  Transport 
O  Utilities (gas / electric / other) 
O  Food and beverages 
 
3 What are your company's annual revenues? 
 
O  Less than € 50 million 
O  Between € 50 and € 100 million 
O  Between € 100 and € 500 million 
O  Between € 500 million and € 1 billion 
O  More than € 1 billion 
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C.1 The Questionaire
 4 How many employees does your company have? 
 
O  Less than 50 
O  Between 50 and 100 
O  Between 100 and 1,000 
O  Between 1,000 and 10,000 
O  More than 10,000 
 
 
Your background 
 
5 How often were you involved in making the following investment decisions in the last 
fifteen years? 
 Never 1 to 5 times 5 to 10 times 10 to 15 times 
More than 15 
times 
Expansion into 
new markets 
     
Expansion of 
production 
capacity 
     
An innovation or 
R&D process 
     
An IT project      
An acquisition      
 
 
6 What is the typical size (in % of annual turnover of the company) of the following 
investment decisions that you have dealt with? 
 
 
Not 
applic
able 
1% 2% 3% 4% 
5%-
10% 
10%-
20% 
20%-
30% 
30%-
40% 
40%-
50% 
More 
than 
50% 
Expansion into new 
markets            
Expansion of 
production 
capacity 
           
An innovation or 
R&D process            
An IT-project            
An acquisition            
 
 
Scenario 1 
 
7 Suppose you are asked to assess the following investment opportunity: 
 
In a strategy meeting it became clear that expansion of your business is 
possible by establishing a new marketing channel abroad. Your marketing 
and sales department estimates the cost at € [amount] million. If this plan 
fails, your company loses this amount, but there is no further damage. 
Whether the channel can fulfill the high expectations is still unclear. Your 
marketing and sales department estimates the probability of success to be 
[success rate]. 
 
 
What should be the minimum net present value (the value of the revenues after deduction 
of the investment discounted back to today) of this investment, would you, in your role, 
agree with this investment? 
 
 
8 How risky do you consider this investment? 
 Riskless   
Neither 
riskless 
nor 
risky 
  
Very 
risky 
I find this investment        
 
 
Scenario 2 
 
9 Suppose you are asked to assess the following investment opportunity: 
 
Your company considers taking a big step in its development by up scaling 
the production. This involves a total investment of € [amount] million. If it 
turns out that the up-scaling is not maintainable in the future, your business 
will lose this investment, but there is no further damage. The probability that 
up-scaling is successful is currently estimated to be [success rate]. 
 
 
What should be the minimum net present value (the value of the revenues after deduction 
of the investment discounted back to today) of this expansion of capacity, would you, in 
your role, agree with this investment? 
 
10 How risky do you consider this investment? 
 Riskless   
Neither 
riskless 
nor 
risky 
  
Very 
risky 
I find this investment        
 
Scenario 3 
 
11 Suppose you are asked to assess the following investment opportunity: 
 
Your R&D department suggests establishing a new manufacturing technique 
within the current conduct of business. To find out whether this technique is 
applicable, research has to be done. If it turns out that the new technique is 
not applicable, your company loses the research costs, but there is no further 
damage. Development costs are estimated at € [amount] million. The 
probability that the production technology will be applicable it is estimated to 
be [success rate]. 
 
   
What should be the minimum net present value (the value of the revenues after deduction 
of the investment discounted back to today) of this project, would you, in your role agree 
with this investment? 
 
 
12 How risky do you consider this investment? 
 Riskless   
Neither 
riskless 
nor 
risky 
  
Very 
risky 
I find this investment        
 
 
Scenario 4 
 
13 Suppose you are asked to assess the following investment opportunity: 
 
The IT department of your company considers using a different system, 
which in time can lead to a significant savings in costs. The costs for the 
introduction of the system are € [amount] million. If it appears that the new 
system cannot fulfill the expectations, your company loses this amount, but 
there is no further damage. Whether the system can fulfill the high 
expectations, is still unclear. Your IT department currently estimates this 
probability to be [success rate]. 
 
 
What should be the minimum net present value (the value of the revenues after deduction 
of the investment discounted back to today) of this IT-project, would you, in your role, 
agree with this investment? 
 
 
 
14 How risky do you consider this investment? 
 Riskless   
Neither 
riskless 
nor 
risky 
  
Very 
risky 
I find this investment        
 
 
15 How do you rate yourself: Are you in general a person who is willing to take risks or are 
you someone who tries to avoid risks? 
 
Please fill in the scale where a value of 0 means "Not at all willing to take risks" and the 
value 10 means "very willing to take risks". 
 
0: Not 
at all 
willing 
to take 
risks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10: 
Very 
willing 
to take 
risks 
           
 
 
16 Are you, in your role in the company, willing to take risks or do you try to avoid risks? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
           
 
 
17 How do you assess an average CEO, president or director in his or her role: Is that a 
person who is willing to take risks or is that someone who tries to avoid risks? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
           
 
 
18 How do you assess an average CFO or controller in his or her role: Is that a person who 
is willing to take risks or is that someone who tries to avoid risks? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
           
 
 
19 How do you assess an average non-executive (like a commissioner or regulator) in his or 
her role: Is that a person who is willing to take risks or is that someone who tries to avoid 
risks? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
           
 
 
20 What is your main background?  
O  Entrepreneur  
O  Specialist (among which accountants, doctors and lawyers)  
O  Finance 
O  Marketing/Sales  
O  Operations  
O  Other  
 
 
21 Did you use a calculator to answer this questionnaire?  
O  Yes 
O  No  
 
 
22 What is your date of birth? 
 
 
23 What is your gender?  
O  Male  
O  Female  
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C.2 Summary Statistics
Table C.1: Summary Statistics
1. What is your current professional role?
O Supervisory board member 15.1 %
O CEO, president or director 16.8 %
O CFO or controller 20.9 %
O COO 1.0 %
O Board member 2.7 %
O Consultant 15.1 %
O Manager 22.6 %
O Analyst 5.1 %
2. What is your company’s annual revenue?
O Less than e50 million 28.4 %
O Between e50 and e100 million 11.0 %
O Between e100 and e500 million 18.8 %
O Between e500 million and e1 billion 8.2 %
O More than e1 billion 32.9 %
3. How many employees does your company have?
O Less than 50 14.7 %
O Between 50 and 100 8.9 %
O Between 100 and 1,000 29.5 %
O Between 1,000 and 10,000 25%
O More than 10,000 10.5 %
Note: Due to missing values, the percentages do not add up to 100%
mean std.dev min max
Used calculator 0.12 0.3262 0 1
Private willingness to take risks 7.07 1.75 2 11
age 46 11 24 68
confidence 0.847 1.46 -2 5
Appendix D
Appendices Career Concerned
Managers
D.1 Message coding
Coding messages
1
Good
Good here
It’s good
My info is good
My info says invest
Investment good here
Good advice
Mine is good
good news
I have good
Ik heb goed
Goed
-1
Bad here
Bad
It’s bad
My info is bad
My info says not invest
My one says bad
Investment bad
Bad news
I have bad
Ik heb slecht
Slecht
0
Good?
Bad?
Invest
Not invest
Yes
Yes?
I prefer not invest
I prefer invest
I would go for not invest
I would go for invest
coding depends on message sent within group before that
Me too
Same here
Table D.1: Coding of messages in chat box
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Instructions 
The experiment will consist out of 18 rounds, 3 trial rounds and 15 paid rounds, followed by a 
questionnaire. The first three rounds are trial rounds and do not influence your payment, so you can use 
them to get to know the game and the environment. From the 4th round (1st non-trial round) on your 
decisions will influence your payment. The top left box of the screen always displays what round you are in 
and whether or not it is a trial round. 
 At the start of the experiment you will be randomly linked to another player. Each of these pairs is then 
randomly assigned a role. Half of the pairs will be committee members; the other half will be bidders.  Both 
the player you are matched with and the role you are assigned at the beginning of the experiment remain 
the same during the experiment.   
During the experiment you can earn points. At the end of the experiment all earned points will be 
converted into Euros at a fixed exchange rate and will be paid to you by the experimenter. The exchange 
rate will be shown on your computer screen during the experiments and will remain constant during the 
experiment.  
Below the tasks of both types of players are explained with screen shots. In the screen shots some areas 
are marked for explanatory purposes. The marks do not appear in the actual experiments. The values of 
different variables in the screenshots are examples and you can (and will) see different values during the 
experiment. 
Note that during the game you will only see the screens belonging to your role, and not the other screens. 
Before the actual experiment starts you will get a small quiz to check your understanding of the game. After 
the quiz your role will be randomly drawn by the computer and the game begins. 
For ease of notation the instruction only uses male pro-nouns.   
D.2 Experiment Instructions 135
D.2 Experiment Instructions
2 | P a g e  
 
The tasks: committee members 
Each round, each committee gets the opportunity to invest. The investment opportunity is either good or 
bad in quality both with 50% probability. The investment decision influences the committee members’ pay-
offs. At the end of the round the investment pay-offs are calculated by the computer: not investing yields 0 
with certainty, while investing yields 100 points if it is a good investment and -120 points if it is a bad 
investment. The quality of an investment opportunity does not depend on the quality of any other 
investment opportunity within the same round or within another round. The investment opportunity is 
presented on a screen like the one below (without the colored numbers): 
 
In the center of the screen (indicated with 1) each committee member sees his own information. Each 
round each individual committee member has a 50% chance of getting correct information and a 50% 
chance of getting random information. Correct information suggests that the investment opportunity is 
“good” when it is actually good and it suggests that the investment is “bad” when the investment 
opportunity is bad. Random information suggests either “good” or “bad” at random with a 50% chance for 
either, independent of the quality of the investment. A committee member does not know whether he has 
received correct information or random information. Every round all information is renewed, so having 
correct information in one round does not influence the chance of having correct information in the next 
round. 
During this stage the committee members can communicate through the chat window on the left side of 
the screen (indicated with 2). Communication is private, so only the two committee members in each 
committee can see what they are saying to each other.  
The committee members have to vote in favor of “Invest” or “Don’t invest” (indicated with 3). If both 
committee members vote in favor of “invest”, the investment takes place. If one or both committee 
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member(s) vote(s) in favor of “Don’t invest”, the investment does not take place this round. Each round a 
new investment opportunity is created for all committees.  
After voting, all committee members go to the next stage:  
 
In the center, the top box (indicated with 1) of the screen each committee member is informed about the 
investment decision taken by his committee, and reminded of what his information suggested. Then he is 
asked to send a message to the four bidders that are matched to his committee about his confidence in the 
decision taken by his committee. The message is on a 5 point scale, ranging from “very doubtful” to “very 
confident”. The message should be entered in the center of the screen in the lower box (indicated with 2). 
The message and the decision taken by the committee are then displayed to two pairs of bidders in the 
next stage of the round. The bidders’ task is to hire committee members to invest for him. The bidders 
compete in pairs in an auction to determine the wage levels. For each individual committee member the 
highest bidder is determined and he pays a wage equal to the other bid.  The committee members receive 
the prices paid by both winners of the auction as wage earnings.   
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At the end of the round each committee member sees how much he earned in the auction and from the 
investment if one is made.  
 
In the center of the screen the total pay-off of the round is displayed (indicated in blue). Both the profit 
made in this round and the total profit, the sum of all points earned in all rounds up to that point, are 
displayed. Note that in the example screen the player is still in a trial period. Trial periods do not influence 
your final pay-off such that the total profit in the example is 0. Whether or not you are in a trial period is 
always visible in the top of your screen (indicated with a red circle). The wage earnings are determined by 
two auctions, they are the sum of the payments made by the two winning bidders. The result screen 
disappears after clicking “OK”, or after 30 seconds automatically and then the next round begins. If you 
make losses these will be deducted from your show-up fee. 
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The tasks: bidders 
Each bidder can earn money by hiring investors with good information. He makes 4 wage offers each round 
by submitting bids for the services of the four individual committee members. Each round two committees 
are randomly matched to two pairs of bidders. Each bidder’s screen will display information about the 4 
committee members in these 2 committees. One committee is displayed on the left-hand side of the screen 
and the other committee is displayed at the right-hand side of the screen. 
In the screen above each bidder observes whether or not each committee invested and the message sent 
by each individual committee member (indicated in red only on the left), ranging from “very doubtful” to 
“very confident”. Each bidder then competes in an auction against one other bidder by submitting a bid 
between 0 and 50 points for each individual committee member. The four bids are submitted by typing 
them in the appropriate boxes (indicated only on the right in blue) and pressing “OK”. The bids are 
compared for each individual committee member and the highest bidder of the pair wins. In case of a draw 
the computer randomly determines the winner.  
The winner of an auction gets the services of that committee member for this round and pays a wage equal 
to the loosing bid. The value of the services is 50 points if the committee member had correct information 
and 5 points if the committee member had random information. Note, the winner does not pay his own bid 
but a price that is below or equal to his bid, and the minimum value of the services of a bidder is 5 points. 
Recall: the chance a committee member receives correct information a particular round is 50%. Also note 
that the quality of the investment opportunities of the two committees is independent of each other. 
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After each round the bidders see their results in a screen like the one below.   
 
In the center of the screen the pay-off of the round is displayed (indicated in blue). Both the profit made in 
this round and the total profit, the sum of all points earned in all rounds up to that point, are displayed. 
Note that in the example screen the player is still in a trial period. Trial periods do not influence your final 
pay-off such that the total profit in the example is 0. Whether or not you are in a trial period is always 
visible in the top of your screen (indicated with a red circle). The result screen disappears after clicking “OK” 
or after 30 seconds automatically and then the next round begins. If you make losses these will be 
deducted from your show-up fee. 
 The committees and committee members are displayed in the same order as in the auction screen. So a 
bidder can easily see which of the auctions he won and which he lost. Note that each round the 
committees are randomly reordered. Furthermore, whether any particular committee member is 
presented as first or as second member (top or bottom on the auction and result screen) is also randomly 
varied per round. It is therefore impossible to track an individual committee member by his position on a 
bidder’s screen between different rounds. Only for the auction and the result screen in a single round the 
order is the same. 
Summary conclusions
This dissertation deals with some aspects related to gaming, that is, it deals with people that
try to take advantage of vulnerabilities and predictabilities in a system.
The first two chapters investigate, in the special case of the tax-system, the requirements on
the environment and individuals for gaming to be a problem. Although the first chapter does
not present a strict boundary (no necessary conditions are given), a sufficient conditions for the
absence of gaming can be provided. Individuals need to have both the opportunity and the
desire to deviate from the planners plan. The individuals need to have enough possible choices
to be able to deviate from the planner’s plan and they need to have a sufficient disagreement
with the planner on what is desirable, before they game the system. Although these results seem
straightforward, the description of our results shows that most models in the optimal taxation
literature satisfy the sufficient conditions for the absence of gaming and that straightforward
generalizations of the existing models can be solved. This is both an optimistic and a cautionary
tale. On the one hand, it validates much research that has been done and shows how the results
of that research can translate into practical outcomes. Our results show that most outcomes
from the workhorse model can be translated to a more generalized setting and thus are not
particular to the relatively simple models used. On the other hand, however, it shows that much
of the literature focuses on a very special model where there are no externalities, no interactions
between individuals’ utility and the planner has access to a set of incredibly powerful tools.
Ironically enough, we can now show that in this special case the planner actually does not need
all of these tools, he can do with a slightly less powerful set. What happens outside of this
special case, or when the planner has less tools, has not been studied quite as extensively yet,
this could provide an interesting avenue for further research.
The next chapter studies the problem of a planner that wants to redistribute from the ’haves’
to the ’have-nots’. Such models have traditionally been single dimensional. They are tradition-
ally based on the assumption that differences between individuals can be summarized in a single
number, usually assumed to be earnings ability, and individuals make a single dimensional choice,
the amount of money they earn. We add to this literature by allowing individuals to differ in
many aspects and make even more choices. In this generalized model we derive the Nash-
equilibrium using the standard first-order approach. We show how the Nash-equilibrium in this
generalized model relates to that of the single dimensional model by deriving generalizations of
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some of the most well-known results in the literature. We show that the equilibrium forces in the
model can still be summarized by the famous ABC-formula: the second best allocation is char-
acterized by the benefits of redistribution, the efficiency cost of the choice distortions and some
aspects of the type-distribution. Using this description we can show that the Atkinson-Stiglitz
theorem, that shows that indirect taxation is superfluous, is particular to the single-dimensional
setting. Only if the planner wants to redistribute in just one dimension, can indirect taxation
be superfluous. In general the planner will need as many tax tools as there are dimensions
of heterogeneity. In similar vein, it is shown that Mirrlees’ (1976) result of separability of the
marginal tax rates also does not generalize. If individuals are different in several dimensions and
the planner therefore has to use several tax-instruments, these instruments will generally depend
on each other. This is the first theoretical result that could explain why many universal health
care systems, systems that redistribute from healthy to unhealthy, have payments that depend
on the income of the recipient, and are thus tied into the income redistribution. Furthermore,
we show that a no-distortion at the top/bottom result holds in this generalized model just as in
the uni-dimensional model, that individuals at the low-end of the health and ability distribution
might be bunched, as well as link our model to a new strand of the existing literature.
For gaming to be a serious issue, the individuals have to understand their environment and
the strategic interactions within it. The last two chapters therefore turn to behavior of the
individuals to see how they respond to stimuli and whether our theoretical models can predict
their behavior.
The third chapter presents us with something of a puzzle in this regard. The results of our
dynamic survey show that experienced players like corporate directors are influenced not just
by their environment and their preferences (as assumed by theory), but also by the role they
are assigned in the decision process. Although this could be a consequence of informational
asymmetries in the normal day-to-day operation of their companies and the response could be
appropriate there, this asymmetry does not exist in our survey. The fact that the effect of
role persists implies that it is not a calculated rational response to the environment at hand,
but comes from somewhere else. The role patterns found, moreover, do not comply with the
expectations of the respondents themselves. The respondents indicate they expect the CEO to
be most willing to take risks on average. If we ask the respondents to make investment decisions,
however, it is the average CFO that is willing to take most risks. The divergence between the
expectations of the executives and the choices of these executives creates another puzzle, if they
know their environment as well as we assume in theory, this difference should not exist. In the
end this chapter leaves the reader as many questions as it answers, but it does show that our
approach to studying this hard to reach group is a viable one, so that we can hope to answer
them at some later time.
The fourth chapter focuses directly on individuals’ strategic interactions. In a series of
experiments half of the subjects, our committees of experts, were given private information and
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the incentive to ’fool’ the other half, the reputational market, into thinking they are able experts.
The difficult thing was that each expert created several signals and each market participant saw
the signals created by 4 experts. Like in the real world, the market has a plethora of signals it
can respond to. In theory this multitude of signals should not matter, theory predicts that some
of them contain information while others are useless, while both the market and the experts
should realize which is which. In our experiments the predictions did not bear out as crisp as in
theory. All signals created by the experts seem to contain some information, which means our
experts are not maximizing pay-offs. There are also indications that the market is not behaving
fully optimal. However, the theory correctly predicts which signals contain most information
and are most important to the market. Theory also correctly predicts how the experts will
respond to the incentives created by the market, they falsify the signals of ability that are most
easily (or cheaply) falsified and try to convince the market of their value. So although there are
clear differences between theoretical predictions and observed behavior, the theory is accurate
enough to help us identify environments in which career concerns of informed experts can cause
problems, without actually having to be an expert in this environment. This implies that we
can hope to use theoretical analysis to identify problems created by career concerns, and design
procedures that are less susceptible to gaming by the experts, without being an expert in each
individual field.

Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Deze dissertatie behandelt aspecten gerelateerd aan het begrip ”gaming”, dit is het gedrag van
mensen die misbruik maken van voorspelbare reacties of zwakheden van het systeem om er zelf
beter van te worden.
Hoofdstuk twee en drie bestuderen, in het speciale geval van een belastingsysteem, welke
eigenschappen van de omgeving en individuen ervoor zorgen dat het systeem gevoelig is voor
misbruik. Hoewel het tweede hoofdstuk geen strikte grens aangeeft (we hebben geen noodzakeli-
jke condities kunnen vinden), geeft het wel een voldoende voorwaarde voor de afwezigheid van dit
misbruik. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat individuen zowel de mogelijkheid als de wil moeten hebben
om af te wijken, voordat gaming plaatsvindt. Dit betekent dat ze voldoende keuzemogelijkheden
moeten hebben om van het plan van de planner af te wijken en het voldoende oneens moeten
zijn met de planner, voordat individuen daadwerkelijk misbruik proberen te maken van het sys-
teem. Hoewel deze resultaten vanzelfsprekend lijken, is het bewijs verre van dat. Het bewijs
en de beschrijving van de voorwaarden laten zien dat de meeste modellen in de literatuur over
optimale belastingsystemen voldoen aan de condities voor de afwezigheid van misbruik. Sterker
nog, onze resultaten zijn van toepassing op veel meer modellen dan degenen die gebruikt worden
in de literatuur. De resultaten zijn zowel positief als een waarschuwing voor de literatuur. Aan
de ene kant laten ze zien hoe de resultaten uit de literatuur, en veel potentie¨le resultaten uit
mogelijke uitbreidingen, omgezet kunnen worden naar een praktisch belastingsysteem. Aan de
andere kant laten ze zien dat heel veel van de literatuur focust op een heel bijzondere setting,
zonder externaliteiten, zonder interacties in de nutsfuncties van individuen en met een planner
met zeer krachtige instrumenten. Ironisch genoeg laten onze resultaten zien dat de planner in
deze setting niet al die instrumenten nodig heeft, hij kan met een kleinere set aan instrumenten
af. Wat er gebeurt als we niet in deze bijzondere setting zitten, of als de planner een kleinere
set aan instrumenten heeft, is een stuk minder bestudeerd en kan een zeer interessante richting
zijn voor toekomstig onderzoek.
Het derde hoofdstuk bestudeert het probleem van de centrale planner die wil herverdelen van
individuen die het ”goed” hebben naar mensen die het ”slecht” hebben. Zulke modellen bestaan
al vrij lang, maar traditioneel zijn ze eendimensionaal: ze zijn gebaseerd op de assumptie dat
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individuen slechts verschillen in hun vermogen om geld te verdienen en de enkele keuze maken
hoeveel geld te verdienen. Onze toevoeging op de bestaande modellen is dat we toestaan dat
individuen verschillen in veel eigenschappen en meer keuzes maken. In dit algemenere model
laten we zien hoe de meest bekende resultaten uit de eendimensionale literatuur generaliseren
naar dit algemener model. In beide modellen wordt de optimale herverdeling bepaald door een
drietal krachten: A, het nut dat de planner ontleend aan de herverdeling, B, het verlies dat
veroorzaakt wordt door de verstoorde keuzes ten gevolge van de belastingen en C, de verdeling
van de types waartussen herverdeling plaatsvindt. Deze beschrijving, die bekend staat als de
ABC-formule, is e´e´n van de handigste manieren gebleken om het eendimensionale model naar
data te brengen. Dat er een directe meerdimensionale versie bestaat is daarom zeer hoopvol
voor toekomstig onderzoek. De hoeveelheid eigenschappen waarin individuen verschillen heeft
echter ook invloed op de belastingmaatregelen die de planner nodig heeft. In een eendimen-
sionaal model heeft de planner maar e´e´n maatregel nodig, de inkomstenbelasting. Dit resultaat
(het Atkinson-Stiglitz theorema) generaliseert niet naar meerdere dimensies. Als de planner wil
herverdelen in meerdere eigenschappen, dan heeft hij ook meerdere maatregelen nodig. Als we
willen herverdelen van gezonde naar minder gezonde mensen, terwijl we tegelijkertijd van mensen
met een hoog naar mensen met een laag inkomen herverdelen, dan hebben we daar twee ingrepen
voor nodig, bijvoorbeeld een algemene gezondheidsverzekering en de inkomstenbelasting. Deze
twee ingrepen moeten ook nog onderling afhankelijk zijn. Die afhankelijkheid zien we wel in de
praktijk, maar was theoretisch nog nooit verklaard. Een regeling waarbij de inkomstenbelasting
afhankelijk is van de hoeveelheid ziektekosten (bijvoorbeeld door belastingvoordelen voor chro-
nisch zieken zoals in de Nederlandse Wtcg), kan heel goed verklaard worden door een planner
die herverdeeld in gezondheid en inkomen. Het hoofdstuk laat ook een paar generalisaties van
technische resultaten zien, die de link tussen het eendimensionale en meerdimensionale model
duidelijk laten zien en het model ook duidelijker plaatsen in de relatie met andere meerdimen-
sionale ’screening’ problemen, zoals de monopolist of veilingmeester die een aantal productlijnen
probeert te verkopen.
Voordat misbruik van het systeem een serieus probleem kan zijn moeten de individuen in het
systeem hun omgeving en de interacties in deze omgeving voldoende begrijpen. De laatste twee
hoofdstukken van deze dissertatie behandelen daarom het gedrag van individuen om te zien hoe
ze reageren op prikkels en of onze theoretische modellen hun gedrag kunnen voorspellen.
Het vierde hoofdstuk levert in dit opzicht een aantal vragen op. De survey resultaten laten
zien dat bedrijfsdirecteuren niet alleen door hun omgeving en preferenties beA˜¯nvloedt worden,
maar ook door hun rol in het besluitvormingsproces. De verschillen in reacties zouden een conse-
quentie kunnen zijn van informatie asymmetrie in de normale gang van zaken. Dat dit roleffect
blijft bestaan in onze survey impliceert dat het geen ingecalculeerde respons is op de directe
omstandigheden, maar ergens anders vandaan komt. In de survey bestaat geen informatieasym-
metrie en is het roleffect dus niet rationeel. De rolpatronen komen ook niet overeen met de
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verwachtingen van onze respondenten. De respondenten geven aan dat ze, van alle directeuren,
de gemiddelde CEO als meest risicotolerant schatten. Als we kijken naar de manier waarop de
directeuren investeringsvraagstukken beantwoorden, dan blijkt echter de CFO gemiddeld risico-
toleranter te zijn. Dit verschil tussen verwachtingen en uitkomsten is net zo onverwacht als de
rolpatronen zelf. Als we er van uitgaan dat de directeuren hun omgeving en de mensen daarin
goed kennen, dan zou dit verschil er eigenlijk niet moeten zijn. Met deze bevindingen levert
dit hoofdstuk dus net zo veel vragen op als ze beantwoordt. Het onderzoek laat wel zien dat
onze onderzoeksaanpak het mogelijk maakt om het gedrag van deze moeilijk te bereiken groep
te bestuderen. Er is dus goede hoop dat de vragen in de toekomst beantwoordt kunnen worden.
Het vijfde hoofdstuk focust op strategische interacties tussen individuen, labsubjecten in dit
geval. In de experimenten worden de helft van de subjecten aangewezen als experts, zij kregen
private informatie en financie¨le prikkels om de andere helft van de subjecten, de reputatie markt,
te overtuigen dat ze goed zijn in het nemen van de relevante besluiten. De grote moeilijkheid
in het experiment was, dat elke expert meerdere signalen kon gebruiken om met de markt te
communiceren en iedere marktparticipant de signalen van 4 experts zag. Dit geeft de markt,
net als in de echte wereld, een plethora aan signalen waar ze op zou kunnen reageren. In
theorie zou de hoeveelheid signalen niet uit moeten maken, sommige signalen zijn moeilijk te
vervalsen en zouden informatie kunnen bevatten, anderen zijn gemakkelijk te vervalsen en zouden
geen informatie moeten bevatten. De theorie voorspelt precies welke signalen geloofd kunnen
worden en welke genegeerd moeten worden. Zowel de theoretische markt, als de experts in de
theorie snappen dit en dus realiseren ze zich op welke signalen ze zouden moeten focussen. In
ons experiment zijn de uitkomsten iets minder scherp dan de theorie. Alle signalen bevatten
enige informatie, wat laat zien dat onze experts het spel niet perfect spelen, en er zijn kleine
aanwijzingen dat ook de markt niet perfect reageert op de signalen. Als we kijken naar het
belang van de signalen, dan blijkt wel dat de signalen die door de theorie aangewezen worden
als informatief, meer informatie bevatten dan de theoretisch nutteloze signalen. De markt hecht
ook meer waarde aan deze informatieve signalen. De theorie geeft aan dat de experts de simpel
te vervalsen signalen gaan vervalsen, als de markt ze positief waardeert en dat is ook precies wat
er gebeurd. Dus, ondanks dat er duidelijke afwijkingen zijn van de theoretische voorspellingen,
is de theorie accuraat genoeg om situaties te identificeren waar carriA˜sˇre- overwegingen van
experts problemen op kunnen leveren, zonder dat we een expert hoeven te zijn in deze specifieke
situaties. We kunnen de theoretische analyse dus gebruiken om het besluitvormingsproces zo
in te richten dat de mogelijke negatieve gevolgen van carriA˜sˇreoverwegingen beperkt worden,
zonder experts te hoeven worden op het inhoudelijke vlak van het besluitvormingsproces.
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